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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis argues that the nature of  disability is, currently, fundamentally 
misunderstood. Current approaches to disability are nounal and seek to determine the 
locus of  disability with the intention of  better understanding the phenomenon of  
disability. In contrast, this thesis offers an adverbial perspective on disability and shows 
how disability is experienced as an increased and personally irremediable impediment 
to daily-living tasks or broader goals. This impediment is not a function of  either 
biological individuality or the Social, but of  a specific relation between the individual 
and their environment. The following delineates the Picture Theory of  Disability — a 
mechanism for the evaluation of  the experience of  disability and a heuristic device for 
the proper interpretation of  disability. The theory is born of  Humean sentimentalism 
and elements of  Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory of  Language, and shows when, where, 
and how disability is experienced.  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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Forward 
During my formative years I lobbied the British Government as an ally of  the 
Disability Rights Movement (DRM) in the UK. Many years passed between that and 
my return to academia, but when my interests in working toward the goals of  the 
DRM were re-awakened by a seminal class held at my university, where I investigated 
the phenomena of  disability with more philosophically rigorous methodology. This 
thesis is the result of  that investigation. 
	 From the outset, it seemed obvious to me that were anyone to speak properly 
about disability, then what was meant by ‘disability’ needed to be clearly understood. 
Yet there appeared to be no consensus of  opinion over what was and was not 
‘disability’ — the more material I read, the worse the situation became. Even more 
worrying was that the definition of  disability with which the DRM identified, and 
which I was, by default, supporting all those years ago (the British social model) no 
longer seemed to me to be consistent or accurate. The result of  my ruminations on the 
phenomena of  disability was that every model which sought to describe the 
phenomena involved some fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of  
disability, and so everything about disability which followed from that 
misunderstanding was flawed. Each model or theory of  disability I investigated sought 
to locate disability in a different place: the social model maintains that disability is a 
function of  the beliefs and expectations of  society, the medical model believes that 
disability is a function of  deviance from species-typical norm, and relational models 
seek to offer some syncretism of  the medical and social models. The misunderstanding 
1
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that I had identified, then, was the idea that disability is the sort of  thing you can 
locate in something — that ‘disability’ is a noun which denotes a thing possessed by a 
person, the person’s environment, or some combination of  the two. 
	 The intent of  the models might be parsed something like this: ‘if  a locus for 
disability were to be found, then we might use that information to overcome 
oppression and inequality by mitigating that disability’. However, there seem to be two 
flaws with this approach:  
(1) The antecedent presumes that such a locus is discoverable, and  
(2) The consequent assumes that finding such a locus would indicate 
how to remove the disability. 
It is not at all clear from (1) that any such locus is determinable — and even if  it were, 
it does not necessarily follow from (2) that if  a locus of  disability were to be found that 
such a discovery would aid or result in the emancipation of  the disabled community. 
By adopting a locus-orientated approach the ‘lumpy-rug problem’ is encountered: No 
matter where you sweep the dust to hide the problem, you are going to end up with a 
bulge in the rug which won't go away. In the same way, no matter how the various 
models try to fully define disability facets of  the phenomenon stubbornly refuse to be 
subsumed within the model.  
	 Moreover, I am not at all sure that disability is the sort of  thing which can be 
found in a particular locus. If  it were that sort of  a thing, then it would follow that 
disability should be denoted by nouns — yet, it seems clear to me that ‘disability’ is 
adverbial: it is a kind of  experience. To experience ‘disability’ is to experience a 
personally irremediable impediment to the achievement of  a socially interesting or 
!2
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important goal, from brushing one’s teeth to pursuing a career.  The experience of  1
disability is the modification of  a verb — the modification is an aspect of  a ‘doing’  2
rather than a ‘something’. In particular, paying attention to the manner in which the 
verb is being modified tells us how an action is being blocked for a particular person in 
particular circumstances. Trying to locate ‘disability’ is, thus, like trying to find 
‘hurriedly’. Simply put, the social, medical, and relational models make a category 
error: disability is an aspect of  human actions and it changes with the person, their 
environment, and the action in question. 
1.1.1 A Note on Terminology 
Over the past 20 or 30 years, it has become widely accepted that the language and 
concepts used in disability studies — as in all studies — should be carefully selected 
and respectful. Language use reflects our understanding of  the social world, and 
informs our perceptions of  it;  it is also powerful and its misuse may reduce the 3
effectiveness of  a work of  praxis. The use of  older terms, such as ‘cripple’, ‘deformed’, 
and ‘spastic’ have come to be considered oppressive and have, appropriately, become 
improper. Unfortunately, as is the wont of  language, their historic or original meanings 
have not always been entirely or accurately replaced.  For instance, the use of  the 4
 I am thankful to my supervisor, Michael Stingl, for thoughts on how best to define my 1
general idea of  disability. To the definition here footnoted, I would like the reader to also have in 
mind ‘unremitting’ in the sense of  ‘chronic’. I do not use ‘chronic’ in the thesis as I wish to avoid 
the medical overtones which it presents. 
 By ‘doing’, I mean to say a kind of  action or verb orientated thing — rather than an 2
entity or a noun sort of  thing.
 Barnes, Colin, and Mercer, “The Individual or Medical Model of  ‘Disability'," in 3
Exploring Disability, 11. Second ed. (Malden; MA: Polity Press, 2010), 11.
 Ibid.4
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word ‘handicap’ is disapproved of  in the UK, yet it is still largely accepted in both 
Australia and the United States of  America in terms like ‘handicapped access’ and 
‘handicapped placard’.   5
	 As a British academic, I am more sensitive to the preferences of  British 
disabled persons; I, consequently, choose to adopt those locutions used by the 
community with whom I have worked and socialised. I mention this at the outset in 
the hope that the language adopted in this thesis is not taken for ignorance or a lack of  
respect, but in the knowledge that it accords with the language used by British disabled 
persons. An example of  this British ‘persuasion’ can be found in my preference for the 
locution ‘disabled persons’ rather than ‘persons with disabilities’.  The development of  6
the disability rights movement in the UK in the early ‘70s resulted in a model of  
disability which focussed on society’s responsibility for the disability which impaired 
persons experienced.  As a result, the disability rights movement prefer the term 7
‘disabled people’ as it highlights ‘how society disables people’. In contrast, the 
preferred North American locution ‘people with disabilities’ was generated as a 
politically correct term that intended to place the person ahead of  the disability.  8
Ironically, in the UK such a term is perceived as stigmatising the individual by 
 Barnes and Mercer. 2010. 11; Forward to: Ron Amundson, “Disability, Handicap, and 5
The Environment”, Journal of  Social Philosophy no. 23 (1992): 105-19. 
 Because the Picture Theory of  Disability considers ‘disability’ to be adverbial, I would 6
prefer that members of  the disabled community be referred to as ‘persons experiencing a 
disability’. However, that is a mouthful, and so I use the terms interchangeably.
 Shakespeare, Tom. Disability Rights and Wrongs Revisited. Second ed. Abingdon, Oxon.: 7
Routledge, 2014.
 Shakespeare, (2014), 19.; Barnes and Mercer. 2010. 118
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individualising them. Since I don't think ‘disability’ applies to people, per sē, but more 
correctly to their ‘doings’, I have elected to use both terms interchangeably.  9
	 Though I recognise that the terminology used here may strike people as 
improper at times, I wish the reader to understand that no offence to any group or 
individual is intended — and that, as often as I can, I shall use terminology with which 
I am familiar (due to my work with the disabled community), or agreed upon in 1981 
at the British Council of  Organisations of  Disabled People (now known as the UK 
Disabled People’s Council). Nevertheless, it should also be pointed out that this thesis 
offers a different interpretation of  disability from others and so existing definitions and 
locutions may not convey the meaning I intend; where this is the case, I have done my 
best to define and describe fully how my interpretation differs from the original. In 
order to aid the reader, an appendix has been included which lists all technical terms 
used in this thesis. Where my use of  a word or phrase differs from the original, my use 
of  the word or phrase is presented alongside that original.  
	 Finally, I should disclose here that I am not, myself, disabled. However, I also 
do not think of  disability as something had by persons — even in relationship to a 
disabling environment. Instead, I think of  disability as an aspect of  ‘doings’ (impeded 
doings of  some sort or other) and what I mean by this is the focus of  this thesis. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Though the word ‘disabled’ has been in use for over 350 years, its definition has 
changed significantly — only coming to refer to “impaired women and children as 
 I would actually prefer the term ‘people who experience disability’, were it not for its 9
circumlocution.
!5
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
well as adult men”  later in the eighteenth century. The current concept of  10
‘disability’, as relating not just to impaired people but also to those elements of  
distributive justice which concern disabled people, is a relatively recent one — largely 
arising after the return to work of  amputee soldiers from the First World War.  That 11
is not to say that there were no disabled people before the World War One, but that it 
is the idea of  disability as we now know it which did not really exist earlier.  For 12
instance, the social response to persons with impairments in the long Eighteenth 
Century was generally more accepting than in our own.  This is not to claim that 13
people were neither shocked or repulsed by “monstrous births” or “freakish… 
bodies,”  but to remark that the exclusion experienced by disabled persons today is 14
arguably greater than it was in the long Eighteenth century: In the Eighteenth Century, 
even though persons with disabilities were often ridiculed or offered up for public 
display,  they were also active members of  the community in a way that they do not 15
 Turner, David M, Disability in Eighteenth-Century England: Imagining Physical Impairment, 10
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 22.
 David Heavy, The Disabled Century, (1999; London: BBC). TV Film.11
 Turner, 2012. 16-22.12
 Ibid. Turner never explicitly claims that the culture was more accepting, but it can 13
clearly be read to be so given that such persons were not yet institutionalised. Many of  the 
disabled community would gain money by showing themselves, but in the more rural districts, 
disabled people would turn their hand to whatever they could — such as Thomas Pinnington, 
farmer William Kingston, and others. (Platts, Rev. John. “Curiosities Respecting Man,” in 
Encyclopedia of  Natural and Artificial Wonders and Curiosities including a Full and Authentic Description of  
Remarkable and Astonishing Places, Beings, Animals, Customs, Experiments, Phenomena, Etc., of  Both Ancient 
and Modern Times, in All Parts of  the Globe, 54-56. New York, New York: World Publishing House, 
1876.; et al.)
 Turner, 2012. 81.14
 Known as ‘exhibiting’.15
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always seem to be today.  Indeed, as the process of  institutionalising such individuals 16
was only just beginning by the end of  the Eighteenth century, persons with disabilities 
were commonly visible and made a living in whatever manner suited them — like any 
able-bodied person. 
	 Despite slowly increasing inclusion and a more temperate response the needs 
of  disabled persons, the disabled community still experience significant oppression and 
lack of  inclusion in most Western societies  — some  even see the use of  the epithet 17 18
‘disabled’ as a mechanism or justification to separate and oppress. It is not surprising, 
then, that academic work in the area has increased over recent years. This work 
crosses many fields of  academic study and such interdisciplinary involvement is 
possibly the reason that researchers of  disability maintain that their research is in 
‘disability studies’ rather than ‘the philosophy of  disability’ or the ‘economics of  
disability’. It is not hard to imagine how the phenomena of  disability branches out 
into ethics, political theory, political science, biology, sociology, anthropology, 
engineering, geography, architecture, history, archeology, medicine, and economics — 
to mention but a few. The philosopher’s involvement is, perhaps, the most problematic 
— not because the discipline is somehow more elevated, but because its remit (at least 
to a certain extent) is to weigh in on the philosophical elements of  all of  the above in 
 As a personal comment, I will say that inclusion has increased significantly over the last 16
15-20 years. However, the level of  inclusion in the early ‘90s when I was lobbying the British 
government was extremely poor.
 I cannot speak to the level of  inclusion experienced in other cultures having only had a 17
limited experience of  them.
 Such as: Douglas C. Baynton, “Disability and the Justification of  Inequality in 18
American History,” Eds. Paul K. Longmore and Lauri Umansky, In The New Disability History: 
American Perspectives, (New York and London: New York University Press, 2001), 52.
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addition to being challenged with the not-so-simple task of  describing and discussing 
the phenomena of  disability itself. Thus, I struggle in this limited space to constrain 
the philosophical tendrils as best I might — that is not to say that I shall not identify 
where these tendrils may lead, but that I refrain from investigating them beyond 
necessity. 
	 The contemporary debate over issues of  disability began only about half  a 
century ago and it emerged at roughly the same time on both sides of  the Atlantic. 
Unfortunately, this separate development also spawned disagreements over the proper 
definitions of  ‘disability’ and ‘impairment’. British definitions, forged at a meeting 
between the Disability Alliance (the forerunner of  what is now the Disability Rights 
Movement) and the Union Of  The Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) 
in 1975, defined disability as follows: 
Thus we define impairment as lacking all or part of  a limb, or having a 
defective limb, organism or mechanism of  the body and disability as the 
disadvantage or restriction of  activity caused by a contemporary social 
organisation which takes little or no account of  people who have 
physical impairments and thus excludes them from participation in the 
mainstream of  social activities.  19
In contrast, the definitions developed in the US were non-trivially different from the 
those that were used in Britain, and roughly substituted the term ‘handicap’ for 
‘disability’ and ‘disability’ for ‘impairment’. 
	 Tom Shakespeare notes that: 
The distinction between impairment and disability lies at the heart of  the 
social model. It is this distinction that separates British disability rights and 
 UPIAS & The Disability Alliance, “Fundamental Principles of  Disability”, October 1, 19
1997. 14.
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disability studies from the wider family of  social contextual approaches to 
disability.   20
It is important to realise that the field of  disability studies is fractured, in part, due to 
profound disagreements over what is ‘disability’ and what is ‘impairment’. These 
disagreement result in various different definitions — especially the definition of  
disability. The notion of  disability developed in thesis is quite different from any other 
model and shall be later presented in full (it would only complicate matters to define it 
without some context). However, here I offer a working definition of  ‘disability’ and 
‘impairment' such that the reader may understand in what way they are generally 
employed in the arena, and in what manner they are different from each other. 
DISABILITY: 	  The impact on the life of  a person caused by social, physical, 	
	 	  and mental barriers. 
IMPAIRMENT: The absence of  certain physical or mental function(s). 
	 Though impairment details the absence of  physical and mental function, I am 
also mindful of  individuals that have super-function — individuals whose mental or 
physical attributes or traits operate above ‘species-typical norm’. This thesis will show 
how ‘impairments’ are relative to the experience of  disability, but that the type or 
severity of  impairment is irrelevant.  The model of  disability presented in this thesis, 21
the Picture Theory of  Disability (PTD), cares about the particular manner in which an 
action is impeded — how that impediment is brought about is less important than that 
 Shakespeare, 2014. 21.20
 Amundson discusses the potential for actions to be completed successfully using 21
different ‘modes’, and that impairment is not as clearly linked to disability as proposed by the 
medical model. This thesis holds that deviance from ‘species-typical norm’ is irrelevant precisely 
because adaptation to achieve goals (perhaps by alternative ‘modes’ of  function) means that it is 
not always the case that impediment to a goal occurs where a medical model of  disability 
demands that it should be. This discussion is further advanced on pages 43-45, and in note 117.
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it is brought about. Consequently, super-function — like impairment — is (to some 
degree) irrelevant, as it focusses on whether or not an individual experiences an 
irremediable impediment to a task or goal as a function of  the relationship between 
themselves and their environment. By the nature of  super-functioning, such 
individuals are unlikely to experience a physical limitation to their actions, however, 
there is the potential to experience a sort of  social-disability. In this case, social 
disability may be experienced, perhaps, as a shunning or loss of  opportunity because 
such individual’s better-than-normal performance may engender jealousy in other 
members of  that community and a desire to exclude that individual. 
	 Though the definitions of  disability and impairment presented earlier seem 
straight forward enough, they engender more issues that you might at first imagine 
because the “social and the biological are always entwined.”  In other words, 22
impairments have been seen as necessary — but not always a sufficient — causes of  
the difficulties which disabled people face.  What results from this observation, is that 23
in the cases where there is no connexion between impairment and disability then the 
concept of  disability becomes, suddenly, much more vague and difficult to define.  As 24
a result, disability seems to be almost always  entwined with the effects of  an 25
 Ibid., 22.22
 Loc. cit.23
 Loc. cit. An example might be OCD or similar.24
 I say ‘almost always’ here, because it is not clear to me that the mentally ill actually have 25
any physical impairment. Often the deficit in mental function is difficult to identify also. This thesis 
later goes on to show how such persons might experience disability under the PTD, but for many 
models of  disability, mental impairments do not count as disabilities.
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impairment, and impairment seems almost always connected to some social factor or 
other. 
	 Tom Shakespeare notes that “the distinction between impairment and 
disability lies at the heart of  the social model,”  and elaborates to observe that, for the 26
social model, ‘impairment’ is generally defined in terms of  biology and is individual, 
whereas ‘disability’ is defined as being a social construction. In short, ‘disability’ is 
what makes ‘impairment’ problematic.  This thesis holds the view that impairment is 27
individual and that impairment differs in non-trivial ways from individual to 
individual: Though the functional nature of  physical or mental impairment might be 
similar for one person as it is for another, because of  the differing goals and 
capabilities of  each individual, the amount of  disability experienced might stretch 
from none to complete. For example, Chris Koch who is a quadriplegic, can use a JCB 
(back-hoe) with skill, but my friend Chip, who has muscular dystrophy, would not be 
able to — even if  he could get into the cab. The functional physical impairment is only 
slightly different between Chip and Chris (as neither of  them has use of  full limbs), but 
the experience of  disability for each of  them is quite different. If  Chip wanted to operate 
a JCB, what would engender his difficulty is his current skill level  — not his ‘dis-28
ability’.  Here the PTD differs from the social or medical models, because, though the 29
PTD perceives impairment as a personal and individual thing, it holds that disabling 
 Ibid., 21.26
 Loc. cit.27
 This is certainly not to say that Chip could not learn to operate a JCB, nor that the JCB 28
could not be augmented such that its controls better suit Chip’s physical requirements.
 I develop the discussion of  ‘capacity to perform’ a task or goal later in this thesis.29
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factor is neither the Social or the biological, but is instead engendered by the distinct 
relation between individuals and their environments as they try to do things — or more 
properly, to pursue goals that are meaningful and important to them.   
	 Consequently, the PTD develops a particularist view of  disability — at least at 
the outset.  The PTD offers only rough formulations of  a general definition of  30
disability so that the reader is able to follow along; the PTD presents no necessary and 
sufficient conditions for labelling something a disability. I do this because, I think, in 
order to fully understand disability it is necessary to start from particular cases and 
move to the more general. 
	 Society influences the environment to a certain degree, but to some extent that 
degree is also pragmatic and reasonable: JCBs are generally designed around persons 
without impairments in virtue of  the nature of  the job in which JCBs are used.  The 31
expectations of  society are represented in certain designs, but many of  these designs 
are rightfully so constructed. I have a friend, Doc, who at 6’8” finds selecting a new 
vehicle to be sometimes restricting because the seating doesn’t always respect his 
height and leg measurements. He once told me that he was very enthusiastic to test 
drive a Jaguar XJS, but found that, despite the vehicle having the longest bonnet of  
any production sports car, the seat did not move far enough back to allow his legs to fit 
under the steering wheel. It would be unreasonable to suggest that Doc experiences 
 Whether or not the PTD is able to make more general claims about disability remains 30
to be seen and would be related to the number and variety of  pictures.
 It would be silly to presume that JCB manufacturers should design JCBs about the 31
myriad of  differences in physiology represented in the world. However, excavators have been 
modified for paraplegics. See: Fossum, Hans. "- Dette Er Helt Rått." AT.no. April 4, 2014. 
Accessed September 23, 2015. 
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disability in the selection of  some cars because they do not respect his height; instead, 
we think it proper for him to select amongst the vehicles that do fit his needs in much 
the same way that a wheelchair user might select from the powered chairs that best 
suit his or her personal needs.  
	 For the PTD, then, disability is not a social construction but a function of  the 
unique way in which people interact with their specific environments as they pursue 
goals that are meaningful to them. The PTD is unable to make claims about how 
society and the environment should be built — instead it offers an analysis of  how the 
interplay between the individual and their environment creates disabling experiences. 
How one might best ameliorate that interplay should be the subject of  further 
research — but, before we can figure out the best way to respond to disability we need 
to know what disability is. 
	 A distinction between impairment and disability was highlighted in the 
meeting between UPIAS and the Disability Alliance.  The meeting constituted the 32
first real attempt at an academic response to the issue of  disability and it sought to 
express the position of disabled people as perceived by disabled people. The meeting 
resulted in the groundbreaking document “The Fundamental Principles of  Disability.” 
Clearly presented was the view that: 
… it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is 
something imposed on top of  our impairments by the way we are 
unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society.   33
 UPIAS, 1997. 20.32
 Ibid.,14.33
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The ideology surrounding this belief  (and its subsequent developments) views any and 
all disability as a result of  the Social.  This ‘social’ approach to disability has been 34
given many epithets such as the ‘strong social model’ and the ‘British social model’,  35
but which I simply call here call the ‘social model’(SM). According to the social model, 
disabilities are always a function of  society. Impairment is thus an individual condition, 
but disability is not. 
	 The social model approach to understanding disability has been described as 
the “‘big idea’ of  the British disability movement,”  and has been profoundly 36
influential in academia since the late ‘70s through authors such as Finkelstein  and 37
Oliver.   Shakespeare, who has had a long involvement with the disabled peoples’ 38
movement and who has published a significant body of  academic work in the field of  
disability studies, observes that the social model has become a sort of  litmus test for the 
 I employ this term carefully and in the manner of  sociologists who “use ‘the social’ as 34
an objectless noun when we want to refer to those aspects of  human life that involve interaction, 
social institutions, collective beliefs, solidarity, etc., but not to restrict that referent to a specific 
social body, which ‘society’ would imply.” I am grateful to Dr. William Ramp for his precise and 
helpful definition — which is probably much more accurate and concise than anything I could 
provide.
 Shakespeare, 2014.35
 Shakespeare, Torn, and Nicholas Watson. “The Social Model of  Disability: An 36
Outdated Ideology?” Research in Social Science and Disability, (2002), 9-28.
 Finkelstein, V. “Attitudes and disabled people”, (New York: World Rehabilitation Fund. 37
1980).; Finkelstein, V.  “To deny or not to deny disability”, in Handicap in a Social World, eds., 
A.Brechin et al., (Sevenoaks: Hodder and Stoughton. 1981).
 Michael Oliver,  “Conductive education: if  it wasn’t so sad it would be funny”,In 38
Disability, Handicap and Society, 4, 2, (1989), 197-200 ; Michael Oliver, “The politics of  
disablement”, (Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1990).; Oliver. “Understanding disability: from theory to 
practice”, (Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1990).
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DRM by which policies, laws, and ideologies can be determined to be progressive or 
inadequate.  39
	 The definitive medical model claims that disability is wholly caused by a 
person’s physical deviation from statistical norm.  Equally categorical, the British, or 40
‘strong’ model holds that society is completely responsible for the disability which 
disabled persons’ experience.  It should be noted that the continuum in-between 41
these two extremes is occupied by various relational accounts of  disability. These 
relational models or accounts are so-called because they consider disability to arise as 
a function of  the relation between the individual and the Social, and such, debate the 
exact nature of  that relationship. I believe that the formation of  relational models is 
(generally) analogous to selecting a temperature on a car heater: as the slider is moved 
from cold to hot to select ‘warm’, what is actually being done is the blending of  hot 
and cold air to achieve warm air. Thus, I consider models formed in this way to just be 
theories which add more or fewer elements from the two polar models. Consequently, 
I am not sure that one, in this way, generates a ‘relational theory of  disability’ — 
instead, I think one simply has (let’s say) a less strong medical model with an admix of  
social model elements (in much the same way that the heater slider does not show 
 Shakespeare and Watson, 2002.39
 Edward Wheatley, “Medieval Constructions of  Blindness in France and England,” in 40
The Disability Studies Reader, ed. Lennard J. Davis, 64-65. Third ed. (New York, New York: 
Routledge, 1997).; Barnes, 2010, 18-24
 UPIAS, 1997, 14.; Wasserman, David, Asch, Adrienne, Blustein, Jeffrey and Putnam, 41
Daniel, "Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience", The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy 
(Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
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‘purple’, it shows less red and more blue).  What I believe to be the right sort of  42
relational model is one which starts from the belief  that disability arises out of  the 
relationship between an individual and their environment and then seeks to describe 
the nature of  that relationship.  43
	 The British social model was forged out of  disdain for what was perceived to be 
the dominant approach to disability at the time, the ‘medical model’ (MM).  Disabled 44
people saw this model as widespread and perfidious (and, to only a slightly lesser 
degree, it still is) — although it mostly arose as a function of  an analytic and scientific 
approach to disease. The MM, the ideology of  which is perhaps best presented in 
“Health as a Theoretical Concept” by Christopher Boorse, clearly delineates health as 
being “normal functioning, where the normality is statistical and the functions 
biological,”  and holds that disease is a deviation from functional or statistical norm 45
and leads, at some stage, to disability.  Importantly then, and in contrast to the social 46
model, the medical model views disability as something which an individual has. 
 In this thesis I refer to the social model frequently, but I refer to the British, or ‘hard’ 42
social model as distinct from the less extreme relational models on the social model end of  the 
spectrum. I am aware that the there is a distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘weak’ social models and 
their discussion is interesting and valuable. However, there is little space in this thesis as it is. This 
discussion is one of  the tendrils I must cauterise. 
 It should be noted that my view here is not the accepted view, and commonly speaking, 43
models which are not fully concordant with either the strong social or strong medical models are 
known as ‘relational’ models.
 Also known as the ‘naturalist’ model, or the ‘bio-statistical model’44
 Christopher Boorse, “Health as a theoretical concept.” Philosophy of  Science, Volume 44, 45
issue 4 (Dec., 1977): 542.
 It is an interesting question whether or not superlative performance is ill-health, as it in 46
itself  constitutes deviation from functional and statistical health. Boorse terms the phenomena 
‘positive health’, but I shall not investigate this issue here. Boorse, 1977, 542.
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	 The tensions between the two models can be nicely illustrated through the 
changing positions of  Ron Amundson, who has contributed importantly to the field of  
disability studies since the early ’90s. Amundson’s early position largely concurs with 
that of  Boorse: “Disabled people, by definition I suppose, show deviations from the 
functional organisation of  a typical member of  the human species.”  However, a 47
more relational interpretation of  disability appears later in the same paper: 
The property of  having a particular [impairment] is an attribute of  a 
particular person… The property of  being [disabled], however, is relational. A 
person with an [impairment] is [disabled] only with respect to a particular environment and a 
particular goal.   48
Despite having reservations about the lack of  consideration given to other factors, 
Amundson’s early work accepts some foundational elements of  the ‘medical’ model.  
	 Over time, the medical account became heavily criticised — being subject to 
vigorous objections  from both social and relational model proponents.  On such 49 50
concern is that MM is integrated with systems of  power such that it underpins medical 
 Amundson, Ron. "Disability, Handicap, And The Environment." Journal of  Social 47
Philosophy 23 (1992). 104. Emphasis in the original.
 Ibid., 110. It is this syncretism of  the medical and social models which I believe to be an 48
improper ‘relational’ model — not because such a model is not relational, but because it becomes 
relational rather than it starting out relational.
 The discussion of  how the medical model is unsatisfactory is very interesting — 49
however, I reserve the right to not elaborate on the discussion further through wont of  space.
 Amundson. 2000.; 2010.; Charlton, James. Chapters 1 and 2 from Nothing About Us 50
Without Us. (University of  California Press 1998), 3-36.; Edwards, Stephen “Definitions of  
Disability,” in Arguing About Disability eds. Kristjana Kristiansen, Simo Vehmas, and Tom 
Shakespeare. 2008, 30-41.; Bethke Elshtain. Jean. “Neither Victims Nor Heroes: Reflections from 
a Polio Person,” in Philosophical Reflections on Disability, eds. D. Christopher Ralston and Justin Ho, 
(London and New York: Springer, 2010), 241-251.; Shakespeare, Tom. Disability Rights and Wrongs 
Revisited. Second ed. (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2014).; et al.
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evaluations and influences distributive justice practices.  Consequently, it is often 51
difficult for an individual’s lived-experience to be taken seriously by the medical 
fraternity. An example of  such disregard can be seen in Williams: “Patients [are not] 
usually… aware of  the significance of  [their] ‘symptoms’ for their future health states. 
That is where the special knowledge of  the doctors comes in…”  Though Williams is 52
actually promoting the benefits of  the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY),  the 53
medical model (which underpins QALY evaluations) makes assumptions about an 
individuals ‘quality of  life’ (the QALY works only in terms of  increase in medical 
health, which is not always synonymous with an increase in quality of  life). As such, it 
is a prime example of  how the medical model has become institutional and how 
medical evaluations are made with the implicit adoption of  the medical model. 
	 By the turn of  the millennium, Amundson had become increasingly 
uncomfortable with the MM: he sought to criticise the idea of  ‘normal functioning’ 
and began to query whether or not “biology [even implies] a concept of  functional 
normality and a distinction between normal and abnormal function.”  Such a 54
	  Amundson, Ron, 2010. 169-182.; Nord, Erik, “Values for health states in QALYs and 51
DALYs” in Quality of  Life and Human Difference eds. Wasserman, Bickenbach, and Wachbroit, 
2005, 125-141.; Williams, Alan. “The value of  QALYs” in Bioethics Stephen Holland, ed. 
(Routledge 2012), 423-438.
	  Williams, A, 2012, 424. Emphasis added.52
 The QALY is a metric which seeks to determine the economic value of  certain 53
treatments given the expected increase in benefit to the patient. There are many and varied 
criticisms of  the QALY, but because it offers a quick and simple calculus it is employed by almost 
all Western healthcare systems. Its fundamental failure is that it weighs prospective outcome values 
post operation against the economic cost of  the treatment — but it has no mechanism for 
considering the post-op value to the individual, only gauging such value in terms of  medical 
health (as opposed to quality-of-life for the individual in question).
 Ron Amundson, “Against Normal Function.” Studies in History and Philosophy of  Science. 54
Volume 31, issue 1: (2000), 33.
!18
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
criticism constitutes a significant change in perspective from his earlier belief  that 
disabled people showed functional deviation from ‘norm’. By this time, Amundson 
had developed the notion that the difficulty in mobility experienced by disabled people 
was a function of  the built environment: “the design of  the [built] environment is the 
cause of  the disadvantage [in mobility].”  As the British social model holds that 55
disability is caused by society, and because society is responsible for ideologies which 
inform the built environment, Amundson’s belief  that the built environment disables 
led him to become more convinced that aspects of  the social model had a greater 
potential to describe disability. As observed above, weaker versions of  the social model 
may be considered relational accounts of  disability because they hold that disability 
arises as a function of  both biology and of  the Social. Consequently, Amundson’s 
position at this point might be said to have shifted away from the MM and to a 
relational account more toward the SM end of  the continuum. 
	 Finally, and by the time Amundson had retired, I perceive his position to be 
more radical and more in line with the beliefs of  the DRM: In a 2010 work of  praxis 
he argues that were practice to match discourse then “minorities and women would 
have very nearly equal rights with majorities and men within the academy [but that] 
disabled people would still not have equal rights with non disabled people.”  He goes 56
further to claim that “basic [DRM] principles are rejected not only in practice but also 
 Ibid., 51.55
 Ron Amundson, “Disability rights: do we really mean it?” In Philosophical Reflections on 56
Disability, eds. D. Christopher Ralston and Justin Ho. (London and New York: Springer, 2010), 
169. 
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in discourse [within the academy].”  Impairments, for Amundson, are now much less 57
important, and social prejudice has become the whole of  disability. 
	 Partly because Amundson was, himself, an academic, and partly because there 
was actually very little development in academe, he became animated over the lack of  
academic development in disability studies.  Amundson found the notion that people 58
were ‘disabled by society, not by their bodies’ very appealing.  For one, it holds that 59
disabled persons are impotent victims of  the Social, and because it also denies that 
disability arises out of  inadequacies of  the body. Consequently, the SM is often seen as 
the model which promotes the emancipation of  the disabled community — of  which 
Amundson was a member.  
	 Danieli & Woodhams maintain that “those who advocate emancipatory 
research tend to have a clearly articulated political position, i.e., that the existing 
material and social conditions of  particular groups are oppressive and should be 
changed.”  This sort of  ‘clearly articulated political position’ is transparent in later 60
Amundson (et al.). Shakespeare confirms that the social model was crucial to the 
disability movement and presents two ways in which it was important: Firstly, the SM 
identified barrier removal as a political strategy, and secondly because replacing the 
traditional individual-deficit approach by a social interpretation of  disability was very 
 Loc. cit.57
 Loc. cit. 58
 A rally cry of  disabled activists during the mid ‘80s. Found in: Shakespeare and Watson, 59
2002, 9-28.
	  Ardha Danieli & Carol Woodhams. “Emancipatory research methodology and 60
disability: a critique.” International Journal of  Social Research Methodology, 8, 4, (2005), 281-296.
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liberating for people with disabilities.  Emancipatory research into disability, 61
therefore, is now often approached through a SM framework — to the extent that it is 
debated whether or not the MM is fundamentally geared to participate in 
‘emancipatory research’.  As a result, it is commonly argued by SM proponents that 62
work toward the inclusion of  members of  the disabled community might only be 
possible through the SM.  This last claim, I think, might be a bit too strong: that 63
research conducted through the MM may not offer any sort of  emancipation is one 
thing, but that no other model but the SM can induce a reduction in oppression is 
quite another.  I think, for example, that relational models of  disability offer a much 64
 Shakespeare, 2014, 13,61
 The medical model is considered by the DRM to be the source of  oppression and 62
marginalisation of  disabled people. The notion that the medical model is an unsuitable approach 
in which to frame emancipatory research, thus, arises (in part) from the MM’s influence on the 
political systems which distribute justice.
 Amundson, 1992; 2000.; Susan Wendell “Unhealthy disabled: treating chronic illnesses 63
as disabilities.” Hypatia vol. 16 iss. 4, (2001), 17-33. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/
3810781.; Charlton, James. Chapters 1 and 2 from Nothing About Us Without Us, (University of  
California Press, 1998), 3-36.
 In fairness to the authors cited in the above footnote, it might be well worth noting that 64
much development in disability theory has been achieved since their articles were written, and 
were they permitted to qualify their positions today they may choose to be less categorical in their 
claims. 
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greater potential for inclusion that the SM itself, because the SM often makes too 
many impractical demands of  society.  65
	 Whether or not emancipation is only achievable through the social model, the 
SM is also not without its criticism. To start, this thesis — as well as work by authors 
such as Tremain,  Shakespeare,  and Savulescu & Kahane  — see no reason that 66 67 68
disability studies cannot be further developed without adopting strong SM ideology.  69
An example of  such criticism can be provided by Tom Shakespeare, who suggests that 
the social model has “logical consequences that were problematic both at the political 
level and the conceptual level,”  and continues to list three powerful arguments 70
against the model: That due to commonly shared experiences of  oppression, making 
distinction about the levels of  impairment is redundant; that attempts to mitigate 
 During the early ‘80s, a campaign was lobbied at the parish council to convert all of  the 65
shop entrances in my local village from stepped entrances to ramped entrances. As most of  the 
store fronts were built in the late Eighteenth century and were positioned on very narrow 
footpaths next to a busy road, it was argued that neither the buildings nor the location of  the 
buildings facilitated ramps to be built (as such a ramp would have taken up too much room on the 
path). The ramps were never built, somewhat to the annoyance of  the campaigners. I feel that this 
was the correct decision — even though it mean the exclusion of  many of  the disabled people in 
the village. I hold this belief  because I cannot support the demand that the shop fronts should be 
moved to permit ramps to be built as doing so would importantly detract from the village’s 
touristic appeal (its primary income base). I would have supported more realistic responses, such as 
a doorbell or the widening of  the path and the narrowing of  the road to facilitate the building of  
period appropriate wheelchair ramps (though this was never an option). I also believe that the 
state should have funded the modifications as it would have been unfair to have weighed the 
obligation at the small business owners whose profit margins were very small. I am mindful that a 
‘service bell’ would not have permitted the type of  integration deserved by disabled people. I do 
believe that the design of  new-build buildings must respect full inclusion.
 Shelley Tremain, “On the Government of  Disability,” Social Theory and Practice, 2001. 66
 Tom Shakespeare, “Still a Health Issue,” Disability and Health Journal 5, (2012): 129-13167
 Savulescu & Kahane, 2009, 14-53.68
 It is hoped that this thesis will provide a more accurate and realistic account of  the 69
phenomena of  disability, and as such will present a way of  emancipation that properly balances 
the needs and wants of  disabled people with the abilities of  the society.
 Shakespeare, 2014, 17-18.70
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disability thorough the curing of  medical problems or the development of  aids should 
be viewed with intense suspicion; and that if  individual experiences are irrelevant to 
disability, then the number of  disabled persons also becomes irrelevant.  As a further 71
criticism, he then lists several reasons “that the social model has now become an 
obstacle to the further development of  the disability movement and disability 
studies”  — all of  which are connected to the stoic and unchanging nature of  the 72
model. These stoic and unchanging properties, he points out, were part of  the very 
reason for its success, but they now seem to be contributing to its downfall.    73
	 The two hegemonic models, the social and the medical, have come to be 
interpreted as standing diametrically opposed to one another and the distinctions 
between them are many and complex. Oliver’s ‘simplification’ of  contrasting elements 
between the two models, for example, results in a list of  over a dozen points.  More 74
recently, dissent from both sides of  the debate has started to emerge. Silvers notes that 
although the SM has enjoyed “unwavering allegiance” from the DRM as well as from 
scholars in disability studies, recently “fault lines in the disability community’s fealty to 
the social model have appeared.”  Importantly, the SM, once the bastion of  hope for 75
disability activists and social scientists alike, is now subject to accusations of  
misrepresenting persons with disabilities by “abridging who they are, or of  even more 
 Loc. cit.71
 Ibid., 20.72
 Ibid., 20-21.73
 Oliver, 2009, 41-57,74
 Silvers, 2010, 19-36.75
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malignant distortions such as promoting values that exclude people with certain kinds 
of  physical or cognitive limitations.”  76
	 Curiously, Silvers observes that, “at the same time (some) disability studies 
scholars are distancing themselves from the social model, medical professionals are 
drawing closer to it.”  As evidence, she refers to the Institute of  Medicine’s (IOM) 77
document “The Future of  Disability in America” [2007].  One might expect that an 78
organisation “suffused with ideas and values associated with the medical model”  79
would offer responses parsed in terms of  that model. Instead, the IOM presents an 
ideology more steeped in a SM approach: 
Since IOM’s previous reports in 1991 and 1997 that highlighted 
disability as a pressing public issue, there has been growing recognition 
that disability is not inherent in individuals, but rather is the result of  
interactions between people and their physical and social environments. 
Many aspects of  the environment contribute to limitations associated 
with disability — for example, inaccessible transportation systems and 
workplaces, restrictive health insurance policies, and 
telecommunications and computer technologies that do not consider 
people with vision, hearing, or other disabilities.  80
	 Dissatisfied with the relational models at the time, Lennart Nordenfelt 
(amongst others ) believes there is a third element to disability. He holds that whether 81
or not an agent is able to do something is neither simply a function of  the specific 
 Ibid., 19.76
 Ibid., 19-36.77
 Institute of  Medicine (US) Committee on Disability in America; Field MJ, Jette AM, 78
editors. The Future of  Disability in America. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2007.
 Silvers, 2010, 21.79
 Loc. cit.80
 Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane, “Disability: A Welfarist Approach,” Clinical Ethics 6, 81
no. 1 (2011): 45-51. Doi:10.1258/ce.2011.011010.
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environment, nor can it be solely related to the agent herself  — instead, a trident 
approach must be considered with the third prong being whether or not she is able to 
achieve her goals. He posits that his “general suggestion, then, is that disabilities and 
handicaps should be determined in relation to the individual's own vital goals.”  In 82
short, disability for Nordenfelt is a species of  inability.  Like Nordenfelt, the Picture 83
Theory of  Disability agrees that goals are something important to focus on, but cares 
about the manner in which daily-living tasks or goals are achieved or not — rather than 
whether or not they are achieved. In as much, the PTD might be considered to be 
somewhat adjacent to a Nordenfeltian ‘vital goal’ theory. 
	 Like Nordenfelt, Savulescu & Kahane also believe there is another relational 
option available and believe the answer lies in monitoring the reduction of  ‘wellbeing’. 
Their ‘Welfarist account’ considers disability to be:  
… any stable physical or psychological property of  subject S that leads to a 
significant reduction of  S’s level of  wellbeing in circumstances C, excluding the 
effect that this condition has on wellbeing that is due to prejudice against S by 
members of  S’s society.  84
However, other academics have begun to question whether or not disability can even 
be resolved through a model framework — for instance, Danieli & Woodhams raise 
concerns over the adoption of  any specific model:  
We are not arguing that disability is not socially created, rather our 
point is that in assuming this a priori, any subsequent ‘data’ generated 
will always be interpreted through the lens of  this theory. We would 
 Lennard Nordenfelt, “On the Notions of  Disability and Handicap,” International Journal 82
of  Social Welfare, vol 2, iss.1,(1993), 17-24. It is important to remember that Nordenfelt was writing 
with the North American terminology. Consequently, in order to make sense of  the position, 
exchange ‘disability’ for ‘impairment’ and ‘handicap’ for ‘disability’.
 Ibid.,17–24.83
 Savulescu & Kahane, 2011, 45. I elaborate on their account in the conclusion.84
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argue that merely replacing one theory with another does not reveal the 
‘reality’ of  phenomena. Of  course it could be argued that one 
representation of  reality conforms to more people’s experiences than 
another, but this cannot be claimed to be any more accurate than any 
other representation.  85
Framing disability in terms of  a given model, they argue, incorporates a bias in 
providing evidence for or against each of  the two models. Those who conduct 
research in the social sciences pay particular attention to this potential for bias  — yet 86
work in disability studies rarely seems to address such concerns. As far as this thesis is 
concerned, the PTD negotiates the issue by requiring that the individual’s own 
perception of  any given disabling experience must be taken into consideration during 
the evaluation of  a picture.  Such a requirement assuages any concerns of  bias 87
because the observer is charged with paying attention to the lived experience of  the 
individual. 
	 Finally, questioning the validity of  approaching disability through a model 
framework seems to lead us back to Silvers, who, in a moment of  pyrrhonism, takes 
things yet a step further and questions models qua models: 
Resolving the presumed conflict between the medical and social models 
is especially contentious because there is not nor can there be such a 
thing as a social model of  disability. This concession does not gain much 
ground toward resolving whatever is in contention between the two 
accounts, however, for by the same token there can be no medical model 
of  disability… A model is a standard, example, image, simplified 
	  Danieli & Woodhams, 2005, 281-296.85
 Steve Firth, “On the Ethics of  Ethnography.” An undergraduate work. Unpublished; 86
available on request from Steven Firth, University of  Lethbridge, Alta., Canada, 2012.
 The exact mechanism of  this evaluation will be presented carefully later in the thesis. 87
Martiny remarks: “As a point of  departure, [the phenomenological approach] focuses neither on 
giving physical explanations nor social prescriptions for understanding disability, but precisely on 
first-person experiences of  living with dis- abilities: what is the experience of  being disabled 
like?” (Martiny, 2015, 553-565.)
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representation, style, design or pattern, often executed in miniature so 
that all of  its components all are easy to discern. Neither the medical 
nor the social model presents a replica or representation of  disability.  88
	 From the above, it is clear that there is a non-trivial disagreement in disability 
studies over the nature of  disability and it is to this body of  work that this thesis, in 
part, belongs. It must be pointed out at this juncture that this is by no means an 
exhaustive literature survey: I have not the space to fully investigate all of  the work 
done with respect to disability theory, let alone the normative aspects of  disability or 
the distributive justice elements of  disability. I do not include here a review of  
normative material, as the Picture Theory of  Disability makes no normative claims 
and should be considered along side other models which offer descriptive accounts of  
the phenomena of  disability. 
1.3 The Picture Theory of  Disability — A Relational Account 
When originally formulating the Picture Theory of  Disability, I was intrigued at the 
lack of  weight which was given to relational models of  disability. Though there were 
issues with early relational accounts (not the least of  which was the early WHO 
definition of  disability which received many and varied criticisms at the time), I feel 
that a relational account better captures the uniqueness of  every experience of  
disability and the great adaptability of  disabled persons. 
	 Relational accounts generally arise from criticism of  one or both of  the social 
and medical models. This criticism has, in some authors, resulted in modified 
approaches to disability that are importantly distinct from either the medical or social 
 Silvers, 2010, 19-36.88
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models. The variation of  approaches is significant, ranging from Amundson’s concerns 
that there cannot be a biological basis for ‘normal functioning’ rendering the concept 
of  ‘impairment’ difficult to substantiate,  to the phenomenological models of  89
disability — models which concentrate on the experiential aspects of  disability — 
critiqued by Martiny.   90
	 As mentioned earlier, Amundson’s notions of  disability were influenced by the 
British social model. His millennial work generated an analogy with the now-defunct 
concept of  race, and observed that the definition of  ‘impairment’ as a ‘deviance from 
normal functioning’ is false and only serves to underpin prejudice and provide a 
framework for the normalisation of  different (atypically embodied) people.  By this 91
Amundson argues that ‘race’ cannot be used to distinguish and group people (due to 
the concept of  ‘race’ itself  being flawed). Similarly, Amundson believed that ‘deviance 
from normal functioning’ should not be used to distinguish and group persons with 
impairments because ‘normal functioning’ itself  is a flawed concept. In contrast, Terzi 
notes that because the social model focusses exclusively on disability arising from social 
oppression, it ignores the very real disadvantages which arise as a function of  bodily 
impairments — concluding that the social model should respect all aspects of  
disability.  92
 Amundson, 2000.89
 Martiny, (2015), 553-565. Phenomenological models (PM) seek to describe disability in 90
terms of  the lived experience. The PTD also takes an element of  the lived experience into 
consideration. However, the PTD differs importantly from the PM as it also considers external 
perspectives which are tempered and bolstered by the lived experience. Consequently, I do not 
believe that the PTD may be considered a ‘phenomenological model’.
 Amundson, 2000.91
 Terzi, Lorella “The Social Model of  Disability: A Philosophical Critique,” Journal of  92
Applied Philosophy 21(2) (2004): 141-157. 
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	 Despite the many and varied relational models, none have succeeded in 
capturing the kind of  attention awarded to the social and medical models. Relational 
models, from the authors mentioned above as well as those from Silvers,  Tremain,  93 94
Cole,  Dimitis & Kauffman,  and Kahane & Savulescu,  generally come to a 95 96 97
relational stance through the analysis of  some deficit of  a model or because of  some 
meritorious aspect of  the phenomena of  disability which has been otherwise ignored 
or devalued. However, I came to a relational stance through being reminded of  
Einstein’s conceptual solution to wave/particle duality:  
It seems as though we must use sometimes the one theory and sometimes the 
other, while at times we may use either. We are faced with a new kind of  
difficulty. We have two contradictory pictures of  reality; separately neither of  
them fully explains the phenomena of  light, but together they do.  98
The early experiments in light (where certain experiments show the particle-like 
nature of  light and other experiments show the wave-like nature of  light) seemed to 
generate a similar dilemma to the two different descriptions of  disability. Einstein’s 
resolution was not that either of  the theories was wrong, but that they were, in fact,  
both correct. Rather than concluding that both models of  disability were correct (which 
 Anita Silvers, “On the Possibility and Desirability of  Constructing a Neutral 93
Conception of  Disability,” Theoretical Medicine 24 (2003): 471-287. 
 Shelley Tremain, “On the Government of  Disability,” Social Theory and Practice, (2001). 94
 Phillip Cole, “The Body Politic: Theorizing Disability and Impairment,” Journal of  95
Applied Philosophy 24(2) (2007): 169-176
 Anastasiou Dimitis and James Kauffman, “The Social Model of  Disability: Dichotomy 96
between Impairment and Disability,” Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy 38 (2013): 441-459. 
 Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane, “The Welfarist Account of  Disability” in Brownlee, 97
Kimberly and Adam Cureton, eds. Disability and Disadvantage, (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2009), 14-53.
 Einstein, Albert, and Leopold Infeld. The Evolution of  Physics: From Early Concepts to 98
Relativity and Quanta, (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1938). 262-263.
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seemed unlikely), I wondered if  investigation of  their maxims might permit a similar 
resolution to that of  Einstein. Below, P1) states the central belief  of  the social model 
and P2) presents the maxim of  the medical model: 
P1) The environment is disabling, 
P2) Physiological difference from statistical norm is disabling,  
However, each maxim resulted in the failure of  their respective model to properly 
describe the phenomenon of  disability, so perhaps negating the premises might be 
enlightening: 
	P1) There is nothing, per sē, disabling about the environment, 
	P2) There is nothing, per sē, disabling about physiological difference, 
Noting that Einstein’s solution to wave-particle duality was that light had both a wave-
like nature and a particle-like nature, I wondered if  a solution to the nature of  
disability might follow by considering the idea that disability could be both social and 
medical: 
P1’) If  there is nothing, per sē, disabling about the environment and 
P2’) There is nothing, per sē, disabling about physiological difference, then 
C1’) Disability arises out of  a connexion or relationship between the individual and the 	
	        	         environment. 
Thus the theory of  disability I present here can be considered a relational response to 
the phenomena of  disability, as the theory takes as its maxims that there is nothing, 
per sē, disabling about the environment and that there is nothing, per sē, disabling 
about physiological difference.  
	 The important relationship between every individual and their environment 
points towards disability being something which arises out of  some aspect or other of  
that relationship. Later in this thesis, I fully investigate the nature of  that relationship 
and how people may experience impeded in the conduct of  a particular task or goal 
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despite their having an innate capacity to achieve that task or goal. It is by attending to 
the manner in which the actions (which are denoted by verbs) achieve, or fail to 
achieve, their end that the PTD is able to tell us what is centrally important about 
disability itself.  
	 The Picture Theory of  Disability, then, is an adverbial account of disability 
and differs from the current accounts which are nounal; it seeks to offer a description 
of  ‘disability’ as something that is experienced, rather than some property that someone 
or some situation has. The medical model observes that a person possesses the 
property of  being disabled and the social model holds that disability lies in certain 
situations, social attitudes, or social institutions. The PTD, in distinction to both these 
theories, focuses on verbs of  activity — and in particular, on a certain kind of  
adverbial modification of  those verbs.  
	 Built into the PTD is a mechanism analogous to Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory. 
For Wittgenstein, pictures reach out to the world and show that objects stand in 
determinate relations to one another. The PTD does the same: it employs pictures 
which reach out to the world and shows that the objects (people, stairs, wheelchairs, 
roads, and kerbs, etc.) in that world stand in determinate relation to each other. Unlike 
Wittgenstein’s PT, the PTD gives greater focus to the verbs (and the adverbs which 
modify them). In Wittgenstein’s schematic ‘aRb’, it is the relation ‘R’ which the PTD 
considers particularly important. In a PTD approach to disability, what counts in the 
states of  affairs that are pictured is how easy or difficult it might be to engage or 
succeed in certain activities or actions. What disability is, the PTD claims, is the 
experience of  a personally irremediable impediment in the conduct of  those verbs; 
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disability is adverbial because it is linked to the way in which those verbs of  action are 
modified: roughly speaking, positive or neutral modification shows no disability; 
negative modification shows disability. In short, the PTD is designed to evaluate 
disability as an experience rather than a property someone has — there are no ‘disabled 
people’ or ‘disabling social conditions’, there are just persons who experience disability 
as they go about leading their lives like the rest of  us. The theory is intended to show 
how and who experiences disability, and the results are not always intuitive. 
	 Throughout this thesis, I shall occasionally use the terms ‘impediment’ or 
‘impeding’. These terms arise out of  the notion of  a task achieved with great 
‘difficulty, vexation, or frustration’. I originally intended the word ‘frustrated’ to mean 
‘denied’ but refrain from its use somewhat knowing that the word is more commonly 
used to imply vexation. Where it is used, ‘frustration’ must be taken to mean the 
prevention of  progress or the fulfilment of  something. However, another important 
advantage of  ‘frustration’ should be observed at this point. It is possible that an 
individual’s progress in an activity may be frustrated, without that individual necessarily 
feeling frustrated. The result of  this is that the Picture Theory of  Disability does not 
depend upon wellbeing as either a necessary component of  disability.  Certainly there 99
may be a reduction of  wellbeing in a disabling experience, but it is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient compliment to disability. Instead, I use the word ‘impeded’ and its 
various related forms to suggest the idea that a task may involve such a significant level 
of  difficulty that it may even result in an inability to perform an activity.  
 See note 368.99
!32
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
	 An adverbial approach to disability only tells us when and where an 
impediment to an action occurs — it does not tell us anything about whether or not 
the action’s impediment is excessive, unremitting, or unusual. In order to determine 
that, I need to employ a further element to the theory which might help us to 
understand how it feels to perform a certain action in a certain way. Humean 
‘sympathy’  — the mechanism by which one person comes to largely share in the 100
emotional sentiment or ‘passion’ of  another by looking upon them  — gives a fuller 101
understanding of  the manner in which the activity is being conducted because the 
observer can relate to the individual in the picture on a very fundamental level. 
Because humans have this inbuilt ability to share another’s feelings, if  an observer sees 
frustration, sadness, dejection, pain, or some such similar emotion being expressed 
during the impeded conduct of  activity which might not (for many other people) 
generate such a response, then the observer is aware that there is a ‘problem’ in the 
picture. This feeling can then be considered in conjunction with the linguistic analysis 
of  that picture which locates the exact nature of  the way in which the verb's action is 
impeded — thus, an experience of  disability can be identified and understood. The 
PTD is more nuanced than has been briefly presented here — there are subordinate 
 The term ‘sympathy’ is disliked in the DRM and associated circles because it implies 100
notions of  pity (in the modern sense). It is important that it is understood that I take Hume to 
mean ‘to understand and reflect other’s inclinations, emotions, and sentiments’. In other words, 
that it is much less of  a feeling, and much more a sort of  psychological mechanism similar to 
empathy. Hume says of  sympathy: “No quality of  human nature is more remarkable, both in itself  
and in its consequences, than the propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments…” (Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, T, 
2.1.11.2; SBN 316).
 Moral sentimentalism did not originate in Hume, but Hume presents a definitive 101
version of  it and has other elements of  benefit to disability studies. For this reason, I focus on 
Hume’s version.
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constraints and limitations — but here, in short, is an overview of  how the PTD 
operates. The picture theory offers no necessary and sufficient conditions for disability, 
however, a (very) general formulation of  the Picture Theory of  Disability might be 
something like: 
Disability is the experience of an unremitting irremediable difficulty, 
frustration, or complete impediment in the conduct of daily-living 
tasks or goals engendered by a specific relationship between a person 
and their environment.  102
1.4 Why a ‘Picture Theory’ of  Disability 
Before I engage the main elements of  the thesis, I want to demonstrate how our 
‘everyday concept of  disability’  may improperly affect our judgement of  disability. 103
It is difficult, when debating disability, to divorce the reader from her idea that 
disability is simply deviation from physiological norm (the medical model is currently 
the socially influential model — even in very liberal countries). The force and clarity 
with which people believe that disability is caused by a physiological impairment is 
significant: I recall teaching a lecture on disability when, after presenting the medical 
model and beginning explication of  the social model, one of  the brightest students in 
the class began to push the ‘impossibility’ that there could be any other explanation of  
disability other than bio-statistical deviance from normality — that impairments are 
simply the cause of  disability. No matter how many ways I presented the social model, 
 This definition, such as it is, merely offers a sort of  rough idea of  disability to assist the 102
reader in understanding the theory. Limitations to this brief  definition are discussed in further 
chapters.
 I am thankful to Kahane & Savulescu (2009) for this locution which describes the 103
intuitional (but often incorrect) understanding of  disability which people tend to have in pointing 
out that ‘she is disabled’. 
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the student was completely unwilling  to open his mind to it. The reasons why this 104
belief  is so pervasive are a subject for another paper, however, I feel that I would be 
remiss if  I did not demonstrate how such a belief  is improper and mis-formed.  
	 Thomas Inglefield was born in 1769 in Hook, which was then a small village in 
Hampshire, England.  From Figure 1, it is 105
difficult to imagine what kind of  life he must 
have had. It is clear from his clothes that he 
was not impoverished, but it is challenging to 
speculate how he came about his money. Being 
a paraplegic in today’s society is fairly limiting: 
there are a significant number of  restricted 
opportunities and the Western desire to 
‘normalise’  people encourages persons with 106
such bodies to either withdraw from society or 
depend upon handouts. One might imagine, 
therefore, that it would have been much worse 
for Thomas back in the long Eighteenth 
Century. 
 I say ‘unwilling’ because this student was very smart, and more than able to grasp the 104
model’s maxims.
 Rev. John Platts, “Curiosities Respecting Man,” In Encyclopedia of  Natural and Artificial 105
Wonders and Curiosities including a Full and Authentic Description of  Remarkable and Astonishing Places, Beings, 
Animals, Customs, Experiments, Phenomena, Etc., of  Both Ancient and Modern Times, in All Parts of  the Globe, 
54-56. (New York, New York: World Publishing House, 1876).
 The process of  ‘fixing’ an individual with impairments to make him more ‘normal’. 106
This can be done through the use of  prosthetics, surgeries, or hearing aids or cochlear implants 
etc.
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Figure 1: David M. Turner, Thomas 
Inglefield, In Disability in Eighteenth-Century 
England, 2012.
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	 Of  course, ‘hiding out’ was always an opportunity in the long Eighteenth 
Century — but the types of  clothes Thomas is wearing suggests that this was not the 
option he chose. He could have inherited the money, but we know that he grew up in 
relative poverty in a small village. Begging or ‘showing’ himself  would have been 
financially beneficial, and though we have contesting reports about him doing so, it is 
2 to 1 against.  Another possible explanation might be a benefactor, but we also 107
know this not to be the case.  
	 In reality, the truth is unintuitive and surprising (given the ideas and 
opportunities we feel are open to paraplegics): Thomas was an etcher of  some 
significant repute  and his livelihood came from his careful, popular, and detailed 108
work.  In order to etch, Thomas held a scribe in-between his stump and his cheek 109
and moved it with the muscles in his mouth (as shown in the Figure 1).  In fact, the 110
few images we have of  him were self  etched from drawings made by his friend Mr. 
Riley.  Figure 2 shows Thomas in his studio posing with his etching and drawing tools. 111
Such was Thomas’s success that he was visited by nobility and granted gifts,  was 112
 This last point is disputed, Platts (who was contemporaneous with Inglefield) claims 107
that “He was not publicly shewn…,” whereas The Royal College of  Physicians observe (without 
citation) that “like many people exhibiting themselves in the Eighteenth century, Inglefield showed 
himself  privately.” According to Kirby (1820) there was no mention of  being exhibited. Source: 
https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/museum-and-garden/whats/re-framing-disability-portraits-royal-
college-physicians/thomas-inglefield-b, and Platts, (1876) 54-56.; Kirby, R. S., “An Eccentric 
Miser.” In Kirby's Wonderful and Eccentric Museum, Or, Magazine of  Remarkable Characters Volume 3 of  
Kirby's Wonderful and Eccentric Museum; Or, Magazine of  Remarkable Characters. Including All the Curiosities 
of  Nature and Art, from the Remotest Period to the Present, Vol. III. (London: R.S. Kirby, 1820), 89-90.
 Kirby, 1820, 89.108
 Platts, 1876, 54-56 109
 Kirby, 1820.110
 Turner, 2012. 111
 Kirby, 1820, 89.112
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able to rise from poverty without ‘displaying himself ’,  and was able to afford a 113
house off  Tottenham Court Road (which was 
then, and is now, a relatively well-to-do area of  
London).  114
	 It is our ‘everyday’ concept of  disability — 
of  what sorts of  things might have ‘disabled’ 
Thomas — which improperly informs our 
perception of  disability and encourages us to 
believe that disability is a simply a function of  
the body. When we see disabled persons 
perform tasks or achieve goals which we would 
not have expected given how we perceive 
disabled persons, we are often surprised by the 
results. This surprise often generates a ‘glee 
factor’ associated with certain social media ‘crip-porn’  events such as stories about 115
Tim Harris, the (Down Syndrome) owner of  Tim’s Place (an American restaurant in 
New Mexico). It is the case that many disabled persons do not consider themselves 
disabled with respect to certain tasks when other people expect that they are.   116
 Platts, 1876, 54-56.; Kirby, 1820, 89.113
 Platts, 1876, 54-56.; Kirby, 1820, 89.114
 A term attributed to Liz Carr which draws attention to the kinds of  social media posts 115
which engender a feeling of  glee from the abled observer. These sorts of  posts include the Down 
syndrome model, Madeline Stuart, and the 2015 birthday party of  autistic child Glenn Buratti.
 N. Watson, “Well, I Know This is Going to Sound Very Strange to you, but I do not 116
see Myself  as a Disabled Person,” Disability and Society, vol 17, 5, (2002), 509-527.; Graef, Roger. 
BBC. Brett: A Life with No Arms (2). UK: BBC, 2015. Film.
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Figure 2: The Royal College of  physicians, 
“Thomas Inglefield at the Age of  20. Born 
Without Arms or Legs”; Original work: 
Dec. 22, 1804 for R.S. Kirby.
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	 The PTD is intended (at least in part) as a corrective to the ‘everyday concept’ 
of  disability — to show the inappropriateness of  such intuitions by locating the actual 
experience of  disability. Neither picture of  Thomas shows disability — certainly, the 
physical impairments are obvious, but the PTD considers the impairments together with 
the environment.  The pictures of  Thomas show that disability is not a function of  117
either the individual or of  the environment because no disability presents, only the 
impairment presents. What matters to the PTD is what Thomas is doing or not doing 
in the picture — and more specifically, how impeded he is (or is not) in doing them. 
For instance, if  the picture shows him at his etching desk surrounded by his tools of  
trade, then it shows no disabling experience, but if  the picture shows him in a stable 
trying to mount a horse, then the disabling experience becomes self-evident. Again, 
the disability does not arise from his having no legs, but of  his having no legs and 
trying to mount a 16 hand horse; the disability is in the relationship between the 
individual and the environment, but more particularly, in what the individual is trying 
to do in that environment. 
	 The PTD, then, attends to all the elements in the picture — the objects, the 
relations, and the verbs which help describe those relations. For the PTD, just as it 
does for Wittgenstein, when a picture shows a state of  affairs it shows that objects 
stand in determinate relation to each other: it is the relationship between the objects 
(and the adverbs which modify the relations) which permits disability to be shown. If  a 
relation between two or more objects is one way, then a disabling experience may 
 In fact, the nature of  the impairment is irrelevant to the PTD — it may be that there is 117
no visual impairment at all. What matters is the relationship between the individual and the 
environment, and how disabling experiences arise as a function of  that relationship. 
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arise, but if  the relationship is another way, then a disabling experience may not arise. 
Figure 2, which shows the state of  affairs of  Thomas at his easel, shows that the 
relationship between the objects (Thomas, his easel, and his tools), and the adverbs 
which describe the relationship, engender no disabling experience. However, were we 
to have a picture which shows a state of  affairs where Thomas tries to mount a horse, 
then the picture would probably show that the relationship between the objects 
(Thomas, the horse, and the stable), and the adverbs which describe the relationship, 
engender a profoundly disabling experience.  
	 The impediment to mounting the horse would probably make Thomas vexed 
or worried about being kicked by it. Perhaps the journey for which he needed the 
horse was to sell some of  his etchings and constituted a major financial deal for him — 
in which case, Thomas may also be deeply concerned that he will miss the opportunity 
to make the sale and may be concerned about his finances and ability to live 
independently. It is not unreasonable to assume, then, that were a picture taken of  
such a state of  affairs, the picture might show the worry, distress, concern, and fear in 
Thomas’s face as well as the general futility in the relationship between Thomas and 
the horse. Here the observer of  the picture is affected by futility in the relationship as 
well as the emotions of  Thomas. It is in this way that the PTD pays attention to not 
only the objects, relationships, and the adverbs that describe those relationships in the 
picture, but also to the emotions and feelings presented by it. By paying attention to 
the emotions, it is possible to evaluate the severity of  the impediment to the goal, and 
the magnitude of  emotional distress which accompanies it.  
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1.5 Intended Applications and Developments  
The picture theory is also intended to be a third-party evaluative mechanism which 
more properly respects the lived experience of  persons with disabilities. A unique 
feature of  the model is its in-built cultural relativism: the theory permits certain 
cultural expectations and permits different socio-cultural backgrounds to inform 
decision making relevant to where the picture is situated. Moreover, it is intended that 
the theory may offer perspicacious insight for anyone who has — or will have — 
interaction with disabled people. As such, it is hoped that the theory will be used by 
persons with disabilities, city planners, members of  the medical profession, 
government authorities, educational institutions, architects, vehicular manufacturers, 
etc.  
	 Such a wide range of  persons and institutions means that the theory needs to 
be transparent and easy to use. Consequently, I shall avoid using complicated 
terminology and make the theory as approachable to lay-persons as is possible — 
hence I take care to eliminate unexamined terminology and philosophical concepts. 
Indeed, the theory itself  (being, in part, born of  Humean sympathy) is entrenched in 
the idea that all “human creatures are related to us by resemblance,”  and so we 118
have an ability to empathise  with their situations. By utilising this notion, I hope 119
 T, 2.2.7.2; SBN 369. References to the Treatise are to A Treatise of  Human Nature, ed. 118
David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): and are cited by 
book, part, section, and paragraph number, followed by the page number from A Treatise of  Human 
Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); 
and abbreviated “SBN” in the text. Any emphasis is Hume’s own, unless otherwise stated.
 Hume’s word was ‘sympathy’. I discuss the Humean element of  the Picture Theory in 119
Chapter 2, but it is enough to know here that Hume’s word ‘sympathy’ is roughly synonymous 
with today’s word ‘empathy’. I use the word interchangeably throughout the thesis. The 
neurobiological term ‘Sympathetic’ refers to the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems of  the 
body — not of, or belonging to, ‘sympathy’ in the usual sense.
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that most of  the readers of  this work should be able to understand, on a very 
immediate and personal level, the emotions and feelings which are a necessary part of  
constructing this theory. 
	 This thesis should be considered — above all — to constitute a theoretical 
investigation into the phenomena of  disability. However, as mentioned above, due to 
the number of  disciplines that are rightfully involved with the study of  disability, if  this 
picture theory of  disability is found to be persuasive, then a further amount of  work 
shall need to be done to investigate the ramifications of  this alternative approach to 
disability. For instance, such a change in perspective should (hopefully) result in a 
fundamental change in the way that medical procedures are evaluated, the way 
welfare is distributed, the way our cities are planned, and occasion a general increase 
in inclusion. Avenues in which this new account of  disability will be influential to other 
fields of  research shall be noted throughout the document — though again, I shall fall 
short of  engaging such issues. 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2. HUMEAN SENTIMENTALISM 
2.1 Introduction 
The PTD employs what I call ‘Naïve Sentimentalism Theory’ (NST) which arises out 
of  approaching disability through a Humean lens. Naïve Sentimentalism Theory is a 
simplified version of  Humean sympathy  together with the usefulness clause which 120
appears in section 2.5.1. It is so named as it offers a simplified or ‘naïve’ view of  the 
phenomena of  disability and drops the normative element  of  moral 121
sentimentalism.  Because NST is limited in its ability to discern the adverbial nature 122
of  disability it must be used in conjunction with the Picture Theory of  Disability 
which is presented in Chapter 4. 
	 Hume might appear to have little to contribute to contemporary debates in 
disability studies. As mentioned in the introduction, the social response to persons with 
impairments in the long Eighteenth Century was generally more accepting than what 
we have now — surprising, then, that Hume’s writing seems to be so harsh towards 
the sorts of  people we would now identify as part of  the disabled community. Hume 
discounts the perceptions of  those in “a defective state,”  and maintains that 123
 In that it does not involve the normative element of  moral sentimentalism.120
 Though NST might provide the first step out of  the descriptive PTD and into the 121
realm of  normativity.
 Hume is not the only person to investigate moral sentimentalism: the idea dates back 122
to the 7th Earl of  Shaftesbury. Hume’s treatment of  moral sentimentalism, however, is well known 
and approachable. Hume’s work in moral sentimentalism was further developed and presented in 
a more unusual format by Adam Smith.
 David Hume, “Of  the Standard of  Taste,” In Moral Philosophy, edited by Geoffrey 123
Sayre-McCord, (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2006), 349-350; ¶12.
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deformity results in pain, engenders humility,  and “produce[s] uneasiness.”  He 124 125
makes a causal connexion between the deformity of  a body and feelings of  humility 
for its owner  and follows with the notion that humility in the individual arises from 126
physical ‘uselessness’.  Consequently, Hume can be read as suggesting that the 127
feelings engendered by observing a person with disability would be revulsion (arising 
from uneasiness) and pity (arising from humility). Furthermore, Hume clearly posits 
that we are “asham’d of  such maladies as affect others, and are either dangerous or 
disagreeable to them.”  128
	 However, the Eighteenth century locution and rhetoric must not be measured 
against our contemporary linguistic preferences. Within contemporary disability 
rights, words such as ‘pity’ and ‘deformed’ are understood as intentional and 
derogatory expressions of  ableism and patronisation, and as such, they are alleged to 
be a function of  a conscious or non-conscious aversion to disabled people.  Despite 129
Hume’s linking the aversion to disabled people to the feelings of  uneasiness and horror 
 Hume’s definition of  ‘humility’ may be read in two different ways: the ‘humility’ 124
understood by Christian virtue (say); or the ‘disagreeable impression which rises in the mind’ (T, 
2.1.7.8; SBN 297). The former is more inline with the contemporary use of  humility, the latter 
more inline with ‘shame’. I here take Hume to mean something a bit more like ‘shame’. For 
instance, were  I to have a dirty and unkept house, I would feel — according to Hume — 
“humility” (T, 2.1.5.9; SBN 289), whereas I believe we would today describe my feeling as 
‘shamefulness’.
 T, 2.1.7.2; SBN 295.125
 T, 2.1.8.1; SBN 298 & T, 2.1.8.8; SBN 302.126
 T, 2.1.8.5; SBN 300. “Concerning all other bodily accomplishments we may observe in 127
general, that whatever in ourselves is either useful, beautiful, or surprizing, is an object of  pride; 
and its contrary, [uselessness] of  humility.” Emphasis mine.
 T, 2.1.8.9; SBN 303.128
 Godrej, Dinyar. “Stuff  Pity,” New Internationalist, November 1, (2015), 2-5. ‘Piss on pity’ 129
is a standard and much used rallying cry for the disability rights community. It can be seen in 
much of  the work of  Johnny Crescendo, a disability rights activist musician from the UK.
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generated by observing such people, we should be fair to writers of  the time and note 
that while today we are sensitive to the need to be more non-discriminatory, in the 
Eighteenth century words to which we are now sensitive did not necessarily carry the 
kind of  pejorative baggage they do today. But beyond such an ex-tempore observation, 
this chapter argues that elements of  Hume’s philosophy contribute meaningfully — 
and importantly — to disability studies.  
2.2 Neurobiological Support for Moral Sentimentalism 
Before elaborating on Humean sympathy, it might be appropriate to note that though 
moral sentimentalism has its detractors, there exists contemporary neurobiological 
research which offers some support for the mechanism. I must be clear that I do not 
wish to say that neurobiology ‘has proven moral sentimentalism to be the mechanism 
by which we come to making moral evaluations’. What I do wish to say is that it is too 
quick to simply discount moral sentimentalism as an out-of-date moral theory because 
there exists some neurobiological support that we do, in fact, develop moral responses 
to stimulus in the ways posited by theories of  moral sentimentalism. Mario Mendez, 
for example, suggests that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex  (VMPFC) of  the brain 130
 The lower middle part of  the brain above the eyes. From: Ventro: underneath; medial: 130
in the middle.
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deals with “complex ‘self-other conjoining,’”  and that the ‘Theory of  Mind’ (ToM) 131
“… facilitates the appreciation that others have thoughts, feelings, and beliefs.”   132
	 This self-other conjoining is a sort of  “resonating of  the protagonist’s mental 
and emotional states with that of  someone else”  and seems to be very similar to the 133
kind of  thing Hume had in mind when he observed that “[a person’s] interests, their 
passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce 
an emotion similar to the original one…”  However, the VMPFC and the ToM are 134
not alone in self-other conjoining: the OFC/VL  mirror neurons help modulate self-135
other conjoining when the observed intentions and emotions of  others are internally 
mapped or imitated. This process actually replicates in the observer the perceived 
emotion or feeling of  the observed. Keysers notes that: 
… our brain first simulates what the other person’s face is doing in the 
premotor cortex, and once you share the facial expression in your premotor 
cortex, your insula  kicks in, making you share the feelings of  that person.  136 137
 M. F. Mendez, “The Neurobiology of  Moral Behavior: Review and Neuropsychiatric 131
Implications,” CNS Spectrum. 2009;14 (11): 608-620.
 The ‘ToM’ is the ability to appreciate the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of  others, and 132
the VMPFC is an area of  the brain which may be responsible for an automatic, emotionally-
mediated moral network — or more simply, where the brain may generate morality. Mendez does 
qualify that “although much of  the presented evidence is still debated, a picture of  moral 
neuroscience is beginning to emerge.” Mendez, 2009, 608-620.
 Mendez, 2009, 608-620.133
 T, 2.2.7.2; SBN 369.134
 Orbitofrontal cortex; the area around the outside of  the front part of  the brain. From: 135
Orbito: surrounding; frontal: front. Ventrolateral (VL) Cortex: The area at the underneath and 
away from the centre. From Ventro: belly; lateral: away from the middle (median).
 Insula: Insula cortex; refers to one of  the folds in the lumpy bit of  the brain — 136
common to all people, and located in the centre of  the brain where the outsides of  the two 
hemispheres meet.
 Christian Keysers, “The Discovery of  Mirror Neurons,” In The Empathic Brain: How the 137
Discovery of  Mirror Neurons Changes Our Understanding of  Human Nature, (Lexington, KY: Social Brain 
Press, 2011),114.
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In fact, mirror neurons work so effectively that simply observing another individual 
permits their actions to become your actions, and for ‘you to feel as they feel.’   138
	 Mendez observes that developmental sociopaths, who often show little ability to 
empathise and have reduced moral emotions: 
… show minimal alterations in heart rate, skin conductance, or respirations 
when they are subjected to fear or stressful or unpleasant pictures, and they 
have reduced autonomic responses to the distress of  others, as well as reduced 
recognition of  sad and fearful expressions.  139
Work in morality and neurobiology can, therefore, be assisted by investigating 
responses from persons who have a reduced moral aptitude such as sociopaths or 
people with chronic antisocial behaviour.  Non-sociopaths generate sympathetic 140
arousal in response to the distress of  others and stressful or unpleasant pictures 
whereas sociopaths demonstrate limited or no sympathetic arousal.  Mendez 141
remarks that neurobiology can demonstrate that the VMPFC is involved in “the 
‘cognitive’ aspects of  empathy, such as taking someone else’s perspective and 
vicariously identifying with it.”   142
	 Neurobiology, Mendez claims, suggests that the VMPFC is both influenced by 
observing emotional stimulus and “attaches moral and emotional value to social 
 Keysers, 2011, 19.138
 Mendez, 2009, 608-620.139
 Ibid.140
 “Sociopaths have instrumental (cold-blooded and goal-directed) aggression with 141
decreased sympathetic arousal. On psychophysiological measures, they show minimal alterations 
in heart rate, skin conductance, or respirations when they are subjected to fear or stressful or 
unpleasant pictures, and they have reduced autonomic responses to the distress of  others, as well 
as reduced recognition of  sad and fearful expressions.” Mendez, 2009, 608-620.
 Mendez, 2009, 608-620.142
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events, anticipates their future outcomes, and participates in ToM, empathy…”  But 143
more importantly, he posits that the most emotional aspects of  empathy belong to 
phylogenetically old systems.  As older cognitive systems often ‘fire’ before the higher 144
cognitive systems,  this fact suggests that perceiving other’s emotional disposition is 145
not just influential, but that it forms a base response which is moderated by higher 
cognitive reflection.   146
	 Finally, Hume’s moral sentimentalism leans upon the claim that “all human 
creatures are related to us by resemblance.”  This resemblance seems to be borne 147
out by Mendez’s claim that higher cognitive reflections are affected by certain 
variables such as the self  as the agent of  an action and the perceived similarity 
between the self  and others.  Such similarity helps us to create a moral attitude 148
towards them, and is influential in our evaluation of  fairness and the generation of  
other moral emotions and sentiments.  Consequently, textual support in 149
neurobiology can be found for  Hume’s general claim that ‘we are able  to directly feel 
the passion of  another’. 
 Ibid.143
 Ibid.144
 By ‘fire’ I mean are shown to become active slightly before other systems when viewed 145
under an fMRI. In other words, older emotionally driven areas of  the brain respond to input first 
and are then mediated by the younger cognitive systems.
 Mendez, 2009, 608-620.146
 T, 2.2.7.2; SBN 369.147
 Mendez, 2009, 608-620.148
 Ibid.; Keysers, 2011, 19.149
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2.3 On the Motivation to Act (Conation) 
The psychological mechanism by which one person infers the affections of  another by 
the communication of  the sentiments  is critical to understanding this thesis, and so 150
Hume’s idea of  ‘sympathy’ requires a clear explication as it is somewhat inconsistent. 
Vitz presents three distinct uses:  151
(1) To identify a cognitive mechanism by which a person ‘enters into’ 
the sentiment of  another, 
(2) To identify the sentiment that is communicated by the principle of  
sympathy,  
(3) To identify the conversion process itself. 
However, it is only with (1) that I am concerned, and use of  the word ‘sympathy’ in 
this thesis should be taken to mean the cognitive mechanism by which one enters into 
the sentiment of  another. 
	 According to Hume, when we experience an external object “the ideas [we] 
form are exact representations of  the impressions [we feel].”  If  an impression is 152
sufficiently intense — such as one caused by an ‘affection’  — then the resultant 153
impression will be as intense as the original:  
 Something akin to our contemporary word ‘emotion’.150
 Vitz, Rico. “Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology.” Journal of  the 151
History of  Philosophy, 42, no. 3 (2004): 261-75.
 T, 1.1.1.3; SBN 3.152
 By ‘affection’ I take Hume to mean how a person is feeling (what emotional state/153
condition they are in).
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This idea [of  an affection] is presently converted into an impression, and 
acquires such a degree of  force and vivacity, as to become the very passion 
itself, and produce and equal emotion, as any original affection.  154
The observation of  an affection in an individual generates an equal affection in the 
spectator. Vitz employs Hume’s example of  a beggar in his description of  sympathy:  
Given the account [of  sympathy] Hume provides in the Treatise, the 
psychological mechanism of  sympathy causes a person (e.g., Hume) to feel 
benevolence for a beggar in the following way. The process of  sympathetic 
conversion begins when he sees the beggar and, consequently, acquires the idea 
of  a passion, such as misery… The principle of  sympathy then operates on the 
faculty of  imagination to increase the ‘force’ or ‘liveliness’ of  the idea of  the 
beggar's misery to such a degree that the idea becomes an impression…  155
Hume cautions that the sentiments of  those others who are not close to us have less of  
an effect on us than those who enjoy a stronger relation.  Hume is clear that were 156
the sensations to be removed from thought and feeling then we would be incapable of  
passion, action, desire, or volition.  The spectator closely ‘resembles’ the beggar and: 157
… makes him ‘conceive the beggar's sentiment in the strongest and most lively 
manner’. Thus, [the spectator] ‘enters into’ the sentiment of  the beggar and 
 T, 2.1.11.3; SBN 317. A close reading of  this passage begets a query as to the manner 154
in which Hume is using the word ‘idea’. At the beginning of  The Treatise, Hume posits that ‘ideas’ 
are feint thoughts, and ‘impressions’ are forceful and violent. The latter are cause by the sensations 
and emotions, the former by thinking on things. Yet the quote footnoted here says that ‘perceiving 
the external signs conveys an idea of  an affection, and this idea generates an impression’ which 
seems to confuse the definitions. The production of  the resultant impression is inconsistent with 
the kind of  perception with which we are dealing.  
According to Hume, witnessing something through the senses should already generate an 
impression (as sight is a violent and forceful perception); there should be no need for an idea of  it. 
However, Hume may also be using the word ‘idea’ in the sense of  ‘notion’ or ‘understanding’. In 
this case, we could read Hume to be saying: ‘…it is at first known only by its effects, and by those 
external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an understanding of  it. This 
understanding is presently converted into an impression…’ Being unsure on this matter, I shall take it 
to mean the latter as this seems to resolve the issue sufficiently for the purposes of  this thesis.
 Vitz, 2004, 264-65.155
 T, 2.1.11.5; SBN 318.156
 T, 3.3.1.2; SBN 574.157
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experiences a sentiment of  sympathy. Consequently, he experiences benevolent 
motivation.  158
It follows, then, that our conation is profoundly encouraged  by external signs and 159
the affection they engender upon us:  160
As in strings equally wound up, the motion of  one communicates itself  to the 
rest ; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget 
correspondent movements in every human creature. When I see the effects of  
passion in the voice and gesture of  any person, my mind immediately passes 
from these effects to their causes, and forms such  lively idea of  the passion, as 
is presently converted into the passion itself.  161
As pain and pleasure are linked closely with our notions of  vice and virtue,  our 162
sense of  moral good and bad follows from justice and injustice.  163
	 Since Hume’s moral theory involves three psychologically distinct perspectives 
(those of  the agent, the receiver, and the spectator),  it can be observed that when an 164
action is evaluated it is possible for all three perspectives to exist within one individual 
 Vitz, 2004, 264-65.158
 I qualify this point with the observation that Hume maintains that some character 159
traits — such as benevolence — are innate. (Vitz, 2004, 264-265.) It follows that some inclination 
to act must come innately and an individual may possess some virtuous or vicious inclinations (or 
perhaps both). I am thankful to James Fieser’s Early Responses to Hume's Moral, Literary and Political 
Writings for a clear presentation of  the innate inclination to act.
 I am, of  course, sensitive to the objection raised that virtue and vice must arise out of  160
the sensations of  the external signs — not the signs themselves (as Hume himself  noted (T, 3.1.2.4; 
SBN 471)), but I do not wish to delve too deeply into the nuances of  that argument — it is 
sufficient that I here simply present the rudimentary notion that the external signs are influential 
in our developing a passion similar to the original. Also, see note 171.
 T, 3.3.1.7; SBN 576.161
 T, 3.3.1.2; SBN 574.162
 T, 3.2.2.23; SBN 499.163
 Fieser, James, ed. “Introduction,” in Early Responses to Hume's Moral, Literary and Political 164
Writings. (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press), 2005. Though I had understood how the three 
perspectives of  a moral action worked, I had struggled to find any explicit explanation in The 
Treatise. I am, therefore again, indebted to the introduction to Early Responses to Hume's Moral, 
Literary & Political Writings, for its explication of  Moral Sense Theory.
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— such a potential permits an internal measure of  our own moral actions: “we 
naturally sympathise with others in the sentiments they entertain of  us.”  Thus, “self-165
interest is the original motive to the establishment of  justice: but a sympathy with public interest is 
the source of  the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.”  Were our action not to 166
receive a public approbation, then we would feel the lack of  approval as uneasiness 
and be disinclined to perform the action. 
	 Even when evaluating our own actions, the mechanism of  Hume’s moral 
philosophy is not solely individual, but depends jointly upon the affections which arise in 
the spectator by virtue of  sympathy and with consideration to the public interest (or 
the Social). By which I mean to say that even in the evaluation of  our own actions we 
consider how others would view our action. This interplay between an individual and 
the Social demonstrates a strong relation between the individual and the Social. This 
relation shall be further examined in Section 2.5. 
2.3.1 The Potential for Incorrect Synthesis 
An issue concerning the epistemic authority of  the spectator arises: Hume holds that 
sympathy engenders a passion in the spectator supposedly equal to the original — yet it 
is unclear to me that there should always be agreement in the affection of  the spectator 
and the spectated.  
	 If  sympathy requires that I am brought to share the affection of  the person I 
am watching, then it requires that I share similar values to the person that I am 
 T, 3.2.2.23; SBN 499.165
 T, 3.2.2.23; SBN 499. 166
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observing. As Hume assumes that people are largely the same he also assumes that the 
things they value are likely to be the same. For instance, Hume maintains that: ‘shame’ 
is felt from the loss of  a faculty: 
Nothing mortifies [old men] more than the consideration of  their age and 
infirmities. They endeavour, as long as possible, to conceal their blindness and 
deafness, their rheums and gouts ; nor do they ever confess them without 
reluctance and uneasiness.  167
Qualifying the above, it is important to note that the question of  whether or not those 
persons who lose faculties actually miss them is importantly different to whether or not 
those people who never had them will want them. Nevertheless, Hume, as an able-
bodied person unused to thinking with the perspectives and values of  a disabled 
person, makes the mistake of  treating a certain difference in functionality as being 
negative — a loss, or an inability. Rachael Cooper, in her paper “Can it be a Good 
Thing to be Deaf,” observes that many of  the Deaf  community believe that being 168
deaf  is actually good, and seek to isolate their non-hearing communities in order to 
protect their culture.  However, according to Hume the impression engendered from 169
observing a deaf  person would result an indirect passion of  pity — such an impression 
would, for Cooper, be improperly formed as it would not reflect the perception of  the 
deaf  person. Cooper’s observations highlight that it would be a mistake to make the 
Humean assumption that being unable to hear is something bad and to be pitied. 
	 I query, therefore, the epistemic authority of  the of  the spectator in Hume's 
synthesis, and acknowledge the potential for an ‘impression’ in the spectator to 
 T, 2.2.8.8; SBN 302.167
 Capital D-Deaf  refers to the culture and community of  deaf  people.168
 Rachel Cooper,  “Can it be a good thing to be deaf ?” in Journal of  Medicine & 169
Philosophy,  Vol. 32, (6), (Nov/Dec 2007), 563- 583.
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become incorrectly synthesised such that it is not a proper copy of  the original. In the 
PTD, this issue is resolved by having access to the perspectives of  the individuals in the 
picture. By tempering the immediate emotional response and the cognitive evaluation 
of  the cause of  that emotion with the perspectives of  the individual in question, the 
potential for error is reduced. It is also the case that the PTD considers the goals or 
tasks which are being attempted: If, for instance, a deaf  individual is depicted at a 
concert in a picture, we cannot simply assume there is a disabling experience because 
we believe that the individual cannot hear the music. It may be the case that the 
individual loves the feel of  the music and the company of  his friends and the visual 
experience. These additional or satellite elements are accessible through the PTD and 
reduce the potential for error in analysis of  a disabling experience. 
2.4 On the External Signs and The Medical Model 
In his early work, Amundson agreed that “the concept of  disability requires us to 
consider the actions (movements and perceptual acts) of  a biologically normal person 
at the hierarchical level of the person's (whole) body.”  The mechanism of  Hume’s 170
sympathy similarly hinges on the empirical: “When any affection is infus’d by 
sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs  in the 171
 Amundson, 1992. Emphasis his.170
 It is important to note that Hume does not speak of  the experience of  ‘external objects’. 171
Instead, he is careful to note that the cause of  sensory impressions is unknown — this ambiguity is 
related to Hume’s fork. However, in this passage above, it is clear to me that Hume really is talking 
about the countenance and look of  an individual — the kind of  way a person looks. Whether or 
not this claim contradicts his larger belief  of  external objects and sensory impressions is the 
subject for another work.
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countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of  it.”  Vitz presents the 172
connexion between the external signs and the process of  sympathetic conversion: 
The process of  sympathetic conversion begins when he sees the beggar and, 
consequently, acquires the idea of  a passion, such as misery. This idea is 
acquired from an impression of  the beggar's misery, which is known by the 
effects and ‘external signs’ of  the sentiment—perhaps, for instance, the 
beggar's worn clothes and malnourished physique.  173
Consequently, both the medical model of  disability and Hume's sympathy can be said 
to be grounded in the individual and are motivated by the external signs. 
	 As physical impairments tend to be observable at the external level, one may 
expect that Hume would also perceive disability as a limitation of  function. When 
Hume offers epilepsy as evidence that “bodily pain and sickness are in themselves 
proper causes of  humility…,”  he presents a demonstration provided at the 174
‘hierarchical level of  a person’s whole body’: “We are asham’d… of  the epilepsy; 
because it gives horror to everyone present…”  The implied premise is that epileptic 175
fits (visible at the whole-body level) are unpleasant and difficult to watch. 
	 Tonic-clonic seizures, as seen in many types of  fit, would doubtfully meet 
Hume’s aesthetic notions of  grace or beauty. Wherever we form ideas of  beauty our 
impressions engender a passion of  pride; conversely, wherever there is deformity, we 
feel ‘pity’: “Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only the necessary attendants of  
beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence.”  For Hume, this notion of  176
 T, 2.1.11.3; SBN 317.172
 Vitz, 2004, 264-65. Sympathetic in the sense of  ‘empathetic’, not in the sense of  173
‘neurobiological’.
 T, 2.1.8.8; SBN 302. 174
 T, 2.1.8.9; SBN 303.175
 T, 2.1.8.2; SBN 299.176
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beauty and deformity applies to all objects — and more so our own bodies. Further 
agreement with the MM of  disability being “deviation from the functional 
organisation of  a typical member of  a species,”  can be found in Hume’s 177
distinguishing character of  beauty: “such an order and construction of  parts, as either 
by the primary constitution of  our nature, by custom, or by caprice, is fitted to give a 
pleasure and satisfaction to the soul.”  In this manner, a ‘dis-order and construction 178
of  parts’, would constitute deformity:  
… we may conclude, that beauty is nothing but a form, which produces 
pleasure, as deformity is a structure of  parts which conveys pain ; and since the 
power of  producing pain and pleasure make this in a manner the essence of  
beauty and deformity, all the effects of  these qualities must be derived from the 
sensation ; and among the rest pride and humility, which of  all their effects are 
the most common and remarkable.  179
I think it, therefore, uncontroversial that Hume would perceive an individual with 
three limbs, say, to be ‘deformed’, and pitiful. 
2.5 On Sympathy and The Social Model 
In the previous section, we saw that Hume linked the indirect passion of  pity to the 
senses, which were in turn, generated through the experience of  the external sign of  
passion in another. From this perspective, I concluded that a Humean approach to 
disability could readily fall in line with the medical model because of  its concordance 
with physical deviation from biological norm witnessed at the hierarchical level of  the 
 Norman Daniels, “Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice,” in Medicine and Moral 177
Philosophy: A “Philosophy and Public Affairs” Reader, edited by Marshall Cohen, (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2014), 90.
 T, 2.1.8.2; SBN 299.178
 T, 2.1.8.2; SBN 299.179
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whole body. But let us take into consideration that we also feel for others because they 
are like us: 
We have a lively idea of  everything related to us. All human creatures are 
related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their interests, their 
passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and 
produce an emotion similar to the original one ; since a lively idea is easily 
converted into an impression.  180
An important observation can be made from the above quote: Hume refers, not just to 
our sympathies with an individual, but also “their interests, their passions, their pains 
and pleasures.”  It is, in part, this specific observation which contributes to a weak 181
social model reading of  Hume. 
	 The various versions of  the weak social model largely prioritise the lived 
experience of  an individual.  As “the passions are so contagious, that they pass with 182
the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce correspondent 
movements in all human breasts,”  we must give consideration to the bigger picture 183
— literally:  
Were I present at any of  the more terrible operations of  surgery, ’tis certain, 
that even before it begun, the preparation of  the instruments, the laying of  the 
bandages in order, the heating of  the irons, with all the signs of  anxiety and 
concern in the patient and assistants, wou’d have a great effect upon my mind, 
and excite the strongest sentiments of  pity and terror.  184
But here, it is the environment which is relevant to our sympathies — not just the 
individual themselves. Hume continues to observe:  
 T, 2.2.7.2; SBN 369.180
 T, 2.2.7.2; SBN 369.181
 Silvers, 2010. 19-36.; Amundson, 2000.; 2010.182
 T, 3.3.3.5; SBN 605.183
 T, 3.3.1.7; SBN 576.184
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No passion of  another discovers itself  immediately to the mind. We are 
only sensible of  its causes and effects. From these we infer the passion : 
And consequently, these give rise to our sympathy.  185
Hume provides a second example of  concern for the immediate environment and its 
relationship to an individual: 
Supposing I saw a person perfectly unknown to me, who, while asleep in the 
fields, was in danger of  being trod under foot by horses, I shou’d immediately 
run to his assistance ; and in this I shou’d be actuated by the same principle of  
sympathy, which makes me concern’d for the present sorrows of  a stranger. 
The bare mention of  this is sufficient.  186
What generates Hume’s reaction is the anticipation of  something happening to that 
sleeping person. The reaction is not a function of  an impairment or a disability which 
a person experiences. In the above example, Hume is concerned not just with the 
environment surrounding the sleeping person, but also that the individual is unable to 
respond to the danger and would be hurt. 
	 A gedankenexperiment presents itself: were a spectator to observe an individual 
walking up some steps, then a certain impression would be generated. If  little or no 
distress be perceived, a less forceful impression would result. However, were the 
spectator to view an elderly person or some individual with a lower limb impairment 
attempt the stairs she might feel a more violent impression — one which mirrors the 
frustration or exertion in the individual: “In like manner, when I perceive the causes of  
any emotion, my mind is convey’d to the effects, and is actuated with a like 
emotion.”  187
 T, 3.3.1.7; SBN 576.185
 T, 2.2.9.13; SBN 385.186
 T, 3.3.1.7; SBN 576.187
!57
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
	 Weak social models maintain that it is the Social and the built environment 
which disables, not the individual — and Hume’s description of  sympathy seems 
sensitive to this position. The sympathetic passion arising from watching a wheelchair 
user access a stepped building or public transport, for instance, would probably result 
in frustration or anger from a difficulty — and as such the sympathetic response of  
pity is, in part only, in relation to the impediment being experienced. The sympathetic 
passion arising from watching a wheelchair user compete in wheelchair-rugby, because 
it does not disable the individual, is more likely to be positive because it reflects the 
passion of  the original.  
	 Indeed, it is because of  the relation of  the individual to the environment and 
the Social that I suggest Hume’s sympathy tempers a strict medical model reading of  
disability with elements from the social model of  disability. A Humean approach 
might consider both the external signs (the physical form, and its impairments and 
limitations) as well as the environmental (the environmental objects with which an 
individual interacts which generally engender a passion in the individual). As such, I 
believe a Humean approach to disability reconciles both models suggesting a relational 
account of  disability. 
2.5.1 The Usefulness Clause 
Further powerful support that a Humean approach to disability is relational can be 
found in his equation of  usefulness with pleasure:  
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Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor… it is 
sure to please the spectator by delicate sympathy with the possessor… and 
pleases us by nothing but its tendency to produce an end that is agreeable.  188
It is a commonly held belief  by the DRM that their physical form or various 
impairments should not be compared to any values of  ‘normal’ — instead their 
differences should be embraced. Indeed, some suggest  that a ‘reconstruction of  189
normalcy’ is needed, and that such a reconstruction would help reduce oppression and 
increase inclusion of  persons with disabilities. Viewing disability through a Humean 
lens may not get us that far, but it certainly respects the fact that usefulness is innately 
pleasurable and therefore, valuable.  
	 Hume does speak about the usefulness of  objects: he suggests things such as 
“the convenience of  a house, the fertility of  a field, the strength of  a horse,”  etc., to 190
be useful — I see no reason why a limb could not be considered useful, and thus, I 
cannot see any reason why an individual is not entitled to pleasure from whatever 
degrees of  usefulness they enjoy. I call this ‘the usefulness clause’. 
	 Chris Koch, a resident of  Alberta living near my institution, was born with 
differently formed arms and legs. Though different from the limbs we most often see 
in society, they are as useful to him as ours are to us: he can write, maintain personal 
hygiene, snowboard, and perform almost all chores on a working farm.  He 191
remarked in Oprah’s Super Soul Sunday that he does not wear prosthetics as “they just 
 T, 3.3.1.8; SBN 576.188
 For example, Nick Watson 2002.189
 T, 3.3.1.8; SBN 576.190
 Google, Talks At. “Chris Koch: ‘If  I Can…’ | Talks at Google.” YouTube. September 3, 191
2015.
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didn’t work for me,”  and instead, prefers to maximise the use of  the limbs he has. A 192
Humean approach might go so far as to suggest that if  a limb is useful to its possessor, 
then it has beauty and should be both respected and valued. 
	 But there are two elements to consider here. The first is that an individual’s 
form can be useful to them — even if  others find it difficult to imagine how. The 
second is whether or not having certain abilities is valuable. On the last point Cooper 
suggests that certain Deaf  communities do not value the ability to hear — rather they 
consider the ability to be detrimental to their society (as hearing brings a set of  values 
that are inconsistent with the beliefs of  the Deaf  community).  On the former, 193
Thomas Inglefield, and Chris Koch show that our expectations of  functionality and 
usefulness are misplaced and inaccurate. Koch for example, has very neat writing and 
is able to brush his teeth; and Inglefield was able to make careful and detailed etchings 
by “guiding the pen and pencil with the muscles of  his cheek and arm.” 	  194
 Val Fortney, “Oprah’s Super Soul Sunday Film Featuring Nanton’s Chris Koch Goes 192
Viral,” Calgary Herald, May 21, 2014.
 Cooper, 2007, 563- 583.193
 Turner, 2012, 98.194
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3. WITTGENSTEIN’S PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
3.1 Overview 
I preface this section with the understanding that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus  is 195
a very careful and nuanced book. The summary of  his Picture Theory provided in this 
section is unfairly brief, and those criticisms of  his work here included are briefer still. 
The reader is reminded that a complete explication of  his Picture Theory of  
Language is not necessary; it is enough to roughly understand the basic principles 
behind it.  
	 Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory is unrelated to disability. Instead, he employed 
the analogy of  pictures-representing-reality to explain how language-maps-reality — a 
sort of  metaphysical lever employed to determine the important connexion between 
language and reality.  In 1922, Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory appeared in his book, 196
The Tractatus, where it was used to help identify what relation one fact must have to 
another such that it is capable of  being a symbol for that other.   197
 All reference to the Tractatus are to Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 195
translated by D. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 201), 31, and appear 
as the indexical number of  the proposition. 
 Bryan Magee, The Great Philosophers; Wittgenstein, Online, Performed by John Searl. 196
(1987; London: BBC). Television.
 Bertrand Russell, introduction to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by Ludwig Wittgenstein 197
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) x.
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3.2 Objects, Elementary Propositions, and Propositional Signs. 
The Tractatus begins with an ontological structure of  the world. He states that “the 
world is all that is the case,”  and that “a state of  affairs (a state of  things) is a 198
combination of  objects.”  In Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory only objects have 199
names  and objects must stand in a determinate relationship to one another. The 200
existence of  these states of  affairs is a fact — or “what is the case.”  Though 201
Wittgenstein goes so far as to outline what are ‘objects’ and how they come together to 
create a state of  affairs, his theory has ambiguities and has received various criticisms.  
	 In the introduction to The Tractatus, Bertrand Russell remarks that, “a logically 
perfect language has rules of  syntax which prevent nonsense, and has single symbols 
which always have a definite and unique meaning.”  Language is charged with 202
(amongst other things) asserting or denying facts,  thus, some connexion between the 203
structure of  the fact and the structure of  the proposition which describes that fact is 
demanded. In the sense used here, ‘logical propositions’ are linguistic expressions that 
are intended to indicate a fact or state of  affairs. Wittgenstein’s definition of  a 
proposition states that, “a proposition is an expression of  agreement and disagreement 
with truth-possibilities of  elementary propositions.”   204
 1.198
 2.01.199
 3.203; 3.221.200
 2.201
 Russell, 2010, x.202
 I use the word ‘fact’ in both the Wittgensteinian sense (what is and is not the case), and 203
also in the looser definition (actuality, truth, etc.).
 4.4204
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	 Though Wittgenstein never supplied a single example of  an elementary 
proposition  he said of  them that the “simplest kind of  proposition, an elementary 205
proposition, asserts the existence of  a state of  affairs.”  An example of  which might 206
be something like ‘the cat is in the box’. Elementary propositions consist of  names; 
they are “a nexus, a concatenation, of  names.”  Such propositions assert the 207
existence of  a state of  affairs — and so, an elementary proposition is true if  and only 
if  a certain collection of  objects stand in a certain relation (and can be seen, more 
loosely, to assert the existence of  a combination of  objects (names)  and says that 208
they stand in a certain relation). A proposition, on the other hand, enables “the 
composition of  more complex propositions from atomic ones by using truth-functional 
operators”  such as ‘and’ and ‘or’. A proposition’s truth value (true or false), 209
therefore, depends upon the truth values of  the elementary propositions as well as the 
mechanism by which the elementary propositions are connected;  it is a “description 210
of  a state of  affairs.”  A proposition might look something like “the cat is in the box 211
 David Pears, “Wittgenstein,” in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, eds. Nicholas 205
Bunnin and E. P. Tsuii-James. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 814.; Anat Biletzki and Anat 
Matar, “Ludwig Wittgenstein,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.).
 4.21206
 4.22207
 4.221208
 Biletzki and Matar, (Spring 2014 Edition).209
 The mechanism I refer to here, is the ‘logical connective’: ’if-then’, ‘and’, ‘or’, etc. 210
Each elementary proposition stands in a certain relation to another within a proposition, and the 
truth value of  that proposition depends not only upon the truth value of  the elementary 
propositions (whether or not they accurately represent a fact) but also the way in which the 
elementary propositions are combined. 
 4.023211
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and the cat is dead.”  Wittgenstein suggests that, “in a proposition, a thought finds 212
an expression that can be perceived by the senses”  — though he draws a non-trivial 213
distinction between the proposition and this perceptible expression (the latter, he 
maintains, should be known as a ‘propositional sign’).  Most importantly, at least for 214
the purposes I have in mind, a proposition can be a picture of  the facts. 
3.3 Meaning, Fact, and Determinate Relation 
The importance of  the relationship between fact and proposition can be found at 
3.1432 where Wittgenstein writes, “Instead of  ‘The complex sign ‘aRb’ says ‘a stands 
to b in the relation R’, we ought to put, ‘That ‘a’ stands to ‘b’ in a certain relation says 
that aRb.’”  ‘a’ and ‘b’, in the above proposition are examples of  signs of  the sort that 215
are used to refer to ‘objects’. However, in most natural languages, words tend to 
describe complex things (entities which are not simple) and propositions about these 
larger things must have sense.  
	 Wittgenstein was not brought to such an extreme species of  logical atomism 
through empiricism, but through concern for logical dependence: If  a proposition 
contained a complex then the sense of  any such proposition would depend upon the 
truth value of  some other proposition (a proposition which describes the relationship 
between the objects in the first proposition). Such a proposition would show that 
 Depending upon your chosen quantum theory, the truth value of  this proposition may 212
be indeterminate (at least without looking)!
 3.1.213
 3.11.214
 3.1432.215
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objects were combined in a certain way to form that complex — but would not share 
the sense of  the original proposition. As Wittgenstein (quite reasonably) demanded, 
the sense of  any picture or proposition must be contained completely within itself, 
thus, any proposition which depended upon another proposition for its sense would be 
unacceptable.  216
	 It might be worth pointing out that Wittgenstein was very clear about the 
‘showing and saying’ distinction. The essence of  the saying and showing distinction is, 
according to what he wrote to Russell, “the theory of  what can be expressed by 
propositions — i.e., by language… and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but 
only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of  philosophy.”  Wittgenstein 217
wished to emphasise the one-to-one correspondence of  elements with things in reality 
and clearly states that a proposition sort of  reaches out to reality and can be “laid 
against reality like a measure.”  The potential of  natural language to form 218
propositions which seem to tell us things about the world is where the problem is to be 
found. “If  a fact is to be a picture,” Wittgenstein argues, “it must have something in 
common with what it depicts.”  But a Picture Theory of  Language permits no such 219
potential flaw. The proposition shows the fact because everything contained in it picks 
 Pears, 2003, 814. Wittgenstein became less confident in this level of  logical atomism as 216
time progressed and by 1929 his belief  that elementary propositions needed to be independent of  
each other was dropped.
 David G.Stern, David G. Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, (New York: Oxford, UK, 217
1996), 69-70.
 2.1512218
 2.16. This quote may be a bit misleading in that what Wittgenstein really wants to 219
claim is that if  a fact is to be a picture it must have everything in common with what it depicts.
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out an object in the world,  and these objects can be shown to stand in determinate 220
reaction to one another.  Such a proposition, then could have “one and only one 221
complete analysis.”  Because the picture properly represents the world as being a 222
certain way, it conveys sense. A thought, therefore, “is a proposition with a sense;”  the 223
meaning of  the fact can be understood. Consequently, “the logical picture of  the facts 
is the thought.”  224
	 Wittgenstein was concerned with the meaning intimated by a proposition and 
sought to determine the conditions for the accurate symbolising of  a fact.  He 225
believed that ‘meaning’ and ‘sense’ were importantly linked and that for a proposition 
to have ‘no-sense’ was the same as saying that it had ‘no-meaning’: “… if  a 
proposition has no sense, nothing corresponds to it, since it does not designate a thing 
(a truth-value) which might have properties called ‘false’ or ‘true’.”  Consequently, he 226
argued, for any ideal language, it is necessary that both the form of  the proposition 
(the determinate relation between the objects) and the elements (the names or signs) 
contained in it should correspond systematically to certain relations of  the fact which 
they symbolise (thought they are not, strictly speaking, the same relations). In other 
words, there should be a proper and accurate mapping of  the fact by the proposition 
and propositional sign.  
 Biletzki and Matar, 2014.220
 2.031.221
 3.25.222
 4.223
 Biletzki and Matar, 2014.224
 Russell, 2010, x.225
 4.063.226
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	 Wittgenstein believed that by viewing the world we make pictures to ourselves 
— somewhat like a mental photo album which stores pictures of  everything we see. A 
picture must show the same objects and the same form because it is also a fact.  227
Wittgenstein makes it clear that the thought and the picture cannot embody the (very) 
same physical objects as the fact — just as names in a propositional sign correspond to 
constituents of  a thought (and these, in turn, correspond to objects in a fact).  228
Pictures are not simply another way of  speaking about propositional signs — they are 
importantly different. James Griffin observes that: 
[Pictures and propositional signs] are on two different levels of  generality: 
‘picture’ the genus, and ‘propositional sign’, a species. Gramophone records 
and musical scores are pictures too: phonetic spelling is a picture of  spoken 
language. Even things outside the range of  senses can be pictures; thoughts are 
pictures. In fact, they are a good example of  just how general a concept of  a 
‘picture’ is.  229
Wittgenstein describes a picture itself  as a fact  because a picture is attached to 230
reality in that it “reaches right out to it.”  Such a picture is able to be “laid against 231
reality like a measure” and shown to be exactly concordant.  Pears observes: 232
If  the points on the canvas of  a landscape-painter were not correlated with 
points in space, no picture that he painted would succeed in saying anything. 
Similarly, if  the words in a factual proposition were not correlated with things, 
no sentence constructed out of  them would say anything. In both cases alike 
 According to Griffin, Wittgenstein did not know what the constituents of  a thought 227
would be, but he knew that thoughts had to have them. Wittgenstein further claimed that they 
were “physical constituents that have the same sort of  relation to reality as words.” I shall leave the 
reader to consider what could be meant by that. James Griffin, "Pictures." In Wittgenstein's Logical 
Atomism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). 88.
 Griffin, 1964, 88.228
 Ibid., 87.229
 2.141.230
 2.1511.231
 2.1512.232
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the constructions would lack sense. But, given the necessary correlations, the 
painting and the proposition have sense and what they say can only be true or 
false.  233
	 Wittgenstein cautions that propositions do not say what is the fact, but instead 
they show or display it in the same way that pictures show or display: “Propositions 
cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them… Propositions show the logical 
form of  reality.”  In the same way that a photo of  a cat in a box accurately 234
represents the relationship between the cat and the box in reality, so too the 
proposition should actually report the relationship between the cat and the box. 
Griffin observes that, “pictures are just as much facts as the facts they picture, because 
pictures consist of  elements combined in a definite way.”  This accurate relationship 235
permits a truth value to be maintained: the proposition either accurately shows the 
fact or it does not. 
	 The picture theory is flawed and was dropped by Wittgenstein himself  only 
seven years after it was published. Whether or not the criticisms of  his theory are 
sound is somewhat irrelevant here, as I only care about several key elements of  the 
theory (which can be considered framework — rather than a fundamental doctrine in 
this project). These elements, which shall be synthesised in the Picture Theory of  
Disability, include the following: 
• The idea that a picture maps a fact (reality), 
• The idea that a picture is composed of  objects (things), 
• The notion that objects in a picture stand in determinate relationship to one 
another, 
• The saying and showing distinction. 
 Pears, 2003, 811-826.233
 4.121. 234
 Griffin, 1964, 89.235
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3.4 The Importance of  Objects in a Picture Theory 
The question ‘what constitutes a Tractarian object?’ (which is the same as asking ‘what 
is or is not a Tractarian simple?’) is important to the Picture Theory of  Disability. 
According to Wittgenstein, a picture should have the same form as the fact, and it is 
itself  a fact. This picture either “agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or 
incorrect, true or false.”  For the following explanation I shall use the idea that a 236
photograph is like a picture.  A photograph shows many objects or elements 237
standing in determinate relation to each other. However, we generally do not analyse a 
picture fully to determine exactly what is in it — instead, we mostly look at the picture 
holistically and roughly compare the elements in it to the world.  238
	 I shall use a photograph of  the War Doctor  as an example — I choose this 239
photograph (screen shot) due to its minimal content. In Figure 3, we see a man holding 
a bag over his shoulder standing in a dry desert. In the middle distance is a barn, and 
in the far distance some pointy mountains above which a few birds are flying. Because 
Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory was part of  a much bigger Theory of  Language just 
exactly what is being named and shown needed to be explicit. In comparison to the 
extreme accuracy needed for the picture theory, the analysis of  the photograph I have 
 2.21.236
 I stress here that it should be an unadjusted photograph — i.e., one not faked or 237
augmented.
 Ironically, it is often the case that the practice happens in the opposite direction: in 238
1920, five photographs (the Cottingley Fairies) were brought to the attention of  Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle whose belief  in fairies and persuasive articles convinced much of  the world that the 
photograph was proof  of  the existence of  fairies. Without complicating the analogy, his mistake is 
analogous to the affirming the consequent fallacy.
 The 12th incarnation of  the science fiction character, The Doctor, from the long 239
running British television series, Doctor Who.
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just given seems to be vague: there are many types of  bag, for instance. Just what kind 
of  a bag is he carrying? 
Over which shoulder is 
the bag thrown? The 
barn-like structure is 
ambiguous too: what 
colour is the barn, what 
type of  barn is it — just 
what is a barn? Looking 
more closely at the barn, it can be seen to be made from wooden planks and a curved 
wooden roof  — but this is not the only type of  barn that there is. The desert 
landscape is also unclear; some deserts have sand dunes while others are flat; what 
kind of  birds fly in a desert? It seems that a more nuanced description of  desert-ness 
seems to be required here too.  
	 The analysis of  the photograph: ‘a man in a desert, near a barn, carrying a 
bag’, is what I refer to as an ‘holistic analysis’, and it identifies only what Wittgenstein 
would call ‘complexes’ (recall that a complex is something that can be further broken 
down until it does not depend upon any further proposition in order to fully describe 
it). For Wittgenstein, because only objects have names, it seems that in order to analyse 
pictures it is necessary to distinguish the object from the complex. It follows, then, that 
the question of  ‘what constitutes an object’ is an important tangent — necessary for 
this work — as just what constitutes an object in my Picture Theory of  Disability 
!70
Figure 3: Source: Moffat Steven, Doctor Who; The Day of The 
Doctor, Film, London, BBC, November 23, 2013, Source: Google 
Image Search, Internet.
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
needs to be discussed. Before we address what constitutes an object under the Picture 
Theory of  Disability, let us consider the Tractarian object. 
3.4.1 The Tractarian Object  
Colin Johnston ruminates on Hide Ishiguro’s suggestion that Wittgenstein was greatly 
influenced by Frege’s work and uses the word for ‘object’ (Gegenstand) in a Fregean 
manner. Ishiguro’s observation warrants some merit, Johnston admits, but also notes a 
fairly significant difference in the use of  the word ‘object’ between Frege and 
Wittgenstein: 
Where Fregean objects constitute only one of  a variety of  logical types of  
entity of  reference, the other types being constituted by Fregean functions of  
differing kinds, the Tractatus introduces the word ‘object’ as synonymous with 
‘entity’ and ‘thing’.  240
Though Wittgenstein was careful and comprehensive in the writing of  the Tractatus, his 
logical atomism has its fair share of  ambiguity. Griffin considers two possible analyses 
of  language for Wittgenstein, first showing the ‘generally agreed’ Russellian analysis 
interpretation to be flawed (or at least that it engenders difficulties), and secondly, that 
Wittgenstein’s later works probably show the method he himself  had in mind when 
writing the Tractatus.  
3.4.2 The Russellian Analysis of  Language 
Wittgenstein was concerned that language permitted mistakes in reasoning to be 
made, because when we think we are referring to a certain object, we are in fact, 
 Colin Johnston, “Tractarian Objects and Logical Categories,” Synthese, 167, no. 1 240
(2008): 147. Doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9307-9.
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sometimes mistaken. This concern is similar to the one which prompted Russell to 
compose his Theory of  Descriptions — indeed, Griffin argues that, “so far as there is 
[an analysis of  language within] the Tractatus, [the Russellian approach] is the usual 
interpretation.”  A Russellian analysis of  the complex statement ‘the book on the 241
table is red’ results in the formula: 
(∃x) (Bx∧Tx∧∀y [(By∧Ty) ⊃ (x=y)] ∧Rx) 
Where Bx: ‘x is a book’, Tx: ‘x is on the table’, and Rx: ‘x is red’. Unsure what 
information this actually gives us about Tractarian simples, Griffin searches for help 
from the Tractatus: “Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a 
statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the 
complexes completely.”  He goes on to show that if  Wittgenstein holds that the 242
proposition which completely describes a complex is “that proposition which is 
equivalent to saying the complex exists,”  then the part of  the formula which says 243
the complex exists is:  
(∃x) (Bx∧Tx∧∀y [(By∧Ty) ⊃ (x=y)] 
Such an analysis leaves only ‘Rx’ to describe the constituents of  the complex — which 
seems problematic given that Rx merely says that ‘x is red’ (which also demands that ‘x’ 
is the constituent(s) of  the statement).  It seems to follow, then, that any statement 244
 Griffin, 1964, 42.241
 2.0201.242
 Griffin, 1964, 43.243
 Loc. cit.244
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which contains a colour predication cannot be a simple  — yet there is no further 245
Tractarian analysis of  the statement possible.  246
3.4.3 Griffin’s ‘Better’ Analysis 
Griffin observes that a Theory of  Descriptions approach “fits the Tractatus poorly”  247
and instead suggests that the clue to the analysis Wittgenstein used was indicated later 
in the Philosophical Investigations: 
‘A name signifies only what is an element of  reality. What cannot be destroyed; 
what remains the same in all changes.’ — but what is that? — Why it swam 
before our minds as we said the sentence! This was the very expression of  a 
quite particular image: of  a particular picture we want to use. For certainly 
experience does not show us these elements. We see component parts of  
something composite (of  a chair for instance). We say that the back is part of  
the chair, but it is in turn itself  a component part. We also see a whole which 
changes (is destroyed) while its component parts remain unchanged. These are 
the materials from which we construct that picture of  reality.  248
Yet this analysis is not without difficulty either, as it is not altogether clear just how 
‘atomic’ objects need to be.  Griffin starts with the statement ‘the broom is in the 249
corner’ (from the Investigations) and points out that a Russellian interpretation of  that 
statement would result in: 
 6.3751245
 It might be worth noting, here, that one reason Wittgenstein abandoned such an 246
extreme logical atomism is the difficulty it has with predicates such as colour, range, length, etc.
 Griffin, 1964, 42.247
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe and 248
P. M. S. Hacker. 4th ed. (Oxford, Oxon.: Blackwell, 2009). 33e.
 Griffin’s more advanced analysis (which starts on page 52) shows that something like a 249
‘red ball’ would also be a complex, and that any property assigned to a thing ensures that it is a 
complex. Such an observation ensures that things as we know them are almost always going to be 
complexes (try to think of  something which does not have the property of  size, colour, position, 
volume, etc.). 
!73
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
(∃x) (Bx∧Cx)  250
where Bx: ‘is a broom’, and Cx: ‘is in the corner’. However, Griffin presents 
Wittgenstein’s own analysis as: 
(i) the stick is in the corner, 
(ii) the brush is in the corner, 
(iii) the stick is attached to the brush.  251
It is obvious from the above that Wittgenstein’s analysis of  the statement is not 
Russellian, and suggests that Wittgenstein believed statements could be broken up into 
smaller and smaller parts until each object corresponded to a certain fact. Indeed, he 
argued “that it must be possible to continue this kind of  analysis to a point at which no 
more subdivision would be possible.”  His result was that only components that did 252
not depend upon a further proposition could be named — these are the elements of  
reality or true Tractarian objects. 
	 Nevertheless, this definition is still not terribly explicit. Griffin supposes that 
even though a book has constituent parts we still often want to name macro things 
rather than all of  its various bits. For instance, when I described the photo above, I 
referred to the macro things not the more particular things. Yet macro things like 
books are considered Tractarian complexes and the basic elements of  a book, its 
pages, spine, binding, dust cover, etc., would be considered Tractarian objects or 
 Griffin, 1964, 47. It should be pointed out here that this is only part of  the formula 250
which appears earlier and is incomplete. The formula appears in a fragmented form to 
demonstrate what this particular part of  the formula says and shown as presented in Griffin.
 Griffin, 1964, 47.251
 Pears, 2003, 814.252
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simples.  Such a view means that Tractarian objects are actually more like Russellian 253
particulars and Griffin makes his commitment clear:  
When I picture a fact, I picture a particular fact, a particular part of  reality. 
And it would seem that any connexions I draw from the picture to the fact 
would have to be particulars.    254
Followed by a more explicit commitment:  
Objects are particulars, and analysis is analysis of  statements about complexes 
composed of  these kinds of  objects into statements about these objects alone 
and their configuration.  255
	 At this point, I would be remiss if  I did not mention that the Delphic nature of  
Tractarian object has engendered significant discussion and the exegetical claims of  
Russellian-Particular proponents like Griffin have been hotly disputed. A contrary 
view to Griffin’s is presented by Johnston who provides evidence to suggest that 
Tractarian objects also include relations and properties and opens with the observation 
that a state of  affairs is a combination of  objects (emphasis on the plural):  256
An elementary proposition ‘asserts the existence of  a state of  affairs’ (Tractatus 
4.21). If  ‘φ’ in a subject-predicate proposition ‘φa’ is not a name, then it would 
seem that the state of  affairs whose existence the proposition asserts could 
involve only one object, a. Further support for the suggestion that objects 
include relations may then be gathered from certain passages in non-Tractarian 
texts. In June 1915 Wittgenstein wrote: ‘Relations and properties, etc. are 
objects too.’  257
 Griffin, 1964, 49. As mentioned above, a further analysis from Griffin appearing from 253
page 52 suggests that things which contain certain properties like colour should also be considered 
complexes, adding to the difficulty of  claiming that a page (for Wittgenstein) would be a simple.
 Ibid., 60.254
 Ibid., 61.255
 2.01.256
 Johnston, 2008, 147.257
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	 Regardless of  which view of  objects is right, I think from the Tractatus it is 
possible to tell you how an object is — though this is not much help when trying to 
determine what sort of  things are objects. What I think is safe to say is that 
Wittgenstein believed that objects had to be simple  (elementary, indivisible things) 258
and that a name (a sign) picks out one object only,  but any more than this is 259
debatable. 
3.5 The Consequence of  Object Ambiguity 
From above it is clear that there is some difficulty in what Wittgenstein actually meant 
by an ‘object’, but this difficulty demands that there is also some uncertainty about 
exactly what sort of  thing can be elementary proposition. David Pears notes that 
Wittgenstein’s faith in the validity of  his deductive reasoning meant that he was unable 
“to produce a single example of  a logically independent elementary proposition.”  260
Like the Tractarian object, we may say how an elementary proposition could be, but 
not exactly what sort of  thing is contained in one. It can be said with confidence that a 
certain configuration of  objects corresponds to the simple signs in a propositional 
sign,  and most importantly that “what constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its 261
 2.02.258
 3.203, 3.221.; Russell, 2010,  xi. It is curious to note that this extreme logical atomism 259
— the idea that logical facts cannot be broken down any further (do not depend upon any other 
fact) — resulted in Wittgenstein maintaining in The Tractatus that nothing correct can be said in 
philosophy and that every philosophical proposition is bad grammar. The best that we can hope 
for, Wittgenstein claims, is that through philosophical discussion we can lead people to the 
understanding that philosophical discussion is, itself, a mistake. This extreme atomism waned in 
later Wittgensteinian work.
 Pears, 2003, 814. 260
 3.21.261
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elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.” Consequently, “a 
propositional sign is a fact.”  So much is clear, but if  we cannot determine what sort 262
of  thing might be an object then we have no way of  naming it and no way of  building 
the (or any) elementary proposition in which it is contained. 
	 Given that an elementary proposition is a concatenation of  names, one 
wonders if  ‘the cat is in the box’ could actually constitute an elementary proposition 
(as such a statement would contain Tractarian complexes such as ‘the cat’ and ‘the 
box’). If  this is the case, then how does one analyse the statement? I am not sure that 
there is, yet, a coherent answer to this question — though most authors I have read 
largely agree that statements like ‘the cat is in the box’ and ‘Steven is in Lethbridge’ 
would constitute an elementary proposition. 
	 “A proposition is a picture of  reality,”  Wittgenstein tells us, and that 263
proposition can be shown by a propositional sign. However, and I believe this to be 
Griffin’s general point, if  it were not possible to properly name an object in reality — 
that is to say that if  the sign given to an object in reality were not to pick out one and 
only one objection that reality — then it would be impossible to build a concatenation 
of  names in the manner needed to form an elementary proposition; consequently, it 
would neither possible to build a proposition nor form a propositional sign.  
 3.14.262
 4.021263
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4. THE PICTURE THEORY OF DISABILITY 
4.1 Exordium 
As presented in the Introduction, the picture theory of  disability (PTD) should be 
considered a relational account of  disability. Relational accounts of  disability have 
been offered since the early ‘90s — in Amundson’s early work, for instance, he argued 
that “a disability results from the interaction between [an impairment] and an 
environment; it does not flow naturally from the [impairment] alone.”  Curiously, 264
the much rebuked 1983 UN definition of  disability considers disability to be “a 
function of  the relationship between disabled persons and their environment”  — 265
this thesis agrees with that claim as a framework, but disagrees that it constitutes a 
definition of  disability.  
	 Earlier I showed how neither of  the two hegemonic models — the medical 
model and the social model — are adequate or sufficient to properly respond to the 
phenomena of  disability. Other models, such as the Welfarist account, appear at first 
to be an improvement, but on deeper analysis also seem to be problematic. The 
welfarist account, for example, holds that: 
‘Disability’ should refer to any stable physical or psychological property of  
subject S that leads to a significant reduction of  S’s level of  wellbeing in 
circumstances C, excluding the effect that this condition has on wellbeing that 
is due to prejudice against S by members of  S’s society.  266
 Amundson, 1992, 110. 264
 Susan Wendell, “Who Is Disabled? Defining Disability,” In The Rejected Body: Feminist 265
Philosophical Reflections on Disability, (New York: Routledge, 1996) 13. The original quotation uses the 
older (and now defunct) term ‘handicap’. I have corrected it here to keep terms constant 
throughout.
 Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane, “Disability: A Welfarist Approach,”  Clinical Ethics 266
6, no. 1 (2011): 45-51. Doi:10.1258/ce.2011.011010.
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On the surface, the Welfarist account seems quite similar to the Picture Theory of  
Disability, however there are also many difficulties with the Welfarist account. In light 
of  the apparent similarity of  the models, and that the Welfarist account has problems 
where the PTD does not, I shall devote some space to discussing the Welfarist account 
in the conclusion. 
	 Instead of  a model or approach to disability that is concerned with naming 
who is or who is not disabled, the PTD is concerned with identifying how, and under 
what conditions, a person experiences disability. Savulescu and Kahane remark that their 
account is relative “to both persons and circumstances… ,”  but seem to conflate two 267
distinct ideas of  ‘disability’: On the one hand, they maintain that if  something leads to 
a reduction in someone’s wellbeing, then that thing is a disability;  and on the other, 268
that disability is a property (either physical or psychological) of  a person such that in 
certain circumstances that person experiences a reduction in wellbeing.  It seems to 269
me that disability is either something someone has, or something that someone 
experiences; it is either nounal or adverbial, it cannot be both. Consequently, the 
primary objective of  the PTD is to offer a mechanism by which one identifies when a 
person may be experiencing a disability.  
 Ibid., 46.267
 Loc. cit.268
 Loc. cit.269
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4.2 A Little Bit of  Hume 
Humean moral sentimentalism is ultimately concerned with how and why we come to 
moral approbation or criticism of  an act. In an earlier chapter, I showed how Hume 
believed we were able to share the ‘passion’ or emotion of  someone else, and how 
‘sympathy’ is the cognitive mechanism by which one enters into the sentiment of  
another. In other words, by simply observing another person it is possible to 
understand how they feel.  A recent photograph of  English teacher, Laith Majid, 270
(Figure 4) demonstrates Humean sympathy nicely — I doubt that there are many 
people who are immune 
to the powerful emotions 
conveyed in the 
photograph. When I 
approached my 
colleagues as to what 
emotion they perceived 
from the photograph, the 
list was comprehensive: 
desperation, anxiousness, harassed fatigue, apprehension, sadness, despair, fear, loss, 
terror, impotence, exhaustion, anxiety, parental concern, worry, hatred, and more. The 
photograph has been shared prolifically and the impetus behind the photograph’s 
 Of  satellite interest, as pointed out briefly in Chapter II, is that this Humean sympathy 270
— what we would now refer to as ‘empathy’ — generally results in conation. However, I would be 
remiss if  I did not also point out that this motivation to act is not always potent. 
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Figure 4: Daniel Etter, “Laith Majid, a Syrian refugee, holding his son 
and daughter, arrives on the Greek island of Kos in August 2015”; 
Daniel Etter, 2015 Google Image Search, New York Times, US.
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dispersal is (at least in part) testimony to the viewer’s ability to interpret and empathise 
with Mr. Majid’s emotions.   271
	 Though Hume’s notion of  sympathy is not without criticism (it was largely 
dropped in later works), it seems that humans are able to share (at least to some degree) 
in the passions of  others through looking at them — and the greater the emotion the 
more likely we are to sense it. The observation that humans are able to share the 
passions of  others constitutes a major part of  the structure of  the PTD. The Picture 
Theory of  Disability depends upon Naïve Sentimentalism to enable the observer to 
share in another persons’ emotions. Neurobiological experiments demonstrate that we 
have a significant sympathetic response to pictures and so a picture can be used to show 
us how another person is feeling. A verbal or written description of  how an individual 
feels is weak, that is to say that it has less of  an ability to portray either the accuracy or 
the profundity of  the emotion in question. The picture, however, is powerful; it almost 
forces us into a ‘cognitive’ form of  empathy (such as vicariously identifying with 
someone else’s perspective).  Used in this way, then, Humean sympathy shows how a 272
person in the picture feels. 
4.3 A Little Bit of  Wittgenstein 
A fairly significant discussion and explication of  Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory  
proceeds this section of  the thesis and little more needs to be added. However, I 
 For those who are curious, Mr Majid and his family are now (as of  September 2015) 271
living well and looking forward to a new life in Germany. Simon Carr. "Remember the Crying 
Syrian Refugee Dad? Now He's Smiling!" Al Bawaba. September 9, 2015.
 For further information, see for example Mendez 2009, 608-620, Keysers, 2011.272
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should clarify what constitutes an object for the PTD. Fortunately, the theory I build 
here is not subject to the kind of  focus on minutiae with which Wittgenstein was 
concerned. By which I mean to say that my theory does not fall foul of  Griffin’s 
concerns about what constitutes an object: it is sufficient for my purposes that ‘objects’ 
can be said to almost always  be macro objects — such as a person, or a staircase. 273
Objects are things designated by nouns in the natural language sense, and no more — 
there is no milage to be gained from recursive analysis to determine exactly what is 
meant by the nouns ‘foot’, ‘sound’, or ‘wheelchair’. However, I should temper my last 
thought with the observation that I see no reason why macro objects could not be 
further analysed into component things such as a limb, hand, or single step; perhaps it 
is also necessary that the Picture Theory of  Disability should have the capacity to pick 
out entities such as sight, noise, or smell. But even these sorts of  thing are macro 
objects in the sense that they are the elements of  reality which we speak about daily 
without any confusion. 
	 In other words, I am satisfied that our natural language names for things at the 
macro level will suffice for the purposes of  the PTD. I make such a claim because what 
the PTD cares about is the relationship between the objects and the verbs, and those 
adverbs which are used to describe that relationship. It is sufficient, then, that the 
objects in a PTD picture are macro and can be commonly named in natural languages 
(rather than an idealised 'logically perfect' language) and spoken about — nothing is to 
be gained from a careful explication of  what might constitute a wheelchair 
(wheelchairs can be quite different from each other). It is enough that 
 That is to say that I cannot think of  an exception, but do not deny the possibility.273
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‘wheelchairyness’ is understood, and were a picture be held up against reality like a 
measure, that the correspondent ‘wheelchair-like-thing’ in reality can be pointed out. 
Certainly, the picture might benefit from the distinction between an electric or a push 
wheelchair, but these adjectives add detail to the picture; they do not question what a 
wheelchair is, they give you more information about what a particular wheelchair does 
and how it does it. 
	 For that matter, neither are the relations between objects in the PTD as strict as 
those found in the Tractatus: In the Tractatus a picture must show the form of  the fact; a 
relation is represented in the proposition by its form: “it is obvious that a proposition 
of  the form ‘aRb’ strikes us as a picture.”  Consequently, “what constitutes a 274
propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to 
one another.”  From all of  this, it is likely that a relation for Wittgenstein would be 275
something like ‘in’ or ‘on top of ’. Such relations might appear in a propositional sign 
as something like ‘the cat is in the box and the cat is dead’ or ‘the red book is on top 
of the table’. In the Picture Theory of  Disability relations for the PTD could be as 
simple as ‘standing in front of ’, ‘sitting beside’, ‘walking up’, ‘working on’, or even 
something like ‘it is raining’. In the PTD, the complex ‘aRb’ might say ‘a is walking up 
b’ or ‘rain is falling on b’ (it is raining on b). By which I mean to say that the 
determinate relation between objects is far looser than in the PT. Where it is unclear 
whether or not the statement ‘the cat is in the box and the cat is dead’ actually satisfies 
Tractarian requirements, the PTD is able to make unproblematic statements like ‘a 
 4.012274
 3.14275
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girl is walking up the steps’, or ‘the wheelchair user is working at a desk’. As in the 
Picture Theory of  Language, propositions built from objects and logical connectives 
do not say what is the case — they show it. 
	 Importantly, the picture is the mechanism through which it is possible to 
‘unpack’ the meaning of  disability for the person experiencing it. The picture is 
important because it can be seen as properly and fully represents an actual state of  
affairs: it shows how a person experiences disability in the world and says (tells us) that 
they do so experience disability. Because less is demanded of  the picture in the PTD it 
is easier to know when we have a sufficient level of  objects for the picture relative to 
the state of  affairs we are tying to picture: The final level of  analysis is reached when 
the objects in the picture show us everything needed to identify the activity being 
performed and any frustration or impediments encountered; when it fully and 
completely shows how a person experiences disability in a state of  affairs — that is, in 
a particular state of  affairs (or a ‘situation’). 
	 Wittgenstein’s picture theory does not fully indicate what counts as a picture 
(though Griffin observed that pictures might include records and musical scores — 
even thoughts are pictures ). However, because the PTD is adverbial, the picture is 276
best perceived, not as a single photograph, but as more of  a gif  or short video clip; the 
picture is an animated picture. Imagine (as is the case) that many photographs taken 
over consecutive time slices show a moving picture of  events. It is this conglomeration 
which the PTD uses to show where disability is being experienced. Of  course, the 
objects in the picture and the relations between them persist throughout the moving 
 Griffin, 1964, 87.276
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picture as the duration is relatively short (the duration of  the activity or event). This is 
a sufficient description of  the picture mechanism and I do not wish to complicate the 
mechanism with discussion over ‘what time intervals are the pictures taken’, ‘on what 
is the picture focused’, or ‘exactly how long does the clip have to be’. In other words, 
all that is needed is the general idea that multiple pictures of  the same event taken 
over a few seconds can be organised in such a way that a moving picture of  events 
results; I am concerned with a general moving picture of  a particular situation (or, in 
Tractarian terminology, ‘states of  affairs’). Simply put, the picture shows how and why a 
person in the picture experiences what they do. 
4.4 Daily-living Tasks and Goals-like-ours 
Up to now I have discussed how I intend to use elements of  Wittgensteinian Picture 
Theory together with Naïve Sentimental Theory to development a Picture Theory of  
Disability. In the next section I show more clearly how the various elements go 
together, and construct a framework for the PTD, but before I move on I need to 
discuss an important constraint which must be applied to the PTD and what is the 
nature of  that constraint. 
	 Because the PTD is formed in a similar way to the Welfarist account, it is 
similarly subject to the criticism (elaborated upon in the conclusion) that what 
constitutes wellbeing is tied to an individual’s preferences, and preferences are 
adaptive. In order to ensure that the PTD is a more robust theory of  disability than 
the Welfarist account, I need to be clear about what kinds of  things I consider to be 
preferences and what are their limits. The PTD considers two types of  preferences: 
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goals-like-ours and daily-living tasks (the latter being a particularly important subset of  
the former). Both of  these types of  preferences are important not just for being the 
things that people care about, but also for being the kinds of  things which engender 
independence. 
	 The PTD considers daily-living activities to be fundamental necessities such as 
preparing or procuring food, or using a toilet. These type of  activities are of  the sort 
conducted by each of  us in the process of  our daily lives and are, as such, essential to 
ensuring a minimum standard of  living. More importantly, though, they are the kinds 
of  activities out of  which independence arises — and it is from this independence that 
we get a more advanced quality of  life. From independence activities arises self  respect 
as an autonomous individual — I believe that this minimum level of  autonomy and 
self-respect to be uncontroversial. Of  course, the types of  activities which generate 
self-respect and autonomy differ from country to country,  but they might include 277
things like going to work, cooking food, making a telephone call, or paying a bill at the 
bank. What they must include are things like being able to dress, maintain a good level 
of  personal hygiene, eat, and use a toilet. In short, daily-living tasks are what they say 
they are: they are the kinds of  chores and activities that are daily necessary for a 
minimum quality of  life, independence, and self  respect. Because ‘daily-living’ tasks 
permit only a basic level of  existence, I think they are perhaps less controversial than 
‘goals’. Daily-living tasks are only really on the border of  being preferential — some 
rights academics might argue that the kinds of  things I have included as daily-living 
 I am mindful that preferences are also socio-cultural and the kinds of  things that are 277
base essential tasks may differ cross culturally in the way that I expect more advanced preferences 
to be equally differing. Because the PTD generates real-world descriptions of  disability, it will 
always depend upon cultural relativism. I engage this topic later in this chapter.
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tasks are actually simply basic human rights which should be afforded to any 
autonomous human. However, I do not wish to engage the rights debate at this point 
for want of  space, instead I shall move onto the question of  what constitutes a goal. 
	 Part of  the issue with determining what constitutes a reasonable goal is that it is 
not easy to justify — there are many social and political theories or rights theories 
which seek to determine what are reasonable preferences and how far (or, if  at all) 
those preferences should be permitted to constrain the preferences of  others. 
Historically, the preferences of  disabled persons — like other minorities — were, at 
least to some degree, discounted,  but the PTD assumes a fair and equal society and 278
as such, it holds that disabled persons should reasonably be entitled to the same level 
of  realistic preferences as anyone else.  Given the great skill and adaptability of  279
persons with impairments, it is hard to place constraints upon what may or may not be 
a potential ‘goal’, but the kind of  goal I had in mind was the kind of  life goal that is not 
unrealistic — in the way it would be as unrealistic, say, to expect a quadriplegic to 
 Douglas C. Baynton, “Disability and the Justification of  Inequality in American 278
History,” in The New Disability History: American Perspectives, eds. Paul K. Longmore and Lauri 
Umansky, (New York and London: New York University Press, 2001), 52.
 The PTD must assume that disabled persons are entitled to the same level of  279
preferences as anyone else for several reasons: The first is that Humean sympathy suggests that all 
human creatures are like us (which, in this case, I take to mean ‘largely equal’). Secondly, the 
process of  determining what is or is not a disabling experience must consider all of  the persons in 
the picture to be of  equal moral worth (else the theory would then be open to accounting for any 
differences held). And Finally, given that the ultimate aim of  this thesis is to provide a mechanism 
for emancipation of  disabled persons, it is important to me — personally — that disabled persons 
share the same level of  autonomy and are as equally included as any other member of  society.
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have the goal of  becoming a Sri Lankan pearl hunter, or for me to be the president of  
America.  	  280
	 The resultant set of  goals may seem somewhat preferential, though not, I 
think, immodest. It seems reasonable that I should have the goal of  gainful and 
meaningful employment — indeed, the society (of  which I am a member) largely 
demands it. Likewise, I can think of  no reason that such a goal should not be shared 
by some disabled person in the same society. Perhaps I have the goal of  going to watch 
John Wort Hannam perform at The Slice (a yearly tradition of  greater importance 
than Thanksgiving) — such a goal is also not unreasonable. Similarly, I see no reason 
why such a goal would not be open to a disabled person.  These realistic goals I call  281
‘goals-like-ours’,  because they are the same kinds of  realistic goals that are open to 282
other members of  a society. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that these goals-
like-ours are culturally relative in that what seems to be an acceptable preference in 
the West — perhaps having a banking job in the city — may not be realistic in other 
cultures (for whatever reason). The ‘ours’ is meant to reflect that cultural variability. 
	 It might be worth noting a similarity between the formulation of  ‘goals-like-
ours’ and the formulation of  Rawls’ ‘Original Position’. The Original Position, 
roughly, holds that if  no-one in a society is able to determine their class, social status, 
  Given that Sri Lankan pearl hunters often dive to 100ft and crack open oysters at the 280
sea floor to find pearls. Diving to such depths requires extreme swimming skills, and quadriplegics 
do not often succeed in being good swimmers. This is not to suggest that no quadriplegic could 
dive for pearls, but that it is probably an unrealistic goal for a quadriplegic to hold.
 To the contrary — I have seen several disabled persons at the Slice sharing the John 281
Wort Hannam love!
 I am thankful to my supervisor for this locution here. The concept of  ‘goals-like-ours’ 282
is intuitively relatable.
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gender, beliefs concerning good or bad, and the like, then any principals of  justice 
chosen from behind a ‘veil of  ignorance’ that ensures that no person is either 
advantaged or disadvantaged by those principals of  justice.  When considering what 283
kinds of  things are tasks of  daily-living or goals-like-ours I encourage the reader to 
place themselves under a similar veil and ask themselves to think of  whether or not 
such a task or goal would be something that they would themselves like to attain — 
given that they know nothing of  their class, social status, gender, beliefs about good or 
bad, and the like. Were any sort of  daily-living task or goal to be considered under this 
veil to be an excessive demand, then it would not — for the purposes of  this thesis — 
constitute a proper daily-living task or goal. So defined, daily-living tasks or goals form 
important boundaries to the Picture Theory of  Disability. 
4.4.1 Capacity and the Distinction between Disability and Difficulty 
The previous discussion seeks to discuss the limits to goals-like-ours. But such a 
discussion only discusses the nature of  those preferences — it does not engage the 
distinction between ‘dis-ability' and ‘in-ability’ which arises out of  our individual 
capacity for a given activity, nor does it draw the distinction between a ‘difficulty’ and 
a ‘disability’ when performing a daily task or attempting to achieve a goal-like-ours. 
This brief  section attempts to provide the reader with a rough understanding of  these 
issues as they pertain to the Picture Theory of  Disability. 
 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy. 1999, Second ed. Vol. 1. (New York, 283
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). This is not the place for discussion of  whether or not 
the view offered in A Theory of  Justice is a reasonable view — I merely wish to draw an analogy.
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	 Discussion of  the nature of  ‘capacity’ — the innate ability of  someone to 
perform or achieve a certain task — is more complex of  a problem than can be fully 
addressed here. It should, perhaps, be observed that a fuller treatment of  ‘capacity’ 
may be necessary to determine what capacities it is reasonable to suppose that a 
person has, particularly with regard to their limits, and in what way capacities may be 
reduced through impairment. For instance, Beethoven could be said to have a great 
capacity for music, yet it is known that he experienced hearing loss later in life. This 
hearing loss did not seem to reduce his ability to compose — though his ability to 
conduct was compromised. In this instance, are we to say that his capacity for music 
was diminished? I think not — more that he experienced a difficulty in interfacing 
adequately with the orchestra as a result of  his hearing loss. If  modern technology 
were available in his time, and if  he so desired it, Beethoven could have interfaced 
more effectively with the orchestra showing that his capacity remained. What, then, 
should be said of  a human’s capacity for flight? Is our lack of  ability to fly some sort of  
impairment which demonstrates a reduction in capacity? Again, I think not — 
humans are not the sort of  creatures that have an innate capacity for flight; it is not any 
sort of  biological ability for the species. Certainly, with squirrel flight suits, we can 
(under certain circumstances) glide effectively — but this is not the same sort of  thing 
as flying properly-so-called. Clearly, then, a capacity for flight is just not something 
humans can claim.  
	 It can be seen from the above flying example that we lack many capacities — 
but we do not consider them to be impairments in the same way as we do when we 
discuss disability. This lack of  a certain capacity — say the capacity for flight — is not 
!90
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
seen as an impairment, because this sort of  in-ability is a capacity we and others don't 
expect us to have. To further develop the PTD, a fuller treatment of  ‘capacity’ seems 
to be required in order to determine what sorts of  things impede a particular action 
resulting in disabling experiences and what sorts of  things impede an action by simply 
being beyond the capacity of  humans in general. In the interest of  familiarity, I briefly 
raise the issue here, and offer a few paragraphs on the notion of  ‘capacity’ for the 
PTD below. 
	 In a conversation with a colleague about the PTD, I hastily observed that ‘a 
person experienced a disability when they had difficulty performing a certain task or 
obtaining a certain goal.’ My colleague observed that he had experienced great 
difficulty in obtaining his doctorate in philosophy and questioned whether or not his 
difficulty satisfied my definition of  disability. Ignoring the very real disadvantage to life 
that a doctorate in philosophy actually carries with it, I was reminded of  a more 
incisive problem than the issue of  preferences: How does the PTD distinguish between 
a disabling experience and one which is simply difficult?  
	 Without speaking about necessary and sufficient conditions for disability, what I 
was trying to say was ‘that a person experiences a disability when they experience a 
personally irremediable impediment or frustration while performing a certain task or 
obtaining a certain goal — but that any such impediment or frustration did not arise 
from a lack of  capacity to achieve that task or goal. In other words, the distinction 
between a task’s being very difficult and a task’s being disabling is that in order to be 
disabling, the task needs to be reasonably within the capacity (both mental and 
physical) of  the individual as well as frustrating or impeding due to a functional 
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relationship between the individual and their immediate environment. This 
perspective is similar to the new approach by the World Health Organisation, who, 
according to Martiny, “[distinguishes] between a person’s capacity to perform actions 
and their actual performance, in order to highlight the effects the environment has on 
the person.”   284
	 If  what impedes an individual from a particular task (broadly speaking) is a 
frustration arising out of  personal limitations relative to that task, then the impediment 
experienced is simply a difficulty; it frustrates because the task is beyond the grasp of  
the individual, so to speak. Whereas, if  an impediment is experienced because some 
element of  the task is made impossible due to a specific function of  a person’s 
physiology in conjunction with some element of  the environment in which that task is 
being conducted, then the experience is a disabling one.  Figures 5 & 6 below show 285
Brett Nielson rolling a cigarette with his feet — a task difficult for some handed 
persons. The task of  rolling a cigarette is not outside of  Brett’s capacity regardless of  
 Martiny, 2015, 554.284
  Presuming the task is not itself  beyond their grasp.285
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Figure 5, left: and Figure 6, right: Brett rolls a cigarette. Screen shots from: BBC. Brett: A Life with no 
Arms. 2015
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his physiology, and therefore, his experience of  smoking is not a disabling one. Yet 
Figure 7 shows a wheelchair user sat at the foot of  some stairs — the stairs in 
conjunction with the use of  a wheelchair engenders a disabling experience in which 
the lady’s goal of  being at the top 
of  the stairs is greatly impeded. 
Similarly, it might be observed 
that a blind person’s failing a 
school test because he needs to 
hear the questions rather than 
read them is a disabling 
experience, whereas a person’s difficulty obtaining their Ph.D. is just a difficult 
experience. Both goals-like-ours are within the capacity of  the individual (let’s say), but 
only the blind person’s experience is a disabling experience. 
	 It may be remarked that people who have no impairments may also display 
frustration and exertion in the course of, say, hauling a log up a banking to be cut and 
split for winter. The Picture Theory of  Disability cannot hold that such people are 
disabled as it would trivialise the experiences of  disabled people. Certainly dragging a 
log up a steep bank would be exhausting and vexing, and I will also admit that for 
many of  us, it is an important summer task. However, the PTD demands that a 
person’s experience be irremediable/or unremitting in order for that difficulty to be 
considered a disabling experience. Now, while hauling a huge log up a slippy wet 
banking is, indeed, extremely difficult, it is also fairly short term (in that at the end of  
the morning the task will be completed). By contrast, the difficulty experienced by 
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Figure 7: Plaid Zebra, ‘Stairbombing will Piss You Off to 
the Point where you Might Actually Care about Disability 
Rights’, “Lady at Foot of Stairs”, Dec. 9, 2014.
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persons with visual impairments crossing the road is a much more protracted and 
irremediable one (in that it probably happens every day). Moreover, as the PTD is 
geared to consider the values and expectations of  any given culture, were hauling logs 
up banks to be common in a particular culture, and if  a certain level of  exertion and 
frustration were experienced by other people who drag logs up banks, then the act — 
upon reflection to the Social — would be considered to be within the acceptable level 
of  discomfort or difficulty for that particular kind of  activity.  
	 Thus, the experience of  disability is connected not only to the individual, but is 
also related to the nature of  the goal and the nature of  the impediment which 
modifies the verb in the picture. The manner in which the verb is conducted must 
show the impediment — it is not enough that the conduct of  an activity is shown to be 
taxing. This does not engender a bootstrapping issue arising from knowing what a 
given activity should look like for a disabled person, because the picture is interactive 
and the individual is able to report why and in what manner they find this or that task 
to be disabling. Figures 8 & 9 above show individuals who seem to be experiencing a 
moderate level of  difficulty experienced from daily-living tasks or goals-like-ours and 
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Figure 8: Barbro Wickström, ColourBox.com, 
“Young Man Working in Forest Dragging Log in 
Winter”.
Figure 9: 123TopImages: Noah Galloway, 
“Noah Galloway exercising with sit-ups”.
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nothing about either photograph suggests that the task or goal is disabling one. This is 
because most people recognise the cross cultural difficulty in hauling a heavy log 
through snow and in squeezing out that last sit-up. Whereas, Figure 10 indicates a more 
protracted and unremitting difficulty 
which presents less ‘difficulty’ but more 
impediment.  
	 A further challenge to the PTD 
comes in the form of  Rapunzel,  286
who experiences complete impediment 
in her desire to escape and marry her 
prince through being locked in a tower by Dame Gothel. A picture analysis of  
Rapunzel’s impediment to marry her prince would show that the goal is within her 
capacity, but that she experiences maximal impediment in the conduct of  her goal 
through coercive limitations on personal freedom. The picture would clearly show the 
true nature of  the impediment to be a transparent abuse of  social power — an entirely 
different order of  impediment. This circumstantial impediment to Rapunzel’s goals, 
therefore, cannot be a disabling experience. Her adverbial difficulty in getting married 
is due to intentional interference in her life by someone with whom she is in an abusive 
power relationship. 
	 Observing the distinction between a disabling experience and a difficult one (or 
one in which we are being impeded in reaching a goal because of  a coercive abuse of  
social power) comes with an important caveat: It is improper, when attempting to 
 My thanks to David Wasserman for this objection.286
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Figure 10: Svetlana Osadchuk, Man Stuck at the 
Bottom of Stairs, The Moscow Times
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determine disability, to make intuitive judgements about capacity before properly 
applying the Picture Theory. That is to say that if  a person has no arms, it would be 
improper to presume that they could not play the piano before finding out whether or 
not they could. The medical models has a limited (if  any) ability to respond to this sort 
of  lived-experience data and, as a result, they generate inaccurate descriptions of  
disability. The medical model analysis would rule that a person with no arms is 
disabled because they have a physiological deviation from the statistical norm and that 
such a biological deviation precludes one from playing the piano. The social model, on 
the other hand, would simply observe that pianos are designed for people with arms 
and hands and unreasonably exclude persons whose biological distinctiveness does not 
include arms and hands; thus, such exclusion, constitutes social oppression.  
	 Figures 11 & 12 show Brett, an Australian Music Producer and entrepreneur, 
playing the piano with his feet; the second photo shows Brett driving his Mercedes. 
The medical model has a natural difficulty in responding to Brett’s abilities because 
the  model seeks to appropriate disability to the impairments of  the individual — 
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Figure 11, Above: Brett driving his Mercedes.  
Figure 12, Over: A younger Brett plays the piano. 
Screen shots from: BBC. Brett: A Life with no 
Arms. 2015
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rather than to assess what experiences are actually disabling. The PTD would evaluate 
the action of  playing the piano or driving the car through the use of  pictures (and in 
this case, audible gifs or move clips) and would show no impediment in either goal or 
task (though he may be better at it with hands, what matters for the PTD is that he is 
achieving his task or goal). Brett does not consider himself  ‘disabled’ with respect to 
playing the piano or driving the car — in fact, he daughter criticises him for parking 
his two door Mercedes in a disabled parking spot, teasing that: “its for people with no 
legs… you’re only disabled when it means [your] being able to park outside of  
Woolworth’s.”  The PTD would concur with her evaluation (and must concur with 287
his) because, while playing the piano and driving a car with your feet may seem 
awkward to those of  us who use hands to play the piano and drive, Brett experiences 
no disability in achieving these goals. 	  
	 The goal-like-ours of  playing the piano is, if  anything, only difficult because it 
is limited by Brett’s musical talent and aptitude, not by his having no arms. As a 
contrast, when Brett was involved in a motor vehicle accident (which was not his fault), 
he received a broken leg and toe bones. He claims that he was vexed because he was 
unable to get up and about because he could neither push a wheelchair himself  nor 
operate crutches, and had, therefore, to depend upon others for their help.  This 288
reduction in independence is important because, for Brett and many others with 
whom I have spoken, losing independence is probably the most undesired eventuality 
of  broad-spectrum or severely disabling experiences with respect to daily-living tasks 
 Roger Graef, “Brett: A Life with No Arms (2),” (London; UK: BBC, 2015), TV.287
 Graef, 2015.288
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and goals. For the PTD, then, the period of  time Brett was unable to get about 
independently would constitute a disability (in that he experienced an unremitting 
difficulty moving about). 
4.4.2 Plugging the Goals into the Picture Analysis 
To a limited extent then, a picture — at least for the PTD — depends upon 
knowledge which the observer does not necessarily have from the outset (although 
such knowledge can sometimes be self-evident in the picture). In order to evaluate 
whether or not disability is being experienced during a given action it is first necessary 
to know what goal or task is being attempted. Because some of  the tasks that will be 
pictured are everyday tasks, it is often easy to see when they are being frustrated — it 
is quite clear, for example, whether or not someone is having difficulty brushing their 
teeth or holding something heavy. However, some things, like a difficulty in reading 
perhaps, are not always so transparent. Consequently, if  the daily-living task or goal-
like-ours is not indicated, the information must be provided to the observer by the 
person in the picture (perhaps by a simple question ‘are you having difficulty reading 
that?’ ). The resultant information may then be used to determine whether or not 289
 When I was 9, I distinctly recall my teacher, Mrs. Oliver, asking me whether or not I 289
could read the black board. Reflecting upon this memory, I realise that the manner in which she 
was made aware of  my difficulty was both in the work I produced, in the fact I appear to be 
squinting, or possibly through my distractedness and lack of  attention. She responded by seeking 
more information about the problem by asking a question. Obviously, she had no access to my 
qualia at the time — she simply saw the signs of  my disabling experience and responded to them; 
she saw my disabling experience by employing the Picture Theory of  Disability. (Out of  interest, 
the amelioration of  that disabling experience was to have my eyes tested, and as a result, I 
received ‘Ronnie Barker’ NHS glasses. My minor disabling experience has been almost eliminated 
ever since).
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the sort of  activity being conducted is within the capacity of  the individual  or 290
whether or not a frustration or impediment arises as a function of  the relationship 
between the individual and their immediate environment. 	  
4.4.1 A Note on Cultural Relativity 
The picture theory has in-built cultural relativity that arises from three elements. 
Firstly, the pictures themselves express cultural relativity in virtue of  showing a state of  
affairs, and that any such state of  affairs must reflect the culture in which the state of  
affairs holds. For instance, if  a culture has no airports, then there can be no picture 
which shows a wheelchair user working behind an airport check-in counter. The 
picture shows a state of  affairs and the objects in that picture stand in determinate 
relation to one another. Thus the picture is framed, so to speak, in the culture it 
represents. 	  
	 Secondly, and closely linked to the first, whatever activities (around daily-living 
tasks and goals-like-ours) are being analysed must also incorporate cultural relativity as 
what constitutes daily-living tasks or goals-like-ours depends heavily on what a culture 
accepts as being appropriate preferences. Earlier, I noted that in the West, we — at 
least to a certain extent — have moved towards Rawlsian notions of  fairness and 
justness. But this is not the case cross culturally — indeed, in the US, the paradigm of  
the West, Rawlsian intuitions are fairly widespread, but they are challenged by 
Libertarian thinking. Nevertheless, because the picture shows a state of  affairs, and 
 Recall that an individual who has the capacity to perform a task experiences a 290
disability when that task or goal is unremittingly impeded through a functional relationship 
between that individual uniqueness and their immediate environment.
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because the picture also shows the goals and tasks being attempted, the tasks and goals 
will be those which are culturally appropriate ones. 
	 Finally, because the Picture Theory of  Disability includes a sort of  empathetic 
arousal (in the form of  NST) to the response to the emotion is grounded in the social 
and cultural background in which the observer developed their belief  sets or in what 
ever society the action is being observed. The PTD will reflect different responses to 
the same sorts of  pictures (not the same pictures — as a picture represents one and 
only one state of  affairs) from one society to another. In part then, the observer brings 
to the picture their own social and cultural bias and expectations; and in part, the 
society in which the action is conducted ‘sets’ the tone for what is or is not an 
experience of  disability. When I was in Singapore, for example, I saw live chickens 
being killed, plucked, and served for food in road-side food carts. I was, at first, 
somewhat taken-aback by this until I looked about to find that this activity was quite 
acceptable in that community. Having made this secondary observation, I realised that 
this type of  activity was a social ‘norm’, and that it was my perception that was ex 
loci.  291
	 A piercing question arises from this observed cultural relativity: is it ‘how the 
observer reads the pictures’, or ‘what is actually in them’, that changes from culture to 
culture. The Picture Theory of  Disability demands, much like the Wittgensteinian PT, 
that the picture is a fact; it shows a state of  affairs (providing, of  course, that it is true 
 Of  course, it is this type of  issue that has been lain against cultural relativity as a 291
criticism — and I think the criticism deserves merit, as the justification of  one belief  over another 
is not a simple matter. This, however, is discussion for another day. The PTD just happens to chew 
up pictures and spit out culturally relative results. I actually consider this to be one of  the strengths 
of  the theory, but perhaps the defence of  that claim is also best saved for another day.
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— i.e. that things are (were) as the picture depicts them). Consequently, what is actually 
in the picture is just a collection of  objects which stand in determinate relation to each 
other — but what is in the picture will change depending upon where the state of  
affairs occurs that the picture shows.  Thus, it is not only the consideration over the 292
activity of  the individual in the picture, but also how the observer reads that activity, 
how the individual reports on that activity, what tasks or goals are being elected, and 
what kind of  environment the picture 
represents which  changes from culture to 
culture. The PTD recognises that what is or 
is not a disabling experience differs, because 
what constitutes an acceptable goal, a 
reasonable amount of  effort, and a suitable 
environments also differs from place to 
place and culture to culture. Likewise, the experiences of  disability will be shown to 
differ from picture to picture, because the picture just shows the way things are in a 
specific state of  affairs. 	  
	 Thus it is the experience of  disability which is culturally relative. It is not expected 
for impaired persons to make a living in the West by sculpting in the way the girl in the 
Figure 13 does,  and so there exists a fundamental difference in what kinds of  293
activities impaired people in the West might expect. Likewise, it might be surprising if  
 The picture, then, must (and would) include enough of  the social context to reflect 292
such variations from one culture to anther.
 That is not to say that they could not.293
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Figure 13: Sculpting Girl. Google Image 
Search. Unknown Author.
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the girl in the photo were to expect some Western-type occupation;  and so, whilst it 294
might be progressive to think that, perhaps, there should be a certain set of  rights 
offered to persons with disabilities, it is clear that many states in the world neither have 
systems to distribute justice in that manner nor the financial ability to finance welfare 
systems like other states.  295
	 Moreover, persons with disabilities experience a different set of  opportunities in 
one state than they might in another. It would be folly to assume that a wheelchair 
user in Tanzania (for example) would have the same work opportunities as a wheelchair 
user in the United Kingdom. That is not the same as claiming that a wheelchair user 
in Tanzania ought not have the same work opportunities — just that the types of  
opportunities will be different in virtue of  the types of  work that are offered there. The 
picture theory of  disability does not pretend to provide a set of  cross-cultural ‘rights’ 
for persons experiencing disability (though it is intended to provide a more accurate 
description of  disability such that a re-evaluation of  our current responses to people 
who experience disability may engender a change in their social status — and with it, 
generate greater inclusion). 
	 The notion that the experience of  disability is culturally relative may not sit 
well — especially with persons from the DRM who believe that there should be a 
 I am being cautious here as I have been unable to determine in which country the 294
photograph was taken.
 Again, I make no claim as to whether or not this is the way things ought to be — I 295
merely observe this is how things seem to be.
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fundamental set of  rights and opportunities for disabled persons  — but let me 296
elaborate on why the experience of  disability is culturally relative. Firstly, if  we feed 
pictures into the PTD it just produces out different results if  the pictures are set in 
vastly different  cultures and locations. A picture showing a deaf  person buying a 297
coffee in a Deaf  culture, for example, will show no disability, but if  we show that same 
deaf  person buying a coffee in a hearing culture, then the PTD is likely to show that 
disability is being experienced. The girl Figure 13 appears to be a gifted sculptor. No 
element of  her environment in combination with her unique individuality creates an 
unremitting and disabling experience with respect to her sculpting (that is not to say 
that she may not experience disability in other things, but that she does not experience 
disability in relation to sculpting) — but I am uncertain whether or not the same could 
be said for a person born with similar differences in the West.  
	 It is in this way that the Picture Theory of  Disability agrees (at least to some 
degree) with the social model of  disability which holds that: (1) society and culture are 
responsible for setting limits on what goals might be realistic, and (2) would hold that 
an observer’s analysis of  the picture would be heavily biased by whatever ideologies 
are held by the Social of  which they are a part. An objection can be formulated here: 
‘The PTD is compromised because it suggests that disability is culturally relative, and 
 The PTD makes no claims about what ought to be the case, but I feel that I can 296
reasonably argue that if  there are no office work opportunities for any person in a culture, then 
mandating that disabled persons should have access to office jobs seems to be irrelevant. This is 
not to say that I believe that disabled persons should not aspire to obtain white-collar jobs, but that 
they should be offered equal opportunities within a society.
 I say vastly because the difference between the sorts of  disabling experiences in the US, 297
the UK, and Germany, for example, are likely as not to be slight. Whereas greater differences may 
exist between other states.
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the observer carries with him the burden of  Social bias — moreover, the idea that 
disability is culturally relative and informed by the Social is just what it is to have a 
social model of  disability. It follows, then, that responses which are generated by the 
PTD must be the same as those generated by the SM.’ 
	 In response to this objection, it should be remarked that the PTD differs from 
the social model in important and non-trivial ways, and consequently, this criticism 
can be dismissed on a number of  fronts: Firstly, the objection is precariously close to 
being a fallacy of  comparison — just because one model shares some similarities with 
another does not mean that it is essentially the same model and that it will generate 
the same sorts of  results. Secondly, the social model states when a person is disabled, 
whereas the PTD shows when, where, and how a person experiences disability.  
	 Thirdly, the social model observes that a lower limb impaired person becomes 
disabled by stairs on every occasion (because stairs are designed to reflect the abilities 
of  ‘species-typical’ individuals), whereas the PTD holds that such an individual would 
experience disability climbing stairs if  they themselves agree that they experienced 
such a disability and that their efforts to climb the stairs shows that they do. For 
example, according to the SM, Chris Koch should be disabled by stairs, but Chris 
(seen in Figures 14 & 15) has said that “. . . stairs are not really a problem.”  It 298
therefore, seems somewhat odd to me that a model of  disability should report that he 
is disabled by stairs when he, himself, says that he isn't. 
	 Fourthly, the SM is also unable to respond to the magnitude of  a disability, as 
such disability is a sort of  all-or-nothing event — a person is either oppressed by 
 Google, September 3, 2015.298
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society or they aren’t.  In reality, disabling experiences are intermittent, differ from 299
person to person, and often short in duration. My colleague, Chip, who is a wheelchair 
user, remarks that his main experience of  disability is in getting in and out of  bed. 
Because of  his individual traits in relation to sleeping in a bed, getting in and out of  
bed can take upwards of  45 minutes. The PTD would respond that he experiences 
disability in the action of  getting in and out of  bed, but that the rest of  his day might 
be largely without other disabling experiences. Perhaps it is unfair to presume the SM 
to consider Chip disabled throughout the day, but it would be obligated to report the 
social and cultural causes of  each individual difficulty or claim that all of  Chip’s 
disabilities are related to various improper beliefs held by a society which have resulted 
in his experiencing social disabilities as well as physical ones. A description of  disability 
which is not particularly helpful. 
 I do accept that this is a bit too quick and unfair to the SM — however, discussion of  299
why moves us away from the issue.
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stairs, Google, “Chris Koch: ‘If I Can…' | 
Talks at Google.” YouTube. September 3, 
2015.
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	 A fifth distinction between the SM and the PTD with relation to social beliefs is 
to be found in the PTD’s treatment of  persons with mental illness. I elaborate further 
on the issue of  mental illnesses and the PTD in a later section of  this chapter, but it is 
appropriate here to note that researchers working with the SM “have rarely included 
psychiatric disability in their work.”  In part, this is because a foundational tenet of  300
the SM believes disability to be: 
… the disadvantage or restriction of  activity caused by a contemporary social 
organisation which takes no or little account of  people who have physical 
impairments and thus excludes them from the mainstream of  social activities.   301
As many people with mental illness do not have a ‘physical impairments’ per sē, the 
model has difficulty responding to such persons. Mulvany observes in a footnote that 
authors such as Shakespeare and Watson  ignore mental illness altogether. So despite 302
claiming that disability is a function of  social oppression, discrimination, and 
exclusion, it offers little in the way of  discussion of  how persons with mental illness are 
oppressed, discriminated against, or excluded from society. The PTD, however, would 
respond clearly that such persons experience disability — and it is also capable of  
showing how such oppression and discrimination is the result of  the Social.  303
 Julie Mulvany, “Disability, Impairment or Illness? The Relevance of  the Social Model 300
of  Disability to the Study of  Mental Disorder,” In Social Health & Illness Sociology of  Health and Illness 
Vol. 22, no. 5 (2000): 582-601.
 Michael Oliver, The Politics of  Disablement, (London: Macmillan, 1990), 11. Emphasis 301
mine.
 Tom Shakespeare and N. Watson, “Defending the Social Model”, Disability and Society, 302
12, 2, (1997), 293-300.
 It could do this were a picture to show that an individual with learning difficulties, say, 303
were subject to  some sort of  social exclusion of  the type regularly seen in public places. An 
example might be the pointing and ridicule of  persons with severe impairments that are 
occasionally taken by their carers to shopping centres or parks.
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	 Finally, it might be fair to say that the SM and the PTD are influenced by 
similar sorts of  concerns, but where the SM observes that the Social (and the type of  
built environment which arises out of  it) is the cause of  disability, the PTD claims that 
disabling experiences can be understood in relation to the Social — not because of  it. 
The PTD observes that considering the daily-living tasks and goals-like-ours in 
relation to the social environment provides a better kind of  response as to when an 
individual encounters disabling experiences. Of  course, it might be possible to simply 
ask the individual which experiences disable and which do not — but then (amongst 
other issues) we incur the bootstrapping problem of  how do we know who to ask? 
Some people’s experience of  disability is self-evident — but there are many who suffer 
profoundly, but not obviously. It follows that a good model of  disability must be able to 
equally and accurately identify the disability experienced by all persons experiencing 
disability. 
	 As mentioned above, the PTD incorporates a daily-living task and goal metric 
into its calculus. Consequently, what may or may not be considered a realistic goal is 
heavily influenced by both the capacity of  the individual and the culture of  which they 
are a part. Chris Koch, as a farmer in the Southern Alberta, Canada, had the realistic 
goal of  becoming a farmer and machine operator, and Nick Vijicic, who was born in 
Australia, had the realistic goal of  becoming a Christian evangelist and motivational 
speaker. These goals were realistic, in part only, through being born in a developed 
Western country. Such opportunities may have been possible were they to have been 
born in a more developing country (say, one of  the African countries) but success in 
achieving such goals might have been less likely — and as such, may have constituted 
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an unrealistic goal under the PTD in that country.  In this respect, then, the calculus 304
of  the PTD is both culturally relative and grounded in the Social. 
	 By focussing on those situations which create a disabling experience, the PTD 
opens up the potential to improve that situation in order to ameliorate that disabling 
experience. Likewise, distributive justice in one country is likely to be different from 
that in another country and, as such, will alter the expectations of  the person with 
disability. It is important to realise that I make no normative claims about this differing 
distributive justice — I merely lay it before the reader as a fact and note the influence 
which the political state has upon the expectations and opportunities of  all those 
individuals (not just those who experience disability) who dwell there.  
4.5 The Synthesis — Pictures 1 and 2 
Putting the framework together is not a complex operation. However, because the 
Picture Theory of  Disability is (largely) a visual construction, it might be necessary to 
revisit the gedankenexperiment in Chapter 2 where a spectator is observing an individual 
walking up some steps. I shall build the picture using Naïve Sentimental Theory and 
the elements from the Wittgensteinian Picture theory I relied on earlier. I shall also 
stipulate a goal or task which is a crucial part of  the picture. The Picture Theory of  
Disability cares about the lived experience of  the individuals in the picture, so the 
picture can be interactive to the extent that the observer may ask questions of  the 
individual in the picture or the individual can intimate what and how they are feeling 
 I qualify this statement with the knowledge that the human spirit is indomitable and I 304
admit that it is possible for people to transgress their origins to become hugely successful. 
However, I would remind the reader that such aspirations are far more rarely satisfied than 
commonly satisfied.
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about their current situation — this lived experience of  the individual is a significant 
part of  the PTD’s calculus. 
	 Imagining the thought experiment as a moving picture — perhaps a gif  or 
short video clip, a simple PTD analysis of  the picture shows that it comprises several 
objects, two relations, and one goal:  
Picture 1: 
Object 1) 	 an individual,  
Object 2) 	 some steps,  
Object 3) 	 an umbrella, 
Relation 1)	 the individual is walking swiftly up the steps, 
Relation 2)	 it is raining, 
Goal 1) 	 to attend a job interview. 
Now, let us consider a second picture: 
Picture 2: 
Object 1) 	 an individual,  
Object 2) 	 some steps,  
Object 3)	 a wheelchair, 
Relation 1) 	 the individual is sitting in the chair looking at the steps, 
Relation 2) 	 it is raining, 
Goal 1)		 to attend a job interview. 
I shall add some colour to complete both pictures: the steps are the only access to a 
place of  work where the individual is going to attend a job interview; the steps are 
exposed to the elements; and there are people hastily making their way up and down 
them to get out of  the rain.  
Interpretation 1) 	 In picture 1, we see a man holding an umbrella walking 
swiftly up the stairs where he opens the door and escapes the rain. During this 
picture, his face has expressed a modicum of  displeasure due to the rain, but he 
is, nevertheless, keen, excited — if  not perhaps a little apprehensive of  the job 
interview. He reports that he is excited about the interview and in a hurry to 
get out of  the rain 
Interpretation 2) 	 In picture 2, a wheelchair user is dressed in job-interview-
suitable clothing, but has no umbrella (it is hard to push a chair and hold an 
umbrella at the same time); she is becoming wetter as time progresses, and after 
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pushing herself  around the bottom of  the building to look for other entrances 
and finding none, she appears at the bottom of  the steps amongst the bustling 
people wet in despair and vexation. She reports that she was excited for this 
opportunity, as it is the first real job offer she has had in some time, and adds 
that she worries that even if  they make the interview (which she is now late for) 
she will not look her best through being wet through. 
As Naïve Sentimental Theory suggests, we are brought to feel the vexation, sadness, 
and futility of  the increasingly dampened wheelchair user as well as, perhaps, the 
trepidation and enthusiasm of  the umbrella man.  The impression received by 305
observing and interacting with the wheelchair user at the foot of  the stairs highlights 
— quite potently — the disability which is being experienced by the individual.  
	 The linguistic analysis of  the picture is more complex than the intuitions which 
Naïve Sentimental Theory presents. The level of  vexation or difficulty has to be 
analysed through the verbs (and the modifiers which add to the description of  the 
activity being undertaken) used in the picture. Wittgenstein mentions verbs in the 
Tractatus only 4 times because he was much more concerned about objects and 
relations. However, in the Picture Theory of  Disability, there is a greater concerned 
about what the verbs show us about a picture. Through the analysis of  the 
relationships between objects and other objects and between actions and verbs, the 
picture theory of  disability shows us the experience of  disability. It is in this way I say 
that the Picture Theory of  Disability is adverbial: it seeks to show us facts about the 
way in which a certain action is being conducted. 
 I say ‘perhaps’ here because, as Hume noted, the extent and vivacity of  the passion is 305
influential as to how observable the passion is. Slight trepidation and excitement would not be as 
easily noticeable as extreme vexation.
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	 In the same way that, for Wittgenstein, “a proposition shows how things stand 
if  it is true,”  and that objects stand in determinate relations to each other, 306
propositions in a Picture Theory of  Disability analysis of  a picture show the verbal 
relationship between objects. For Wittgenstein, relations between objects took on a sort 
of  positional manner: ‘the broom is attached to the handle’,’the cat is in the box’, 
‘the broom is in the corner’. In the PTD it is best to conceive of  relations as verbal as 
well as positional: ‘the man is walking up the stairs’, ‘the girl is listening at the 
pedestrian crossing’, ‘the wheelchair user is talking at the lectern’. Indeed, it is a 
careful selection of  modifiers and verbs which properly present the relationship 
between an individual, their environment and their task or goal. It is not enough to say 
‘the man is walking up the stairs’, it necessary to show in what manner the man is 
walking up the stairs. The key to the PTD is being able to link the observer’s 
emotional responses to the proper source of  that response; to generate an accurate 
analysis of  what is actually going on in the picture. If  an improper or hasty analysis of  
the picture is made, an improper conclusion will result. Above all, the PTD seeks to 
determine when a person has a disabling experience, and it does so by evaluating the 
response of  an individual to any given environmental or psychological strain. 
	 Returning to the above thought experiment, the important verbal phrase is 
‘getting to a job interview’. In one case, the subject's ability to realise this action is 
neither impeded nor limited in anyway, but in the other picture the verbal phrase is 
not just impeded but damply negated! The PTD is an adverbial description of  
disability because the picture shows how the action in characterised by the verbal 
 4.022306
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phrase is being conducted (if  at all). A linguistic analysis presents words which modify 
the verbal phrase: In the first case, we note the man is walking ‘swiftly’ and that words 
like ‘excitedly’, and ‘apprehensively’, can be used in relation to the picture. However, 
in the second, we have few adverbs available to describe her movement — perhaps 
‘frantically’ or ‘dejectedly’, and that words like ‘sadly’, and ‘disappointedly’ can be 
used in relation to the general picture. We might say that the PTD’s adverbial 
evaluation of  the picture seeks to highlight the manner of  the impediment to an 
action. Any adverbial impediment to that action can be understood through the use of  
negative adjectives to describe the emotion of  the individual in question. If  the action 
is not impeded and the adjectives used to describe the individual’s emotional state are 
positive, then there is likely to be no disability being experienced. Contrarily, if  the 
action is severely impeded, and the adjectives used to describe the individual’s 
emotional state are negative, then there is likely a disability being experienced. The 
Picture Theory assists with the analysis of  the adverbial nature of  the actions, and 
Naïve Sentimental Theory assists with analysis of  the individual. Together they form a 
cohesive and coherent analysis of  disability.  
	 Now, although I have stated that the PTD requires that we pay close attention 
to verb use in descriptions of  the pictures it is not the case that we need to be over 
analytic. It is enough that a fairly clear picture is presented of  who and what is in the 
picture, what and how significant is their action, and what is the relation between the 
individual and the object upon which they are acting. Again, because the PTD seeks to 
know about the nature of  an individual’s experience it is necessary to pay closer 
attention to the verbs used to describe that action and the adverbs which modify them.  
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	 It is not the case (even though I have mentioned that the elements of  the 
picture of  interest to the PTD are verbal) that there should be no attention payed to 
the nouns (the objects) in the picture; the individuals and the object with which they 
may be interacting are important — indeed, the adjectives used to describe their 
emotional states are very important (as are the adjectives we might use to describe 
their expression). However, where the PTD differs from medical and social models is 
that it looks beyond the individual to the frustration of  the action arising as a function 
of  the relationship between the individual and the environment.  
	 By comparison, the MM locates disability in physical deviation from norm; in 
a person’s impairment. This approach results in a model for which disability becomes 
a property of  the individual: ‘the wheelchair user is disabled because he has lower 
limb impairments.’ Of  course, the social model fares equally poorly as they modify the 
environment, objects, or ideologies surrounding the individual: ‘the flight of stairs is 
the disabling factor because it is not respectful of  his biological individuality.’  
	 Seeing the growing frustration and distress of  the wheelchair user (as linked to 
the verbal element of  the picture) is how the Picture Theory of  Disability shows that 
the individual is experiencing a disability. It shows it because the picture together with 
the knowledge that the activity being attempted is an important daily-living task or 
goal (to which access is impeded) engenders in the observer a similar feeling of  
frustration and despair to the original. The Disability Rights Movement hold that 
persons with disabilities do not want pity (which is where a strict Humean 
interpretation would, perhaps, lead) — because the ‘disability’ is neither theirs, nor in 
them. Instead the movement would prefer the experience to not have existed in the 
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first place. For this reason, the DRM is a strong proponent of  the social model of  
disability and reject the medical model.  
	 Yet the DRM can also support the PTD: For the PTD disability is an 
experience tied to the verb in the picture (and in the verb used to report the fact), not a 
noun or adjective which can be applied to the individual themselves (not, that is, 
independently of  the circumstances in which they find themselves and the goals they 
are pursuing); ‘disability’ is located in the irremediable and impeded nature of  the 
action — where the attempted action is specified by the verb and the impediment is 
shown through the adverb. For the PTD, a difficulty, frustration, or vexation 
(holistically, an impediment) of  the daily-living task or goal-like-ours is where disability 
lies — it does not reside in the individual. Where the PTD differs from the social 
model, here, is that the PTD describes disability in terms of  the verb, not in terms of  
the Social (which, again, would make disability nounal). It is by showing the difficulty 
experienced by a person with disability that the Picture Theory of  Disability is able to 
identify the imbalance that exists between those who experience a difficulty and those 
who do not. 
4.5.1 A Very Brief  Note on Normativity 
As mentioned several times above, the PTD makes no normative claims, but to satisfy the 
curiosity of  the reader, I wish to show how a normative evaluation might proceed 
through a PTD analysis of  the above pictures. As an observer in Canada, it seems 
perfectly reasonable that the wheelchair user should have the same access to a job 
interview for which they are as qualified as the man with the umbrella. It also seems 
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somehow ‘unfair’ that they should be getting wet because there is no other access to 
the building, when at the same time, the guy with the umbrella is bounding up the 
stairs and out of  the rain. 
	 The normative claims that ‘not getting into the building is unfair’, and that 
‘stairs unfairly impede the wheelchair user’ which may arise from the picture analysis, 
are informed by the Social in which I, as the observer interpreting the pictures, am 
positioned. I do not suggest that there is a cross-cultural de-facto response to this 
particular image, but I do suggest that given my position in Canada and my 
expectations of  fairness and equality which are a function of  the social and cultural 
construct in which I live, the pictures seem (to me) to be unequal in an unfair way.   
	 This sort of  normative evaluation arises because the goal-like-ours of  attending 
a job interview (for which they are skilled) is a realistic one — and realistically 
expected to be open to all as part of  equality of  opportunity.  What engenders the 307
notion of  unfairness in the above picture, is that for the wheelchair user, access to this 
goal is impeded. The social model of  disability claims that the disability in the picture 
is in the stairs, and the medical model holds that the disability is in the individual. Yet 
it is in the manner in which the task is personally irremediably impeded that the 
disability lies. 
	 The ‘fairness’ informing the observer’s evaluation of  the picture is just part of  
the reasonable expectations relative to that goal: the person is qualified and the job is 
open to all, but this person’s ability (in the verbal sense —rather than in the sense of  
 Much needs to be said about how it would be possible to ensure equal opportunities to 307
disabled persons. I am fairly sure that the PTD (together with some normative principles) would 
support a greater inclusion for disabled persons — however, this again, is subject for future 
research and development.
!115
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
capacity) to access the interview is impeded or frustrated. Thus, and here all three 
models agree, when the resulting a lack of  welfare originates from this source it is tied 
to a disability. It is the sympathetic evaluation of  the picture which permits one to 
consider how we would feel if  we were struggling to get to a job interview, and to 
understand how we would feel if  we could not get to a building and were becoming 
more and more wet and tired. The PTD itself  makes no normative claim here: the 
PTD simply locates where in the picture disability occurs. What it is for the interview 
goal to be a realistic one, is that it should be available to all people in the society in 
question. So to this, and only this degree, norms enter into the PTD: they enter into 
the observation and help inform the observer of  the ‘unfairness’ of  an action. Where 
one person holds a realistic goal and experiences unremitting frustration (in the sense 
that it happens every time they attempt to realise such a goal) in the pursuit of  that 
goal, then they experience disability. What the PTD does not engage, is what we 
rectify the unfairness. The PTD is able to inform this decision, but that is the purview 
of  a further set of  research. 
4.6 The Synthesis — Pictures 3 and 4 
	  
Let us consider another gedankenexperiment in which a person seated at a computer in an 
office is typing away gets up and goes for a beverage. An analysis of  the picture reveals 
objects, relations, and a goal: 
Picture 3: 
Object 1) 	 an individual,  
Object 2) 	 a desk,  
Object 3) 	 a computer, 
Object 4)	 a chair, 
Relation 1)	 the individual is sitting in the chair, 
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Relation 2)	 the individual is typing, 
Relation 3)	 the individual walks through the office to the coffee room, 
Goal 1) 	 to get a drink. 
As before, I shall provide a second picture: 
Picture 4: 
Object 1) 	 an individual,  
Object 2) 	 a desk,  
Object 3)	 a computer, 
Object 4)	 a wheelchair, 
Relation 1) 	 the individual is sitting in a wheelchair, 
Relation 2) 	 the individual is typing, 
Relation 3)	 the individual goes through the office to the coffee room, 
Goal 1)		 to get a drink. 
In a similar manner to the previous set of  pictures I shall bring some colour to the 
pictures: the office is bright and well lit, and the desks are replete with drawers, a 
phone, in and out trays, and paperwork — the humdrum office space. The offices in 
the buildings have wide door frames and each office is next to other offices similarly 
laid out. One of  the office spaces is a coffee or break room and access to this room is 
wide and easily navigable by a double door-width archway. There are people walking 
in and out of  offices in the manner found at any regular office building.   
Interpretation 1) 	 In picture 3, we see the individual sitting at her desk 
typing and composing a spreadsheet. Feeling the need for a drink, the 
individual gets up from her desk and proceeds to the coffee room where they 
open the fridge and get out a drink. During this picture, her face has expressed 
no distress other than to express a fleeting greeting to some work colleague. 
When engaged, she comments that she is thirsty and the spreadsheet is more 
problematic than she expected. 
Interpretation 2)	  In picture 4, the wheelchair user is seen at their desk 
typing at the computer working on a spreadsheet. Needing some other 
document, she spins her wheelchair around to reach the required document 
from a filing cabinet behind her, and placing it on the desk, she proceeds to 
leave the office to obtain a drink. She pilots the chair down the corridor and 
into the coffee room where she vends a (probably quite nasty) beverage from 
the vending machine. A modicum of  grouchiness flashes across her face as 
some hot liquid splashes onto her finger, but otherwise she appears contented. 
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She remarks that the coffee in the machine is awful, and complains about the 
cups being over full.  
That neither of  the individuals shows any kind of  discomfort, frustration, despair, or 
anguish in pictures 3 and 4 is how the Picture Theory of  Disability shows that neither 
individual experiences a disability. It shows it because an analysis of  the verbs and 
adverbs we use to describe the picture, together with the knowledge that the activity 
being attempted is an important daily-living task or goal-like-ours is not being 
frustrated or impeded, engenders in the observer no feelings of  frustration, discomfort, 
etc.  
	 Pictures 3 and 4 show that the wheelchair user experiences no more vexation 
or difficulty in her job than the non-wheelchair user — they do so by showing that 
neither individual seems to experience any ‘impediment’ in conducting a particular 
action. The adverbs modifying the verbs in the pictures generate no negative 
descriptors other than ‘disgruntled’ in response to the coffee. There is no protracted or 
unremitting impediment to any of  the work tasks (similar to daily-living tasks and 
associated with goals-like-ours), and as such there is no adverbial evidence to suppose 
disability is being experienced. In short the PTD claims that persons who experience little-to-
no difficulty performing a daily-living task or achieving a goal-like-ours do not experience disability. 
	 In some cases, it is possible that the adverbs used to modify the activities 
described by the picture cannot be properly and fully linguistically defined or analysed. 
But here we find another strength of  the PTD. Where the linguistic analysis can be 
taxing and incomplete, the picture (and the emotional analysis developed through 
Naïve Sentimental Theory) are much more complete. Recall the photograph 
presented earlier of  Mr. Majid and his family — though I never shared the entire list, 
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the list of  interpretations of  his expression and body language in the picture offered by 
my colleagues included 43 different words — some adverbs, some verbs, some nouns, 
and some adjectives. However, all of  them were variations on a theme and were they 
put together, perhaps, we might have a fuller idea of  the emotion were we unable to 
view the picture itself. Indeed, the more describing words we use (either of  a verbal or 
nounal nature) in a description the more full the picture which results. Nevertheless, no 
literary analysis (however well written) is able to totally grasp the picture to its fullest 
degree whereas the picture shows its meaning directly.  308
	 I mentioned earlier that it is the picture together with Naïve Sentimental 
Theory  which provides a fuller interpretation of  the fact. I claim this because 
sociopaths are less responsive to emotions expressed in the conduct of  an action — 
this phenomenon is known as ‘decreased sympathetic arousal.’  So it is possible that 309
the extent to which someone is able to ‘see’ what is expressed in a picture may be 
different from one person to another. For instance, someone with decreased 
sympathetic arousal (not necessarily a sociopath) may get more information from the 
linguistic analysis, whereas someone with a greater sympathetic arousal might find the 
picture itself  to be more evocative. Consequently, a Humean subject is required to 
operate the NST element of  the theory. For this reason, I feel that Naïve Sentimental 
 Here, think how many people have tried to write about ‘love’ and have found their 308
work wanting. We certainly cannot say that Shakespeare’s attempts failed, but they are found 
wanting. By comparison, someone shown a photograph or short film presenting ‘love’ can rarely 
be unclear about what is being presented.
 A. Raine, J. R. Meloy, S. Bihrle, J. Stoddard, L. LaCasse, and M. S. Buchsbaum, 309
“Reduced prefrontal and increased subcortical brain functioning assessed using positron emission 
tomography in predatory and affective murderers,” Behav. Sci. Law. (1998);16:319–332.; Mendez, 
2009, 608-620.
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Theory on its own, is insufficient to provide the observer with the correct interpretation 
of  a picture. It falls upon the picture to provide background, setting, and adverbial 
information about the objects and the relation of  one object to another. The 
interactive nature of  the picture enables the observer to inquire as to the lived 
experience of  the individuals in a picture and completes the image. In these examples 
the interactivity is hypothetical (as is the picture itself), however, they are to be largely 
based on real-world situations.  
	 Thus when seeking to know whether or not a certain individual experiences 
disability in life, one must ask about multiple situations before it is possible to 
determine an answer. Chris Koch explains that he can operate a tractor, JCB, and 
skateboard as well as any other individual — but that he is not good at swimming: he 
sinks like a stone “nine times out of, nine”.  Consequently, were Chris to be analysed 310
under the PTD about his disabling experiences, the picture of  him operating a JCB or 
skateboarding shows that he experiences no disability — despite his outward 
appearance. However, the picture of  him trying to swim would clearly present a great 
difficulty and thus a disability. The linguistic analysis of  the picture (including 
interaction), knowledge of  the goal, and Naïve Sentimentalism together build a full 
and complete picture of  ‘fact’ or state of  affairs which clearly identifies disability when 
it is experienced. It is for this reason that the theory is named the Picture Theory of  
Disability, and is not some species of  Naïve Sentimentalism.  
 Fortney, 2014.310
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4.7 Mental Illnesses and the PTD 
With the mechanism and operation of  the PTD fully presented, I can now proceed to 
demonstrate a very important advantage of  the PTD over the other theories and 
models of  disability: The PTD is fully able to encompass mental impairments.  311
Mental impairments have been extremely tricky for the medical model because it is 
only able to demonstrate the functional reduction in performance of  certain tasks 
when compared to other people. That is to say that the medical profession are often 
still unsure exactly what (exactly) causes certain mental impairments such as 
Asperger’s, Dyslexia, OCD, etc. The fact that doctors and specialists cannot always 
show a physical difference between persons with Asperger’s and persons without 
demands that in order to affirm the diagnosis a batch of  psychological exams as well 
as functionality tests are required — from these a ‘diagnosis’ is then inferred.  This 312
diagnosis is to be contrasted with the diagnosis of  ‘disability’ which comes out of  
comparing (say) the prevalence of  one legged women to the prevalence of  two legged 
women, and then concluding that women with one leg are a deviance from statistical 
norm and are, therefore, disabled in virtue of  the difficulties experienced due to that 
deviance.  
	 Of  course, the above is much too quick of  an appraisal of  the medical 
determination of  disability — but it does capture the essence of  the procedure and on 
 There is an important medical and functional distinction to be made between mental 311
impairments and illnesses. However, I cannot engage this distinction here. I mean only to 
reference those types of  reduced mental function which might engender either a social or physical 
impediment to a goal or task. Here I shall call them impairments recognising the lack of  accuracy 
this term engenders.
 This is just one reason why it is very difficult to ‘diagnose’ a mental impairment.312
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what criteria they base their conclusion. Under the medical model, mental 
impairments cannot be identified in the same physical way — often,  there is no 313
discernible physical difference in the neurological structure and diagnosis can only be 
made through the evaluation of  performance.  Nevertheless, the individual often 314
claims a great difficulty in the conducting of  daily-living tasks or goals. That persons 
with mental illnesses claim difficulties in achieving certain tasks of  daily-living is 
equivalent to the claim of  the PTD — that persons with mental impairment 
experience disability. 
	 But the dysfunction arising from mental impairment sometimes engenders a 
different kind of  difficulty: Because persons with Asperger’s tend to be outwardly 
‘species typical’, people assume that they do not experience disability — but this is not 
the case. Many persons with Asperger’s are profoundly disabled with respect to social 
interactions and conventions such as shaking hands. This level of  social awkwardness 
can result in diminished social circles and opportunities including a lack of  job 
opportunities. The PTD is able to consider the interactions and lived experience of  
such individuals and determine whether or not a social disability is being experienced. 
No other model  is able to evaluate this sort of  disabling — and very real — 315
experience as effectively as the PTD. That said, I should observe that the social model 
 That is to admit that occasionally a physical difference is easily determinable.313
 This evaluative method is equally problematic to disabled persons as they often feel as 314
though their experiences are de-valued.
 Martiny (2015) discusses limitations of  Phenomenological approaches to disability. He 315
observes that, roughly speaking, current Phenomenological approaches are only speak to acquired 
disabilities (as they require a personal evaluation of  ‘I cannot’, where congenitally impaired 
persons only have a perspective of  ‘I can’). It is for this reason that I discount current 
Phenomenological approaches here, as they don't reflect the entire continuum of  disability. 
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has attempted to speak to what they call ‘social disability’ and observes that bullying 
and shunning which can often arise from mental illness is an example of  such 
disability. The PTD, on the other hand, is not only able to identify where, how, and to 
whom such social experiences occur — but also to what level such experiences are 
disabling. 
	 For example, a recent television police drama from the US, Monk, was set 
around an unusually gifted detective named Adrian Monk who, due to the murder of  
his young wife, developed OCD as well as other neurological issues. For those who 
have watched a few episodes, it is clear that Monk regularly experiences a profound 
disability in the manner mentioned above. Indeed, much of  the series is framed about 
how he manages this disability and creates work-arounds in order to achieve his daily-
living tasks and goals. The television program reflects the reality of  the current 
Western response to persons with mental impairments and demonstrates the social 
discomfort to himself  and others that arises out of  his compulsions. In the series, 
Monk has been diagnosed with a number of  mental impairments and does appear to 
‘get better’ over time, but the medication (which he elects to not take) prescribed has 
its own downsides and is of  little help to him — given the types of  activities that give 
his life meaning and of  which he enjoys. It is never admitted in the program, that 
Monk has any ‘disability’, but the viewer is brought — quite potently — to the real 
difficulties and impediments of  Monk’s life. As many of  Monk’s fundamental daily-
living tasks are regularly frustrated, the PTD would determine that he, absolutely, 
experiences disability.  
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	 The program does a reasonable job of  presenting the real-world difficulties of  
persons who experience issues similar to those of  Monk, and the viewer is brought to 
empathise with the lead character because of  these persistent difficulties. When 
looking at the character analysis and an understanding about the experiences of  
Monk, what the viewer of  the program is doing is actually applying the Picture 
Theory of  Disability: The viewer is aware of  the difficulties which arise for Monk in 
the conduct of  daily-living tasks or goals, and the dialogue and moments with his 
psychiatrist permit an ‘inside view’ of  the lived experience of  Monk himself.  
	 The Social model is challenged when it comes to persons with disabilities 
because it is committed to observing that any disability arises out of  socially 
constructed barriers and oppression. Importantly though, most of  Monk’s frustrations 
are not caused by social barriers or oppression, but by the internal inability to conduct 
a task of  daily-living — such as eating outside, or walking about a town without feeling 
compelled to touch each post or parking meter.  Certainly we can be sure that in the 316
West, at least, many persons with mental impairments experience oppression and 
exclusion, but are we really able to suggest that this disables in the same way that 
having no legs disables? To do so would be to claim that the experience of  disability 
 To be fair to the social model, it would claim that society judges Monk for feeling 316
compelled to touch each post and that he should not feel subjugated because of  this compulsion. 
Moreover, they would claim that the awkwardness that Monk feels in touching these posts is a 
function of  him knowing that such behaviour is criticised by society. However, that is a 
misunderstanding of  the exactly what is going on. The disability, that Monk has to touch each 
post, does not arise because society judge him unfairly and is not welcoming of  such difference, 
but out of  a mental compulsion to touch each post. Were it that society did not consider Monk’s 
behaviour odd, it would not alter the compulsion — nor would it remove the disability he 
experiences (given that the disability experienced is, say, being slowed in walking, or feeling 
compelled to back-track if  he missed a post, or being unable to hold a conversation properly by 
being distracted by the counting and touching).
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for one individual is the same as the other. While this may occasionally be the case 
(perhaps in someone who is unable though a psychological fear to enter a rotating 
door and someone who is physically unable to get their wheelchair into the rotating 
door), the types of  disabilities experienced by the mentally impaired and the physically 
impaired are, almost always, different. 
	 When talking of  social oppression and barriers, there is an important 
difference between the sorts of  barriers which the mentally impaired and the 
physically impaired experience. I am happy to agree that they may be very distantly 
related (often in a very tentative manner) to society, its expectations, and beliefs, I am 
even happy to accept that the barriers result in the same kind of  functional difference 
— but I am uncomfortable with the two types of  impairment being simply lumped 
together in the same way because they are things which are subject to oppression from 
societal ‘norms’. Being committed to this belief  demands that Trekkies and Whovians 
would also experience disability because they do not fit well with the Social and are 
oppressed by it. Certainly, we may say that they may experience bullying — perhaps 
even ridicule — but do we want to suggest that they are disabled? I think not — it is a 
different order of  experience more akin to the type experienced by Rapunzel. 
	 Because the PTD is entrenched in a lived-experience version of  disability, any 
amelioration would start with the individual and is tailor made to them — it considers 
the adverbial nature of  their specific experiences of  daily-living tasks and goals-like-
ours. As a result, it is the real difficulties (the impediments to those daily-living tasks or 
goals-like-ours denoted by the verbs in the picture) which are reported by the 
individual and must be reduced — not whatever hypothetical or intuitive social oppression 
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or barrier is presumed. For instance, the Figure 16 below is of  Chris Koch driving a 
tractor and operating a rotor 
tiller. Our intuitional 
observation, looking at Chris, 
is that he could not operate 
such a complex piece of  
equipment. However, it is these 
intuitions which 
inappropriately inform our ideas of  disability — not Chris’s lived experience of  
disability.  
	 In other words, a person experiencing mental or physical impairments in one 
country may not experience difficulties experienced by some other person with similar 
impairments in another country due to differing expectations, goals, and daily-living 
tasks. The PTD observes that, since the verbs in each picture are different, the 
adverbial analysis of  those verbs in each picture will be different — and thus, the level 
of  experienced disability (if  there is any at all) will be different. Let me be more 
explicit: The television character, Monk, has severe OCD (amongst other mental 
issues). However, Monk is a detective who advises the San Fransisco police 
department. The difficulties and frustrations he experiences often impede his daily-
living tasks (and a major plot of  the program is that they frustrate his goals about 
returning to the force — a goal-like-ours). The PTD would demonstrate that Monk is 
disabled with respect to certain activities (though not disabled at all in respect to other 
activities, such as showering). However, some other individual, say in Indonesia, is 
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Can..." | Talks at Google.” YouTube. September 3, 2015.
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unlikely to be able to acquire such a position as Monk in the first place, and is 
therefore, unlikely to experience the frustration of  not being able to return. This is not 
the same as claiming that the individual in Indonesia is not likely to experience 
frustrations in some other respect — nor that such a person ought not to have that 
opportunity — but that their experience of  disability will be different from those of  
Monk, and therefore the picture arising out of  their experiences is likely to be 
different.  
	 People with Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID or ‘transability’) are people 
who identify as being able-bodied but who have a very strong desire to become 
physically impaired. Such individuals feel as though a certain limb does not belong, 
never ‘feels like their own’,  or consider their limb to be a birth defect.  However, 317 318
their beliefs are not only limited to disassociation with a limb, but also include the wish 
to become blind or deaf  — some even express a desire to become incontinent. These 
feelings are so pronounced that transabled people occasionally resort to acquiring their 
desire by self-removing a limb or causing such ‘accidental’ damage that medical 
intervention (and sometimes amputation) results.  Successful amputation of  a limb or 319
 Sarah Boesveld, “Becoming Disabled by Choice, Not Chance: 'Transabled' People Feel 317
like Impostors in Their Fully Working Bodies,” National Post Canada, June 4, (2015). Accessed July 
1, 2015. 
 Shannon Larratt, “One Hand Jason: BIID Interview in BME/News [Publisher's 318
Ring],” BME Tattoo Piercing and Body Modification News, February 19, (2008), Accessed October 12, 
2015. An odd perspective given that we usually consider birth defect to be negative not positive — 
in that we usually consider a birth defect to result in the lack of  something rather than something 
‘normal’ that shouldn’t be.
 Boesveld, 2015.; BBC, “Surgeon Defends Amputations,” BBC News. January 31, 319
2000. Accessed October 12, 2015.
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appendage that was never felt to belong usually results in a drastic improvement in the 
quality of  life. 
	 Transability has struggled to gain any kind of  momentum as a serious issue and 
continues to be plagued by vehement and striking opposition.  Perhaps this 320
opposition is not surprising given that a transable  individual seeks to be in an 321
‘unhealthy state’ — importantly different from other trans-identities where individuals 
seek to be in another — but heathy — state. Consequently, the desire to be medically 
assisted to become incontinent, to have a limb removed, or some similar medical 
intervention seems by many to be an irrational decision. It is unclear as to whether or 
not this condition should constitute a disability or not and the social and medical 
models do seem to struggle with these outlying cases. The social model fares somewhat 
better here than the medical model because it is sensitive to the social disability which 
might be experienced by being outcast, for instance. However the medical model can 
offer no such recognition of  BIID as a disability. Shannon Lariat observes of  her 
friend ‘Jason’ (not his real name) that:  
Years ago, after a lifetime of  anguish due to having an extra hand — essentially 
a birth defect in his opinion — he took the radical step of  amputating this 
hand just above the wrist. He’s never regretted his action, and feels that now his 
body is ‘right’.  322
 Baril, 2014, 36-7.320
 The author of  a very interesting paper on the subject, Alexandre Baril, suggest that the 321
terms ‘transable' and ‘transability’ should be used as it falls inline with other current ‘trans’ 
terminology; I concur. Baril suggests: “In trans communities, the desire to develop terms allowing 
transpeople to reclaim their experiences has long been expressed.” Alexandre Baril, “Needing to 
Acquire a Physical Impairment/Disability: (Re)Thinking the Connection between Trans and 
Disability Studies through Transability,” Hypatia 30, no. 1 (2014), 32.
 Larratt, 2008. 322
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There has been doubt from many quarters — including the medical fraternity and the 
Disability Rights Movement — that such beliefs are improper and not at all well 
considered. However, this does not seem to be the case according to transabled 
individuals’ themselves, who often report a considerable amount of  thought and effort 
involved in their self  medication. Jason recalls that:  
I did experiments with animal legs I got from a butcher. It’s lucky I thought of  
that, because some of  my early attempts were total fuck ups and would have 
ended up with a damaged hand which might have had to undergo years of  
painful reconstruction, and worse yet, no amputation.  323
	 Because of  their counterintuitive and seemingly irrational beliefs, transabled 
individuals have found it difficult for their desires and feelings to be taken seriously. 
This often leaves transabled people to go through life in sometimes significant 
discomfort, agitation, and anxiety. Because the medical fraternity are skeptical that the 
wishes of  transabled people are properly founded, transabled people find it very 
difficult to approach or attain the body that they desire. In 1990 and again in 1999, a 
Scottish doctor completed the amputation of  healthy limbs and received attention for 
being the first medical surgeon who admitted to performing amputations of  healthy 
limbs. These operations did succeed in raising awareness of  BIID as a condition and 
researchers — at least in Canada — are now trying to better understand how 
transabled people think and feel.  324
	 Transablism generates a healthy level of  criticism and skepticism from not only 
medical professionals but also the disability rights community. In part, discussion of  
 Ibid. 323
 Boesveld, 2015. 324
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transabilism is hampered by the lack of  uptake within disability studies.  Part of  the 325
reason that disability studies has difficulty dealing with the issue of  transabilism is 
because they often assume a sort of  ‘involuntariness’ in the concept of  disability. Of  
course, such models which hold this functionally render discussion of  transabled 
realities impossible. Baril observes that, “disability studies have demonstrated little 
interest in the decision-making process involved in modifying the body’s health and 
abilities to acquire a physical impairment.”  Even the disability activist community  326 327
view the phenomena with caution considering “transabled people [to be] dishonest 
people, people who try to steal resources from the community, people who would be 
disrespectful by denying or fetishising or romanticising disability reality.”  328
	 Sometimes, transabled people self-report as experiencing a disability prior to 
any surgeries or ‘accidents’ — in other words, while they can be identified as being in 
a healthy state. The case of  transabled persons permits an interesting test case for the 
PTD as the theory is charged with identifying disability whenever and wherever it is 
experienced. Without data on the type of  impediments that persons with BIID 
experienced to their daily-living tasks or goals, it is difficult to forecast how the PTD 
would fair. 
	 The PTD is, of  course, not in the business of  making normative statements 
about being dispossessed of  some function of  your body due to an intense feeling that 
it is improper. What it must do is provide information on whether or not a transabled 
 Perhaps the one field that should be open minded towards difference…325
 Baril, 2014, 37. (Emphasis mine)326
 I take Baril to mean the DRM, here.327
 Boesveld, 2015.328
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person who has not yet achieved the desired state experiences disability.  Such a 329
situation may be assessed in the same way that the PTD approaches any disability. 
Were a difficulty experienced in a daily-living task or goal — as a function of  some 
specific relation of  the individual to the environment — then such a state would be 
considered sufficient to say that the individual is experiencing a disability. Now, as to 
what type of  difficulty a pre-operation transabled individual might experience, I could 
not say. What is important for the PTD is that the transabled person’s lived experience 
is taken into consideration along with the PTD picture analysis. I have a feeling that 
what ever difficulty might present would be along similar lines to the difficulty 
experienced by some persons with mental illnesses. This is not to say that transability 
is a mental illness — maybe it is, I am not an expert in this area — but it is to say that 
the kinds of  discomfort or difficulty that may arise as a function of  feeling that your 
body is not quite right in its current state is a similar type or sort of  discomfort or 
difficulty that may be felt by persons with OCD, Dyslexia, or ADHD. It is clear, I 
think, that the PTD would maintain that a post-operative transabled individual would 
experience the same sort of  difficulty realising a daily-living task or goal that any other 
similarly impaired individual might also feel.  
	 As the PTD considers that the frustration of  daily-living tasks or goals is what it 
is to experience disability, it is easily able to handle both common and uncommon 
occasions of  mental impairment as well as more common and less common occasions 
of  physical impairment. The fact that the PTD considers the perspective of  those who 
experience disability over and above whether or not the impairment is measurable (or 
 The PTD would likely show that person post-amputation would experience disability 329
wherever a picture would show such an experience of  disability.
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how measurable it is), or whether or not the disability arises of  some mental issue or 
physical issue, it is stronger and more durable than either of  the two currently 
hegemonic models. 
4.8 Objections To The Theory 
In this section I need to consider several immediate objections to the Picture Theory 
of  Disability. Throughout this next section I shall consider the objections to the theory 
which have been raised, then repudiate or refute the criticisms. My thanks go to all 
those with whom I’ve talked about this new approach to disability and to their 
insightful thought and responses. 
4.8.1 Bias 
It is possible to criticise the PTD by observing that the perception of  the event by the 
observer is subject to a certain amount of  interpretation or bias. To this objection I 
respond that a picture is a fact — in the same way as it is for Wittgenstein. A fact is the 
“existence of  states of  affairs.”  Where the potential for misinterpretation exists is in 330
the interpretation of  the demeanour of  the individual in the picture — not of  the 
picture itself. A fuller response to this concern was presented toward the end of  
Chapter 2 and is entitled ‘The Potential For Incorrect Synthesis’. 
 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 2010, Proposition: 2330
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4.8.2 Temporary Disability 
‘Some persons, it has been argued, are temporarily disabled. For instance someone  
usually unimpaired but who has broken their leg. Given that the PTD holds that 
disability is not something a person has, to a certain extent, the duration is somewhat 
irrelevant. The PTD requires that the difficulties befalling a person who experiences 
disability must be severe and unremitting. In the case of  a person with a broken leg the 
difficulties experienced are severe, but not irremediable. However, the short term 
nature of  the illness is overcome by the severity of  a break, and as such the PTD 
would show the broken leg to be a short-term impediment to a person’s daily-living 
tasks and goals-like-ours. Furthermore, while a broken leg may take weeks or months 
to repair itself, that shortish duration may be considered to be sufficiently unremitting 
in the sense that the symptoms do not come and go from day to day. In this sense, 
were a person to receive an operation which affected their eyesight for several months, 
then that person might also experience disability in the sense of  a short-lived inability 
to see.  
	 To investigate a related case, persons with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (also 
known as ME) may have periods of  poor health in which they experience quite 
profound disability, however, they may also experience periods of  good health. 
Whether or not they experience any difficulty on a given day, the fact that their 
condition is protracted and will influence their experiences for years ensures that the 
PTD evaluates such persons as experiencing disability — even when they are 
experiencing less immediate disability than usual. This differs from the current 
medical model which has difficulty in recognising a lack of  evidence with the lived 
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experience reports of  the individual given the illnesses intermittent, recurring, but 
debilitating nature. 
	 Yet a further related situation might be a person who has chronic and severe 
migraines. Such a person may only experience a migraine for a matter of  hours — a 
few days at the longest — before the symptoms may cease. If, when the symptoms are 
present, the individual is sufficiently incapacitated that it affects their ability to get out 
of  bed, work, or conduct other basic daily tasks, then despite the relatively short 
duration of  the symptoms, the PTD would consider such a person to be disabled 
because the condition is, in medical terms ‘chronic’ (but which I prefer to call 
unremitting to avoid unnecessary medical connotations). In the case of  the individual 
with migraines and the person with ME, the PTD would simply remark that the 
disability which they experience would be staccato and of  varying length, but that 
their conditions were sufficiently unremitting (in the sense of  long-term) that they may 
be considered ‘disabled’.  331
4.8.3 Sociopathy as Disability 
Over dinner one evening, I was asked: ‘whether or not a sociopathic person would be 
disabled. Their actions both cause other people to experience difficulties arising from 
social incompatibility, and, thus, are they themselves disabled by the lack of  social 
community that they occasion?’ I confess to having given quite some thought to this 
complex issue. On the one hand, the PTD does not wish to wave its metaphorical 
hand at such psychological cases — denying that such persons with such conditions 
 When I mean to say that a person is ‘disabled’ I do not wish to say that they are a 331
‘disabled thing’, but that they are ‘disabled by…’ This is an important distinction I wish to make.
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experience disabilities. On the other hand, though, I am sympathetic to the idea that 
they may be considered by others to have some sort of  ‘mental illness’.  
	 In order to respond to this query, I am required to accept that social disability is 
a similar sort of  thing as a physical difficulty or disability. Because the question of  
whether or not people ought have this or that opportunity, or ought be treated in this 
or that way, demands a normative response, the PTD is unable to offer a response. It is 
not the purpose of  the PTD to make claims about what should or should not be; that 
discussion is reserved for those who take the theory-so-offered and apply it to 
normative questions about disability. In order to comment on whether or not a 
sociopath experiences social disability I would need to know what sort of  thing 
constitutes a ‘social disability’. 
	 Upon the more descriptive issue — whether or not a sociopath under the PTD 
could be considered to experience disability — I can comment. Under the Picture 
Theory of  Disability, a sociopath would have to be irremediably frustrated, placed in 
discomfort, or otherwise disadvantaged by some relation between themselves and their 
environment. From what little I know of  sociopaths,  they tend to be emotionally 332
unaffected by social interactions but extremely vexed when they are unable to reach 
their goals. This frustration is not really engendered by some aspect of  themselves in 
relation to their environment (though it is, perhaps, occasioned by some relation 
between themselves and others). I therefore, do not believe it the case that they would 
experience disability due to there being a lack of  relationship between themselves and 
 I confess that what I know about sociopaths is very little, and the position represented 332
here is based upon that which I recall from my few years of  Psychology classes during my early 
academic studies. 
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their environment. Nor do I believe that they would report experiencing disability 
through a general disinterest in how other people affect and influence their lives. I 
think that it is the case that sociopaths have a psychological condition which borders 
on mental impairment — but that is not the same as the experience of  disability 
proper. In short, the PTD would be unable to discern any kind of  unremitting 
impediment or frustration of  either daily-living tasks or goals-like-ours (at least none 
that are not experienced by other people in similar situations). 
4.8.4 Dyslexia as Disability 
‘Dyslexia is irremediable and causes difficulty in reading and expressing ideas — often 
in the most formative years of  a person’s life. But we can’t seriously suggest that 
difficulty in reading and writing is a disability, can we? Some people in the world can’t 
read and write, but that doesn't make them disabled!’ Absolutely we can hold that 
Dyslexia is a disabling experience. The PTD is clear that any relationship between an 
individual and their environment which engenders an impediment to the conduct of  a 
daily-living task or goal is one from which a disabling experience is generated. It might 
be the case that, in some countries, some people are unable to read and write at all 
(and, as such, they would experience difficulty in performing such actions as were 
demanded of  them). However, the in-built cultural relativity that the PTD respects 
that, in the West (where reading and writing are considered fundamental skills), the 
inability or difficulty to develop reading and writing skills would impose a severe and 
unremitting disadvantage or limitation in the conduct of  daily-living tasks or goals — 
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in this case, reading The Lord of  the Rings, or the more long term goal of  becoming 
educated; and, as such, suggests that a person with dyslexia does experience disability. 
	 Another analysis of  dyslexia might be that, in itself, it represents only a 
difficulty to the individual, and a dyslexic person may have adapted to other ways of  
doing things which do not require reading, per sē (an example of  achieving the goal of  
knowing The Lord of  the Rings books without reading might be to hear the 
audiobook versions). In which case, maybe what is being impeded for that individual is 
the goal of  getting, or advancing in, an education.  
	 What the PTD would show in these cases would depend upon the whatever the 
picture presented: if  an individual experienced a profound impediment to his or her 
reading to the extent that it interfered with their daily-living tasks or goals then, for 
that individual, dyslexia would be a disability. Yet, if  some other dyslexic person 
experienced an impediment in gaining the kind of  employment they desired, then, for 
them, not being able to read The Lord of  The Rings might just contribute a difficulty. 
So, for each individual, what matters seems to be their goal, how they have adapted to 
achieve their goals, and the nature and frustration of  them. The PTD, which focusses 
on the whole picture as well as the lived experience, would be able to distinguish 
between these two cases and a proper account of  disability would be reported. 
4.8.5 Are Babies Disabled? 
While on the subject of  younger children and developmental difficulties, one of  my 
interlocutors queried what the Picture Theory of  Disability would have to say about 
very young children — babies — who were ‘diagnosed’ as disabled by the medical 
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model. I feel that the treatment of  such children or babies by the PTD is quite clear, 
and would depend upon the type and manner in which the impediments were being 
experienced. At an extremely young age — younger than 18 months old — it is 
difficult to know or see what types of  things children struggle with. Dyslexia, for 
instance, does not appear until reading skills begin to be taught, yet deafness can often 
be determined at a much earlier age.  The PTD would observe, simply speaking, 333
that were the relationship between a baby/child and their environment to profoundly 
impede some daily-living task or goal (perhaps eating, sleeping, learning, or 
conducting an activity that the child enjoyed) then that baby/child would experience a 
disability.  
	 Chris Koch and Brett Nielson both argue that their abilities and successes in 
life have arisen from the tone of  their upbringing.  Because of  the nature of  their 334
physiological differences, it was obvious from birth that they would likely experience 
certain disabilities in life. However, a newly born baby is largely unable to do anything 
other than signal that it wants something — nor is that signal able to express what it 
wants or needs. Consequently, at this stage a child born without differences 
experiences the same sorts of  difficulty in life as a child who is born differently (mostly 
because everything requires external assistance at that age). Certain differences that 
require immediate medical intervention are (at least in the West) relatively quickly 
 The PTD, curiously, has much to offer on deafness. It permits a deaf  individual to 333
experience little-to-no disability if  that person is to be brought up in the Capital ‘D’ Deaf  culture, 
but in the rest of  Western culture, deafness would be considered to bring about hearing related 
disabilities.
 Google, 2015.334
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identified and can be addressed appropriately.  This leaves the child in a state in 335
which they are able to progress through life and discover the kinds of  experiences (if  
any) which will, for them, be disabling. 
	 The kind of  care that babies receive by caring parents is the kind of  care that 
Chris and Brett experienced, and they both claim that being treated much like other 
children is probably contributes to their experiencing less actual disability as they grew 
up. Under the PTD, what it is to experience disability is for some daily-living task or 
goal to be frustrated in an unremitting kind of  way. Consequently, before the PTD can 
make claims about who does or does not experience disability, this sort of  frustration 
of  tasks and goals needs to be evident. People born differently, like Chris, often remark 
that their childhood was “pretty easy, actually.”  This is the case because all human 336
children tend to be naturally adaptive — whether or not they are born differently — 
and they tend to perform desired tasks in a way which best suits them and in which 
they experience the least difficulty.   337
	 In short, then, the PTD shows when an experience is a disabling experience 
one. Life for very young babies is almost completely disabling — but this is brought 
about by their innate capacity for life: their limited abilities are due to their limited 
capacity for elevated activities. Consequently, babies are not disabled because they 
 This claim is not without its criticisms. Persons born intersex are often unreasonably 335
operated on to force gender prescription, certain physical deviations are also attended to when, 
perhaps, the child would have been better without intervention. This is not the place for that 
complex and difficult conversation. I merely wish to show that blocked urethras, heart defects, and 
other such similar bodily issues which require immediate attention to maintain the health of  the 
individual, tend, in the West, to be responded to quickly and without too much concern.
 Google, 2015.336
 Think of  how some children are able to figure out ways to climb out of  their crib, or 337
get candy when unsupervised.
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have not yet developed the capacities with which to achieve their goals. Perhaps we 
might say that their crying arises because they want to be fed, cuddled, cleaned, etc., 
and are frustrated by not having these things done and by being unable to do them 
themselves. 
	 This leads on to the very interesting question as to whether or not the PTD 
would endorse medical intervention in order to rectify certain childhood 
disadvantages.  This question is a normative one, and leads into a much bigger task 
than this thesis has space to discuss. Many normative questions naturally arise out of  
the Picture Theory of  Disability, and all are very interesting. However, they must be 
handled with care in this thesis, as the PTD makes no normative claims at all. 
Questions arising about what ought to be the case given this or that scenario is clearly a 
topic of  further and more advanced research (which I feel would be of  great value to 
applied philosophy). What I think can be observed is that, if  some wheelchair user can 
trick-hop his chair up stairs, then he may not experience disability from the 
relationship between himself  and that specific environment.  
	 I feel it important to point out here that normalisation of  the individual is a 
knee-jerk reaction to persons who are not born like us (what the medical profession 
term ‘not species typical’). In my personal experience of  persons with significant 
impairments, they claim that they often did much better in their natural condition 
than they ever did with ‘the best that medicine could provide’. This experiential 
position is backed up through a significant body of  data, and first person perspectives 
in concurrence have been presented by Chris Koch, Brett Nielson, et al.  Chris 338
 Google, 2015.; Graef, 2015.; Watson, N., 2002, 509-527.; Fortney, 2014.338
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Koch, for example, observes that prosthetics were never his thing;  that he could got 339
by better without any additional encumbrance. This sheds (at least some) doubt upon 
the claims that children are better ‘fixed’. What the PTD would commit to, is that a 
certain child may experience disability in certain actions of  daily life; what I caution, is 
that those disabilities may not be where you might expect them to be. 
4.8.6 Why a Picture Theory at All? 
The question as to whether or not the Picture Theory of  Disability is needed at all — 
given that the pictures we use to determine whether or not disability is being 
experienced are often going to be hypothetical — is a good one. The point of  the 
Picture Theory of  Disability is to provide a metric by which disability can be properly 
identified. Its implementation requires that the pictures are properly formed and, in 
general, accurately represent the real situation in the way that Wittgenstein’s pictures 
can be ‘laid against the real world like a measure’. Current models of  disability are 
rather crude in that they blame either the individual or the Social — but never look 
properly and fully at the lived experiences of  those experiencing a disability. The PTD 
seeks to return the power of  showing what and what is not disabling to those who 
actually experience disability. Moreover, the PTD offers a full and careful theory of  
the phenomenon of  disability itself  — it does not confuse the desire to ameliorate 
normative problems with describing what disability is. The PTD is a sort of  ‘ground-
up’ approach — whereas other models are largely ‘top-down’ approaches. 
 Fortney, 2014.339
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4.8.7 Humean Subjects  
An instrumental element of  the Picture Theory of  Disability is Naïve Sentimentalism. 
However, applying Naïve Sentimentalism requires a ‘Humean subject’, as distinct 
from the kind of  simple ‘metaphysical subject’ which could interpret Wittgenstein’s 
Picture Theory.  This requirement means that only Humean subjects — only people 340
who are able to respond emotionally to a picture — are able to apply a Picture Theory 
of  Disability analysis.  
	 The metaphysical subject who appears in the introduction to the Tractatus has 
no attributes (since no propositions can be about the subject itself). This subject holds 
up propositions to the world to see if  they are true and thus, cannot be a part of  the 
world. They are more like Zen perspectives on the entire world, and as such are 
unknowable. In contrast, the Humean subject is just a disinterested (one might say, 
fully impartial) version of  us. This impartiality is bounded in so much as the Humean 
subject is able to sympathise with the situation of  the Other.  341
	 Certainly, this is a limiting factor to the theory, but I believe that it is trivially 
limiting in the respect that only a few members of  society would not be able to employ 
the theory to its fullest —sociopaths, for example, might not get the same kind of  
results that would be seen by a Humean subject. I cannot give ground on the necessity 
for a Humean subject, because if  the individual in the picture was not frustrated (or, 
perhaps, wasn't showing signs of  vexation), but still had a disabling experience, a 
 Russell, 2010, xxii.340
 In sociology (and literary criticism), ‘Other’ is a status which results from a process of  341
‘othering' -- a process in which an individual or group is made subject to an external relation; not 
‘the same’. Once again, my thanks go to Dr. William Ramp for his helpful definition here.
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Humean subject could still perceive the frustrating nature of  the situation and identify 
that a disabling experience is occurring. This is to say that for a person to experience a 
disability, there does not necessarily have to be an effect on that person’s wellbeing — 
either short or long term. Such an individual may have adapted to their situation and 
have become pretty tough to ‘frustrate’.  Nevertheless, they may still have disabling 342
experiences. 
	 Thus I am comfortable biting the bullet on this objection, given that at the 
results of  employing a Humean subject together with the picture theory seem to vastly 
outperform other models. Moreover, without some sort of  experiment, it is difficult to 
know what results might be obtained were a sociopath to apply the Picture Theory of  
disability anyway. It is possible that a Picture Theory analysis on its own would provide 
a reasonable interpretation of  most experiences of  disability, and that Naïve 
Sentimentalism would refine and hone those analyses plus give us information on 
disabling experiences which are not immediately apparent from a Picture analysis 
alone. It is for this reason that I believe that Naïve Sentimentalism needs to work 
together with the Picture Theory analysis to present a full and proper account of  
disability.  
 The idea that a person may experience disability, but are tough to frustrate is a difficult 342
one. What I mean to say by this, is that were a person a life long user of  a wheelchair, then they 
become accustomed to a certain level of  frustration and are less likely to present that frustration 
visibly. However, a Humean subject who would observe that person trying to attend a job 
interview would be able to perceive an almost hidden frustration — even if  the person were not 
obviously vexed. That Humean subject would then be able to identify that experience as being a 
disabling one.
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4.8.8 A Cumbersome Theory 
Finally, I have been asked whether the Picture Theory of  Disability is not somewhat 
cumbersome when all the other theories seem to be so simple: ‘disability is caused by 
the environment’, ‘disability is a function of  deviance from species typical normality’ 
etc. I believe that it doesn’t really matter how simple a theory is if  it doesn't work — 
simplicity is only a preferential quality; it is not a maxim. That there are 6 quarks and 
not 2 is not a failure of  physics to find the truth; there just happen to be 6 types of  
quarks. It might be argued that my model is slightly more challenging than other 
models which seek to do the same work (the Welfarist account, for instance, can be 
consolidated into a 6 page document), but I believe that my theory is more pragmatic, 
more comprehensive, more indicative, more realistic, and more insightful — and, most 
of  all, because my model respects the lived experience of  the individual, it is also the 
model which interprets disability through the eyes of  those people who experience it.  
	 Moreover, the nature of  sharing pictures and gifs to analyse disability makes 
the theory less complex than many others. The ability to easily show where disabling 
experiences are, or are not, occurring makes the theory significant in important ways. 
Unlike other theories which rely upon blanket statements of  disability, the PTD is able 
to simply share a picture, news article, or gif  to demonstrate how and for whom an 
impediment is affecting a goal. For instance, in a recent e-mail with a disability rights 
colleague in the UK, I received: 
Struggling to see disability here, eh? 
http://www.bbc.com/news/disability-34539992  343
 Kate Monaghan. “No Fear: Double Back Flip in a Wheelchair - BBC News,” (London; 343
UK: BBC News), October 23, 2015. Accessed October 29, 2015.
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The link was to a news article from the BBC showing a WMX (Wheelchair motocross) 
‘Life Rolls On’ event at the Venice Beach Skate Park, California which was shared 
instantly over e-mail. Pictures easily and simply show where disability is being 
experienced and these results can be easily shared: the ease by which the news reel was 
shared, and the clarity with which the video showed no impediment to the goals of  the 
people at the event, shows that the PTD’s mechanism of  evaluating disabling 
experiences is an improvement on the other models. As such, I suggest that the Picture 
theory of  disability provides a more pragmatic and valuable approach to disability.  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5. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE PICTURE THEORY OF DISABILITY 
The scope of  this thesis must be somewhat constrained and, therefore, it cannot not 
investigate all avenues of  interest. At first, it may appear that the Picture Theory of  
Disability is overly broad in its characterisation of  disability, making, for example, 
impediments due to racism or sexism into disabilities. But a strength of  the PTD is 
that it is used to distinguish the kind of  impediment involved (whatever kind that may 
be); and consequently, it should be noted that the construction of  the PTD naturally 
lends itself  to be employed in order to identify other forms of  disadvantage and loss of  
opportunity through gender inequality, racial prejudice, ageism, (and possibly many 
other-isms) wherever they occur. NST together with a picture theory analysis of, say, 
an experience of  gender inequality, would show where, when, and to whom, a 
difficulty or reduction in opportunity occurred. Slight augmentation of  the theory 
would easily be possible to demonstrate not an irremediable impediment to daily-
living-tasks and goals-like-ours resulting in the experience of  disability, but an 
irremediable impediment to daily-living-tasks and goals-like-ours resulting in the 
experience of  sexism/racism/ageism/etc. 
	 The Picture Theory of  Disability is a relational theory and some final space 
should, thus, be provided for a comparison with another relational account in order to 
demonstrate the benefits of  the PTD over a close and interesting competing theory of  
disability.  
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	 The ‘strong’ social model presented by the UPIAS in 1975 holds that it is 
society which disables impaired people,  but by 1980, Finkelstein had softened 344
(though only fractionally) the definition to claim that disability is a result of  “the 
outcome of  an oppressive relationship between people with… impairments and the rest 
of  society.”  The Disability Rights Movement staunchly held on to the UPIAS 345
definition of  disability and this persistence must have had some affect on the 
development of  the work in academia. Nevertheless, relational models have also been 
influential and work by people such as Amundson,  Terzi,  Shakespeare,  346 347 348
Anastasiou & Kaffman,  Tremain,  Savulescu & Kahane,  et al., developed 349 350 351
relational accounts with varying emphases. Of  these, the Welfarist account offers the 
most competition to the Picture Theory of  Disability. It is prudent, therefore, to offer 
here a discussion of  the Welfarist Account and why the Picture Theory of  Disability is 
importantly different. 
	 The Welfarist account as presented in Disability and Disadvantage briefly 
investigates what Kahane and Savulescu call the ‘everyday concept’ of  disability. They 
 UPIAS, 1997, 14.344
 V. Finkelstein, Attitudes and Disabled People: Issues for discussion, (New York, New York: 345
World Rehabilitation Fund), 1980, 47. Emphasis mine.
 Amundson, 2000, 33-53.346
 Terzi, Lorella “The Social Model of  Disability: A Philosophical Critique”, Journal of  347
Applied Philosophy, 21(2) (2004: 141-157. 
 Shakespeare, 2014.348
 Anastasiou, Dimitis and James Kauffman, “The Social Model of  Disability: 349
Dichotomy between Impairment and Disability,” Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy 38 (2013): 
441-459. 
 Shelly Tremain, “On the Government of  Disability,” Social Theory and Practice, 2001 350
 Savulescu & Kahane, 2011, 45-51.351
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suggest that we all possess an everyday concept of  disability — the sort of  concept that 
permits us to discern disabled persons from non-disabled persons.  They then go on 352
to observe that the ‘everyday concept’ has both descriptive and evaluative components — 
the descriptive component helps us describe and define disability and the evaluative 
dimension seeks to determine what it is about disability that makes life worse.  In this 353
respect, Kahane and Savulescu consider disability to be a thick evaluative concept which 
“has specific descriptive content and commits speakers to certain valuations,”  and it 354
becomes clear that they are interested in determining what it is about disability that 
makes life worse.  
	 The PTD might be said to be similar to the Welfarist account, as they both are 
interested in what makes make a person’s life poorer. However, this is too quick: 
Though the PTD pays attention to the manner in which an activity is being 
conducted, it is not always the case that there needs to be a reduction in wellbeing. For 
the PTD, if  a daily-living task or goal-like-ours is being seriously impeded as a 
function of  a relationship between the individual and the environment, then a 
disability is being experienced — even if  no reduction wellbeing is identified. The 
individual is still faced with an adverbial impediment or frustration leading to the 
experience of  disability. For instance, the wheelchair user from our earlier thought 
experiments, who may be used to the types of  disability she experiences might, when 
 Kahane & Savulescu, 2009, 17. Note that such a concept is flawed as it is often 352
ineffective at identifying persons with mental impairments, and often sees ‘disability’ where there 
is none.
 Loc. cit.353
 Loc. cit.354
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faced with missing her job interview, simply flick up the collar on her jacket and push 
herself  back to her car muttering grumpy expletives about non-accessible buildings.  
	 Certainly, it might be responded that her not getting the job would be a 
reduction in wellbeing — but I am not so sure: she might be used to this sort of  
occurrence, and may be fully able to get the sort of  job that makes her happy in a fully 
accessible (though in our case, it was stated that this was her first job opportunity for a 
while ). Consequently, the effect on her wellbeing may be zero — or at least small. 355
When she discovers the building to be inaccessible, she might have reflected that she 
ventured off  into the rain for no good reason, instead of  staying home to watch Dr. 
Who. Such an experience cannot be disabling in and of  itself; this sort of  experience 
happens to all of  us. However, the point is that the picture does not necessarily show 
that reduction in wellbeing. What the picture does show, is the manner of  the 
impediment; and the Humean element of  the picture theory would provide the 
observer with an emotional response to the stimulus. 
	 The Welfarist account tracks the loss of  wellbeing, which it sees as harmful to 
an individual. Thus it defines disability as:  
DisabilityW  
Any stable physical or psychological property of  subject S that leads to a 
reduction of  S’s level of  wellbeing in circumstances C.   356
 I offer only samples — in reality, it is entirely possible that a wheelchair user would 355
check the accessibility of  a potential workplace before turning up for the interview, or maybe they 
wouldn’t. What is important is that this is the sort of  activity from which a disabling experience 
may occur, but that a loss in wellbeing is not clearly indicated.
 Ibid., 25. Though it might be worth noting that they drop the qualifier “excluding the 356
effect that this condition has on wellbeing that is due to prejudice against S by members of  S’s 
society, ” which occurs in Savulescu, J., and G. Kahane. (2011). Instead, they develop various 
potential modifications to their definition to suit different objections. Such augmentation with ad 
hoc modifications suggests a weakness of  their account.
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Kahane and Savulescu point out that their account is not an analysis of  the everyday 
concept — instead it preserves the evaluative dimension and drops the descriptive 
element.  They are firm that a ‘stable physical or psychological property’ should not 357
to be taken to mean ‘impairment.’ They argue instead that they refer to “any intrinsic 
property of  the agent (qualified only in the sense explained above, that leaves out the 
contents of  mental states)”  — where ‘above’ refers to the “abiding physical and 358
psychological traits of  a person — features of  her body and broader cognitive, sensory, and 
affective dispositions — and excludes the content of  their mental states. . .”  They 359
do, however, state that the Welfarist account makes no reference to biological or 
statistical normality.   360
	 The important distinction to be made between the models is that the Picture 
Theory of  Disability considers that disability just is what it is to experience an 
impediment to a task or goal: it is not a property of  an individual nor of  the 
oppression imposed by the Social, but the experiencing of  a frustration or impediment 
in the conduct of  a daily-living task or goal. This subtle distinction liberates the society 
as well as the disabled person as neither are immediately responsible for that 
frustration or impediment. In short, there is no such thing as being disabled, there are 
simply people who have disabling experiences.  
 Kahane & Savulescu, (2009), 31.357
 Ibid., 25-6. A definition that I think I agree with — providing that I am correct in 358
taking Kahane and Savulescu to mean an enduring trait or element of  a persons physical or 
psychological being. 
 Loc. cit.359
 Ibid., 26.360
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	 The most important consequence of  this position is that although a person’s 
impairment or difference (broadly speaking) is connected to welfare, that connexion 
is not necessary — natural, but not necessary. Consequently, the PTD, like the Welfarist 
account, need make no reference to biological or statistical normality. For example, we 
earlier showed a picture of  a young girl (Figure 13) who had adapted to use her innate 
abilities in order to model clay and showed how Brett Nielson has adapted to become 
a skilful pianist and excavator driver — neither of  these individuals experience 
disability in achieving their goals. This position seems to imply that though 
physiological difference may be linked to a reduction in wellbeing, the connexion is not 
categorical — such difference may not affect their wellbeing, arising as a disability only 
in certain circumstances. 
	 The Welfarist account contains a built in normativity which arises from their 
notion that disability is the loss of  wellbeing due to intrinsic properties of  the 
individual. These properties are considered harmful traits in that they lead to a 
reduction in wellbeing in certain circumstances,  and in a footnote, Kahane and 361
Savulescu clarify that the harmful is a comparative notion and that “it refers to what 
makes life worse.”  This leads them to claim that if  something engenders a reduction 362
in wellbeing, then that thing is bad — though only instrumentally bad. Thus, they 
claim, though this would imply that a need to correct the ‘bad’ by removing the harm, 
it also means that they can correct the bad by changing the circumstances; there is no 
intrinsic reason to correct a condition that counts as a disability under their model.  363
 Ibid., 24.361
 Loc. cit.362
 Ibid., 26.363
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	 In contrast the PTD is not normative. Though it pays attention to the manner 
in which activities are frustrated or impeded, it does not make any claim about harm 
arising out of  the impediment. Instead, it shows the manner in which the activity is 
being frustrated and details the effects of  that frustration on the individual. The PTD 
can offer information about that where, when, why, and how that disabling experience 
occurs, but any normative claims must be constructed out of  an evaluation of  the 
impediment to the activity. Whatever normative resolution to the problem arises out 
of  that evaluation does not involve the PTD — other than to re-assess how things 
might go were this or that altered to reduce the impediment. Further research is 
necessary in this area to investigate what normative claims naturally arise from a 
different perspective on disability. 
	 Kahane and Savulescu claim that their Welfarist account is relational whereas 
the ‘everyday account’ is not and observe that the formulation of  the Welfarist account 
may vary in its specificity. For example, in relation to issues of  political or legal 
contexts they suggest that the formulation may alter to something like: 
A stable physical or psychological property that leads to a reduction of  level of  
wellbeing for most people from category Y in circumstances C.  364
but observe that such a formulation may be an obstacle when an answer to a 
normative question about a particular person in a particular circumstance is sought. 
Again, here the PTD cannot comment, as it is concerned with observing disabling 
experiences at the individual level.  
 Ibid., 28.364
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	 In summary, then, there are two main areas of  concern with the Welfarist 
model: Firstly, the format of  their definition rests heavily upon what ‘wellbeing’ is 
defined as. Kahane and Savulescu remark that “the extension of  disabilityW is 
determined by the empirical facts plus whatever is the true account of  wellbeing”.  The 365
obvious objection to be presented here is that ‘whatever is the true account of  
wellbeing’ is still a matter of  significant debate. Ethical theories which seek to define 
wellbeing range from ‘somewhat similar’ to ‘diametrically opposed’. As evidence, I 
offer the fact that this philosophical concern has been the subject of  continual and 
deep philosophical investigation since Socrates and Plato  2500 years ago. That the 366
definition of  disability rests upon resolving the issue of  ‘what is the good’ is likely to be 
of  little reassurance to the members of  the disabled community. Kahane and 
Savulescu address this objection, and by way of  a defence observe that “to some extent 
this fear is exaggerated.”  As support, they observe that the main competing theories 367
of  wellbeing largely agree on the things that make life go better or worse. I remain 
unconvinced by their defence.  
	 Secondly, the Welfarist model presents only a normative explanation of  
disability. The account seeks to find the answer to the question ‘in what way is 
disability ethically interesting’ — and in that sense, it succeeds well. However, this 
 Ibid., 43. ‘DisabilityW’ is their notion for the Welfarist account of  disability. Emphasis 365
mine.
 Eudaemonia: ancient Greek roughly meaning ‘happiness’ (but more carefully, ‘living 366
well’) was considered a goal to which everyone should work towards (though this is a bit of  a 
simple interpretation). Understanding Eudaemonia was a significant topic of  discussion for 
Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Various ideas about ‘the good’ have been discussed 
ever since.
 Ibid., 43.367
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account cannot be considered to offer a deep philosophical investigation into the 
phenomena of  disability itself. Kahane and Savulescu sought to put their finger on 
what is important in disability, but instead identified what is normatively important about 
disability. As a result, they have they have created a normative account of  disability — 
they have not analysed the phenomenon itself.  
	 In contrast, the Picture Theory of  Disability intends to show what ‘disability’ 
is. For the PTD, diminishment of  wellbeing is just not a necessary condition of  
disability — often that reduction in wellbeing will be in the picture, but it does not have to 
be. In short, the reduction in wellbeing is neither necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for there being disability.  The PTD is charged only with showing out ‘where the 368
disability is’; it permits us to properly identify where a problem occurs in an 
individual’s pursuit of  a task or goal. The normative question about how do we best 
fix the problem identified by the picture (and why) therefore arises naturally from the 
identification of  disability. But here I leave the field open to various theories of  
normative ethics and their application to individual or socially recurring problems of  
disability.	  
 It is easy to see that a loss of  wellbeing does not guarantee that a disabling experience 368
occurs, as my getting fired from a job would constitute a significant reduction in wellbeing without 
my experiencing a disability. However, having a disabling experience does not necessarily imply a 
reduction in wellbeing: Imagine you are to catch the bus: there is no room and you consequently 
have to wait till the next one. Such a difficulty would hardly constitute a reduction in wellbeing — 
more an annoyance. Similarly, a wheelchair user might be unable to get on the bus because it is 
not a kneeling bus and they too will have to wait for the next tube. This annoyance and frustration 
would constitute a disabling experience — but similarly, not a reduction in wellbeing.  
Moreover, even if having a disabling experience generated a reduction in wellbeing, it does 
not tell us what is ‘disability', it merely tells us that there is a strong connection between disability 
and normativity. Something I think no-one would deny.
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	 The Welfarist account, then, offers a great deal in terms of  a normative 
evaluation of  disability — but its similarity to the PTD is, perhaps, less pronounced 
than it first appears. Most importantly, their most significant difference is that they, like 
all other accounts of  disability, present a nounal interpretation of  disability. The 
purpose of  a model of  disability is to accurately and fully define the phenomena of  
disability, and over the last 50 years or so, these models have largely perceived 
‘disability’ as a noun which denotes a property possessed by a person, the person’s 
environment, or some combination of  the two; they promoted a nounal description. In 
contrast, the Picture Theory of  Disability offers a description of  disability that focusses 
on the manner in which daily-living tasks and goals-like-ours are impeded or 
frustrated — it promotes an adverbial account of  disability. The Picture Theory of  
Disability shows — in an adverbial way — the manner in which impairments get 
turned into disabling experiences. 
	 An adverbial account of  disability has many benefits over a nounal account: It 
offers a pragmatic description of  the experience of  disability; it is liberating to the 
disabled person as it does not hold the cause of  disability to be the fault of  the 
individual; it shows clearly the functional issues behind the experience of  disability — 
the frustration of  daily-living tasks and goals; it is able to encompass both socially and 
physically disabling experiences; it can account for disability if  experienced by ‘super-
functioning’ persons; and it accounts for the disabling experiences of  the mentally 
impaired as well as those with physical impairments. It is important for a model of  
disability to describe and demonstrate when, where, why, how and to whom disability is 
being experienced because ‘who is disabled’ is much less important than ‘how their 
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experience of  disability affects their life’. Such a model or theory should be able to 
properly report disabling experiences for all of  those who experience them (which is 
why it is important that a theory of  disability should be able to embrace mental 
impairments).  
	 The PTD incorporates Humean sympathy (in the form of  Naïve 
Sentimentalism) to yield a shared emotional response to observing the frustration or 
impediment to the conduct of  an activity. The sympathetic element permits a more 
holistic interpretation of  the picture. In cases where there is no great reduction in 
wellbeing, or where the reduction in wellbeing is not immediately apparent, sympathy 
permits a fuller explication of  the impediment and what effect that impediment might 
have on the individual. The built environment, on its own, is not immediately the 
cause: it is only in relation to an individual in pursuit of  a task or goal that we perceive 
how the environment does or does not suit the individual. Were we to see a young 
child playing on a high swing in a tar macadam playground littered with broken glass 
bottles, it is sympathy which brings us to feel concern for the child and the potential fall 
from that high swing. This sentimental element provides the PTD with a robust 
mechanism to evaluate the lived experience of  the individual’s relationship to the 
environment. Indeed, Naïve Sentimentalism, as presented here, may also provide the 
first step out of  the descriptive nature of  this model into a normative realm. An 
observer of  a picture might feel a strong desire — a conation — to ameliorate the state 
of  affairs as represented by the picture as it is shown, and it is this conation that 
provides the pathway to discussion of  how the problem presented by the picture can 
be addressed.  
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	 Therefore, Naïve Sentimentalism is an instrumental element of  the Picture 
Theory of  Disability. However, applying Naïve Sentimentalism requires a ‘Humean 
subject’, as distinct from the kind of  simple ‘metaphysical subject’ which could 
interpret Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory.  This requirement means that only Humean 369
subjects — only people who are able to respond emotionally to a picture — are able to 
apply a Picture Theory of  Disability analysis.  
	 In closing, then, the PTD is naturally limited to being a descriptive theory. I 
believe that investigating the normative elements of  disability before properly isolating 
and describing the phenomena itself  is somewhat akin to searching for The Titanic 
without knowing that The Titanic is a ship which sank over 100 years ago. In this 
respect, the Picture Theory of  Disability not only offers the best platform from which 
to investigate normative questions arising from the phenomena of  disability, but it also 
identifies the true nature of  disability itself  demonstrating that disabling experiences 
arise as a function of  impediment to goals-like-ours. What normative responses to the 
phenomena of  disability in light of  this alternative perspective on disability may 
present is an open question — one which further research in the area should help 
satisfy. 
 Russell, 2010, xxii.369
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7. APPENDIX 
The content of  this thesis is designed to be accessible across disciplines and to the lay-
reader. However, as is the nature of  all academic documents, there may be terms that 
have been employed but are unfamiliar to the reader. This appendix is provided for 
the reader’s benefit and contains elaboration on terms and names used in this thesis. It 
is important to note that some words have been used in a way specific to this work. If  
such a word is intended to be used differently from the original, steps have been take 
to state the original definition alongside the manner which they are used here. 
Atomic: 	 Simple or elementary — in the same way that an atom was once 
considered indivisible. For Wittgenstein, atomic meant something 
which did not depend on any other proposition. Griffin observes that a 
broom was, for Wittgenstein, a complex (being that it was made up of  
a stale and a brush). However, it is unclear whether or not a brush or a 
stale can — in their simplest forms — actually be considered a simple 
or indivisible object. C.f. ‘Object’. 
Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID): A rare and complex condition in which 
an individual has the profound feeling that some element of  their body 
is functional when they feel it should not be. The condition most often 
concerns the having of  a limb that the individual feels is not theirs — 
but may also include a disconnect with bodily functions such as 
continence or hearing. The feeling of  disconnect or dis-ownership can 
be so strong that certain individuals forego the use of  the faculty often 
employing un-needed aids such as braces or wheelchairs. However, the 
desire to be dispossessed of  a certain functionality can occasionally 
result in home-performed amputations or other personal interventions. 
Complex: 	 An entity or thing which depends upon another thing; one which must 
be further described by another proposition. An example for 
Wittgenstein might be a broom — which consists of  a stale and a 
brush. However, it should be pointed out that because what constitutes 
an ‘object’ is debatable, what constitutes a complex is equally 
uncertain. 
Conation: 	 The compelling feeling which a person experiences when they are 
brought to act; the motivation to act. This feeling is the feeling that 
encourages people to catch falling children or help those in pain. The 
orientation or urge to act often characteristic of  emotion. Hume 
maintains that the motivation to act (conation) is, in part, engendered 
through sympathy. 
Cultural Relativity; Relativism: The principle that a person’s individual beliefs, 
activities, and judgements should be understood in terms of  that 
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individual's own culture. First presented by Franz Boas in 1887 and 
then popularised by the development of  sociology and anthropology. A 
difficult challenge to theories of  morality is the problem of  how to 
account for the fact that some basic moral beliefs do not seem to be 
shared across cultures. 
Daily-living Task: These tasks differ for one individual to another (and possibly 
from one country to another), but they are the sorts of  tasks that it 
would be reasonable to assume would be desired by most humans: the 
ability to go to the toilet or brush teeth without assistance. However, in 
certain states, it may include the desire to go to work, or to be able to 
get to work using a vehicle or public transport. It may not include 
something like ‘drive a Ferrari’ unless it is reasonable for the individual 
in question to have a Ferrari.  
Descriptive: 	Statements present an account of  how the world is. The word is 
connected to ‘description' of  a given thing. Contrasts with 
‘normative’. 
Difference: 	 In terms of  disability studies, difference most often means ‘a difference 
from bio-statistical norm’ or ‘atypically embodied’. I prefer ‘different’ 
as it makes no claim of  biological reference (it does not refer to a level 
of  ‘normality’). The point being that the difference could be from you 
or me, or from other disabled persons. I use the term to suggest that 
difference is natural — perhaps not statistically dominant — but a 
common and repeated diversity of  the species. I think it improper to 
hold up a certain Platonic ideal of  human form and compare all other 
humans to it. Better to suggest that there is just internal diversity of  the 
species and ‘difference’, as doing so, implies no pejorative connotation. 
Disability, a: There are as many different definitions of  ‘disability’ as there are 
models which describe the phenomenon. One mid-ground definition 
might be something like: Disability is the resultant impact on the life of  
a person caused by the physical or mental barriers that person 
experiences. In colloquial terms, ‘disability’ is a term often used 
improperly to describe the ‘thing’ that a disabled person is said to have 
which engenders their not being able to do a certain activity. The term 
is often confused with ‘impairment’ (which, according to the medical 
model, is the thing which causes a disabled person to be disabled). This 
treatise sees ‘a disability’ to be the act or experience which engenders 
frustration in an individual and makes a given task of  daily-living or 
goal-like-ours to be difficult, frustrating, or vexing. The thesis offers no 
necessary or sufficient conditions for disability. 
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Disability, The Experience of: The functional irremediable impediment in 
performing a daily-living task or goal-like-ours which arises out of  a 
specific relationship between an individual and their environment. 
Disability Rights Movement (DRM): A generally consolidated activist movement 
of  disabled persons and allies who seek the emancipation of  disabled 
people. The movement’s beliefs largely arise as an emergent property 
of  smaller disability organisations. The movement appears holistic and 
well organised; they have amongst their number many academics who 
offer insights into disability from across the disciplines. The movement 
originated with the Disability Alliance in late 1975, but took years to 
evolve to hold the holistic beliefs that they currently purport. There is 
no ‘official’ movement, instead the movement is more organic, being 
composed of  many smaller cells and registered organisations. However, 
those smaller units largely proffer beliefs which are said to be those of  
the movement (or vice versa). Because the smaller organisations are 
made up of  disabled persons, the view held by ‘the movement’ tends to 
be the aggregate view of  the members of  the organisations. 
Evaluative/Normative: Contrast with ‘descriptive’. Normative statements present 
an account of  how the world should be. The process of  assessing a 
thing for its normative or moral content. More judgment based than 
the process of  description. 
Elementary: 	see Atomic. 
Elementary Proposition: A simple kind of  proposition; asserts the existence of  a 
‘state of  affairs’; a concatenation — a linking together to make one — 
of  names. Depending upon whether or not ‘objects’ are like ‘Russellian 
Particulars’, an elementary proposition may be something like ‘the cat 
is in the box’. An elementary proposition must contain only one name 
and says that that thing has a property. However, an elementary 
proposition may say of  two names that they have some sort of  relation. 
In general, any proposition expressed by an atomic sentence of  first 
order logic.  Expressed by combining an ordered n-tuple of  names and 
a predicate symbol.   
Environment: The environment is all of  that which is external to the individual and 
includes: the built environment, the particular and immediate 
environment in a picture, the beliefs of  the Social, and the 
infrastructure brought about in view of  those beliefs. It includes the 
social and political expectations, beliefs, and systems of  a state, as well 
as the distributive justice which that state provides. Such 
‘environments’ are very different from one location to another and I 
imagine that there are few (if  any) absolutes. 
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Epistemology; Epistemic: The study of  or relating to knowledge or those 
conditions under which we acquire knowledge. Occasionally 
considered to refer to that which we know about the world through 
perceiving it through the senses (though this is only part of  total 
epistemic knowledge). 
Eudaemonia: An ancient Greek concept roughly analogous to the idea of  ‘living 
well’, but more loosely translated and understood as ‘happiness’. 
Happiness was an ideal goal to work towards in ancient Greece and 
underpinned almost every belief  structure to one level or another. It 
should be pointed out that the concept was importantly different from 
the sort of  hedonistic notion of  happiness that we, today, understand 
from a life spent chasing possessions and experiences.  
Empiricism: 	The ideology that our concepts and knowledge only comes from our 
experiencing the world. 
Frege, Gottlob: German mathematician, logician, and Philosopher; 8 November 
1848 – 26 July 1925; Often considered to be the father of  analytic 
philosophy. Famous for his work in the philosophy of  language and 
mathematics; also considered to be a leading light in mathematics and 
logic. Probably his most famous and influential work is the Begriffsschrift. 
Gedankenexperiment: German for ‘a thought experiment’. A thought experiment 
may be used in many disciplines and is a mechanism used to imagine a 
particular scenario in order to consider a given issue more effectively 
and without expensive or impossible experimentation. They are often 
helpful in many fields of  study, for instance, Einstein’s theory of  
relativity is presented using thought experiments such as moving trains 
and elevators. Thought experiments, though, may take many forms. 
Occasionally, the thought experiment can be amplified to be 
considered a framing of  a particular work, as in Daniel Dennett’s 
paper “Where am I?”   
Goal; Goals-Like-Ours: These should be considered to be the same sorts of  goals 
that anyone can hold. They do not include things which would be 
impossible, for example, a ‘goal’ for me could not include becoming 
President of  the USA. Goals-like-ours should be more long term 
desires than daily-living tasks, are perhaps less privileged than daily-
living tasks (in that they can be more easily given up or lost), and are 
culturally relative: certain goals, such as having a better-than-
minimum-wage job are acceptable in some Western states, but perhaps 
too unrealistic in others. A goal to run a marathon as a blind person is 
reasonable in some states that have marathons, but perhaps not in 
states that have no marathons.  
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Hume, David: Scottish Philosopher, writer, and historian; 1711 – 1776. Wrote a 
number of  well respected works — though mot of  his contributions 
were considered unimpressive during his time. His philosophical 
contributions are now considered of  the highest order and Bertrand 
Russell said of  him that ‘to a certain degree, he represents a dead end: 
in his direction, it is impossible to go further’ (A History of  Western 
Philosophy). Hume is famous for his skepticism, empiricism, and 
naturalism. One of  his most influential works includes A Treatise on 
Human Nature which fell ‘dead-born’ (“My Own Life” by David Hume 
1776) from the press when written, but which is now considered one of  
his greatest contributions to philosophy. 
Hume’s Fork: A name given in later days to Hume’s notion that there are only two 
types of  human study:  ‘relations of  ideas’ and ‘matters of  fact and real 
existence. Of  the first kind are geometry, algebra, and maths, and the 
second includes everything else. The former can be considered 
statements about ideas: a Priori, and the latter statements about the 
world: a Posteriori. This division is important as another postulate of  
Hume’s, the problem of  induction, suggests that we cannot be sure in 
our knowledge of  anything understood through the senses — more 
explicitly, that we cannot be sure in any ‘matters of  fact’. Hume was 
thus considered a skeptic (though, also an empiricist — despite his 
problem of  induction). 
Impairment:	Most often defined as ‘the loss or lack of  physical or mental function’. 
However, I prefer to use the term in the broader sense meaning: a 
physical or psychological difference (different in a similar way to which 
a yellow nib (a kind of  the marble toys) is ‘different’ from a blue nib, or 
a green nib, or a ‘dobber', or a ‘crystal') in anatomical structure or 
function which may or may not contribute towards a person’s 
experiencing a disability. I would largely agree with Wasserman that 
“impairments are generally seen as traits of  the individual that he or 
she cannot readily alter.”   370
Libertarian: 	A political philosophy whose mandate holds that liberty is its principal 
objective. Libertarians seek to maximise autonomy and freedom of  
choice. This political view arises out of  the moral belief  that agents 
have full autonomy and have certain moral right to acquire property 
rights in external things. From a hard Libertarian position, taxation is 
improper as individuals are entitled to all their money, and 
consequently, that the welfare state is unacceptable. In short, an 
advocate or defender of  personal liberty. 
 Wasserman, Asch, Blustein, and Putnam, Fall 2013 Edition.370
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Logical Atomism: The idea that the world consists of  ultimate logical ‘facts’ or 
simples (hence the ‘atom’) that are unable to be broken down any 
further; a thing which depends upon no other proposition. This theory 
was proffered by Russell, Carnap, and Wittgenstein. These facts 
contain objects or ‘particulars’ and these objects can be named. 
Macro Object: Larger object; the sort of  everyday object which Wittgenstein might 
have considered a ‘complex’. Something like a broom, a cat, a car, or a 
wheelchair. 
Meaning: 	 See ‘Sense’. 
Medical Model (MM): Occasionally known as the Bio-Statistical theory. This model 
holds that persons are disabled due to deviation from species-typical 
norm. 
Mental Impairment; Illness; Disorder: An ‘impairment’ is traditionally defined 
as a loss or lack of  function — what is or is not considered to be a 
mental impairment is, thus, quite unclear. As functionality is relative 
and subjective, what constitutes a loss or lack of  function is difficult to 
exactly determine. It is, in part, this issue that has made mental 
impairments so difficult for other models to embrace. For the purpose 
of  this thesis, I consider mental illness and mental disorder to be the 
same as mental impairment, and I use the terms interchangeably. 
However, it should be noted that there are important distinctions 
between them (though this distinction is a medical one which I cannot 
engage here). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental 
Disorders (DSM) is on its 5th edition, and some of  its content is 
considered controversial. Boorse appealed to a similar sort of  book to 
determine what was or what was not an unhealthy state. I have no 
intention of  making such an egregious error. We might suggest that the 
DSM presents what is largely considered to be the full spectrum of  
mental disorders — and such disorders may be more or less 
debilitating. Some mental disorders do not disable or disadvantage the 
individual in question, whereas some are profoundly disadvantaging. A 
mental impairment, at least as far as the PTD is concerned, is a mental 
disorder (that may or may not be mentioned in the DSM) that is 
sufficiently problematic as to cause the individual to experience 
difficulty in certain areas — especially those that affect the achieving of  
daily-living tasks or goals. As such, may include things like Dyslexia, 
OCD, ADHD, Asperger’s etc., but is unlikely to include something like 
Sociopathy or Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 
Moral Sentimentalism: Largely, the idea that our desires and emotions play a 
leading role in the anatomy of  morality. There are many species of  
moral sentimentalism, such as epistemological sentimentalism and 
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metaphysical sentimentalism. Hume’s model arose from the 
development of  a theory presented by the 7th Earl of  Shaftesbury, 
whose moral sentimentalism holds that the main object of  moral 
evaluation is the motivation (he called it ‘affection’) behind that action. 
It is a sort of  judgement or reflection upon this action and how the 
action makes the observer feel, that is the source of  approbation or 
condemnation of  that act — and by extension, the person acting. 
Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME): Also: systemic exertion intolerance disease 
(SEID), post-viral fatigue syndrome (PVFS), chronic fatigue immune 
dysfunction syndrome (CFIDS), and many others. A long term chronic 
condition characterised by periods of  extreme tiredness and general 
fatigue. The conditions are often so severe that they limit a person's 
ability to carry out ordinary daily activities. Many medical causes have 
been hypothesised, but the condition remains enigmatic and difficult 
(and occasionally, impossible) to treat. ME is currently diagnosed based 
entirely on a patients lived-experience, and as much, the medical 
model has a great deal of  difficulty responding to it. 
Naïve Sentimental Theory (NST): In the Humean chapter, a response to the 
current models of  disability were presented — these included a 
syncretism of  the social and medical models by virtue of  Humean 
sympathy as well as a second tool in the Usefulness Clause. The 
limitations, criticisms, and unifications together with sympathy, 
conation, and the Usefulness clause, are to be considered the Naïve 
Sentimental Theory and offer a naïve view of  the phenomena of  
disability. The PTD incorporates NST in conjunction with the picture 
theory to permit the observer to make an evaluation of  the picture and 
determine whether or not a disabling experience is present. 
Normalise: 	 The process of  augmenting an impaired person in a manner that ‘fixes’ 
their impairment or helps to make them more ‘normal’. Such a 
modification may include the use of  prosthetics, or cochlear implants, 
or be as invasive as surgery. Curiously, individuals born differently 
formed rarely desire prosthetics, but people who acquire impairments 
often prefer them.  
Normalisation: The process of  augmenting a physiology in order to assume a more 
regular appearance, gait, ability. The medical fraternity, who assume 
that species typical norms are desirable, are often responsible for 
encouraging, from an early age, the adoption of  certain prosthetics or 
aids. This technique has been heavily criticised and its success is 
debatable. The term derives from the suggestion that providing a 
prosthetic or enabling a certain sense returns the individual to 
‘normal’. The social model believes that the desires of  society to have 
!171
The Picture Theory of  Disability!
members largely similar in physiology is, instead, the motive behind the 
action and criticises the practice. 
Normative/Evaluative: Contrasts with ‘descriptive’. In its simplest form, 
‘normative’ relates to evaluative statements about how a thing ought to 
be. Importantly different from statements that contain the words 
‘could’, ‘ought’, or ’would’. Makes moral claims; this thing is good, that 
thing is bad. 
Object: 	 Complicated and contentious. An atomistic entity which has no 
subordinate attributes; a simple — some ‘thing’ (entity) which does not 
depend upon any other proposition for its explanation. Depending 
upon the preferred interpretation of  a Tractarian object, it may be 
something like a stick, or a cat. However, other interpretations will 
force the Tractarian object to be something like an atom — or at least 
force the object to be the sort of  thing that does not contain parts. 
Objects are things, not properties (close sometimes to bare particulars 
— certainly as treated in First Order Logic).  
Person with Disability; Disabled Person: Largely depends upon the model used 
to define disability. The social model describes disabled people as those 
who experience repression, oppression, and disadvantage because of  
society’s expectations. The medical model defines disability as 
functional deviance from bio-statistical norm. The welfarist account 
defines persons with disability as those persons whose well being is 
reduced as a function of  their physiology. The Picture Theory of  
Disability holds that there are no such things as disabled people: there 
are, instead, persons who experience functional difficulty, vexation, or 
frustration in the conduct of  a specific daily-living task or goal as a 
result of  some special and unique connexion between themselves and 
their environment. 
Picture:	 In the sense used for this thesis, a picture could be a gif  or short video 
— it could also be an imagined picture (mind image of  reality) or a 
simple photograph. The most powerful and useful could be something 
like a short animated gif  of  a particular event. A picture contains 
multiple macro objects, imparts the knowledge that a certain task or 
goal is being attempted, and is discursive in that the observer may 
question persons in the picture for more information on their 
experience of  that picture. It is designed to be both being interpreted 
as a thought experiment, or being an actual replication of  reality. The 
objects in the picture must reach out to real objects, though; and they 
must stand in the same relation as the objects in real life. The picture 
— even if  a thought experiment — must be something that is (or could 
be) real. 
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Picture Theory of  Disability (PTD): A theory of  disability which seeks to define 
the phenomena of  disability as adverbial rather than nounal. In short, 
it is a mechanism to determine when disability is or is not being 
experienced. A person experiences disability when they experience a 
functional relationship engendering an unremitting or irremediable 
difficulty, frustration, or vexation in the conduction of  daily-living tasks 
or goals as a result of  a specific relationship between a person and their 
immediate environment. 
Pity: 	 Noun: the feeling for others — mostly feelings of  sorrow or sadness. 
Usually evoked by someone or something that is suffering, in pain, or 
in distress. Verb (with or without object): to feel or be compassionate to; 
to have or to feel pity. The potential for condescension and superiority 
has been pointed out by the DRM who vehemently disapprove of  pity 
as an appropriate sentiment; one of  the slogans used in the ‘90s was 
‘Piss on Pity’ — it is still employed in activist demonstrations. Pity is 
heavily used by Hume in the Treatise. However, it should be noted that 
the ‘pity’ to which Hume was referring was unlikely to carry the same 
emotional baggage as it does now. 
Predicate: 	 The part of  a sentence which tells you more about the subject — what 
they have, are doing, have been etc. In the sentence ‘Mum is weeding 
the garden’, ‘Mum’ is the subject, and ‘is weeding the garden’ is the 
predicate. The predicate is everything in the sentence which relates to 
the subject. 
Proposition: 	In logic, a proposition is simply something which is either true or false 
— Both atomic propositions (propositions that contain only one name) 
and molecular ones (those that contain multiple names) count. That 
which contains more than one elementary proposition linked together 
with a logical connective like ‘and’ or ‘or’; a description of  a state of  
affairs might be considered to be complex propositions. Where an 
elementary proposition might be something like ‘the cat is in the box’, 
depending upon whether or not objects are like Russellian Particulars, 
a proposition may be something like ‘the cat is in the box and the cat is 
dead’.  
QALY: 	 The Quality Adjusted Life Year; an evaluative metric to determine the 
cost efficiency of  a particular medical intervention. The QALY seeks to 
estimate the increase in quality of  life from any given medical 
procedure. It then evaluates that increase against the cost of  the 
intervention. The QALY is a Utilitarian response to the problem of  
health care efficiency. However, a number of  papers (including one by 
myself) have criticised the idea that the QALY is a proper Utilitarian 
response. This metric is employed, in one form or another, in most of  
the Western health care systems. 
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Quadriplegic: Similar to ‘paraplegic’ but with anatomical differences which also 
involve the arms. A quadriplegic individual may have both arms and 
legs but be unable to use them (as in paralysis), or an individual born 
with anatomical differences in the limbs. Thomas Inglefield was a 
quadriplegic. Paraplegia is a term used to describe people with 
anatomical differences in the lower limbs or people who are unable to 
operate their lower limbs. 
Qualia: 	 From Latin, quālis; meaning ‘of  what sort’ or ‘of  what kind’. A 
Philosophical term referencing individual instances of  subjective, 
conscious experience — an individual’s own sense perceptions. The 
notion behind your enjoyment of  peanut butter, and my hatred of  it. 
Your sense perception is your own, and so are everyone else’s. 
Rawls, John: 	American moral and political philosopher; 1921 - 2002. He wrote a 
profound work of  moral and political philosophy called A Theory of  
Justice which was called by Gordon Davis “the most important work in 
moral philosophy since the end of  World War II.” The work has been 
heavily influential in philosophy and Political Science. The work’s 
mantra holds that: “the most reasonable principles of  justice are those 
everyone would accept and agree to from a fair position” (A Theory of  
Justice. p. 774-5). 
Relation: 	 The specific correspondence in which one object stands to another. For 
Wittgenstein, relations need to be logical — we can say that the woman 
is sitting in the chair, or that the computer is on the desk, but we 
cannot say that the tank hovers in mid air (because tanks are not the 
sorts of  things that hover in mid air). For the PTD, macro objects can 
have roughly descriptive relations — but they must also have accurate 
and real relations. If, in a picture a man is running up some stairs, it 
cannot be that the real world shows the man sat in a wheelchair 
running up the stairs. 
Russell, Bertrand: A British logician, philosopher, mathematician, historian, 
political activist, and social critic; 1872 – 1970. Alongside other 
philosophers of  significant repute (such as Frege, and Wittgenstein), he 
is also considered a father of  analytic philosophy. He is considered one 
of  the most approachable writers of  philosophy with his papers being 
clear and easy to read yet profound and rigorous. His paper “On 
Denoting” has been referred to as a ‘paradigm of  philosophy’. He is 
also considered a logical atomist. One of  his great works, Principia 
Mathmatica was written with friend and colleague A. N. Whitehead. 
Russellian Particular: Loosely speaking, a ‘particular’ is that to which a predicate 
can apply. The Russellian particular had a bundle like nature in that 
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there is no such thing as a ‘bowl’, but that bowls were the sorts of  
things that had bowl-like properties: that they are curved to retain 
fluids, that they are somewhat solid, that they have weight, and a 
certain form etc. A name can pick out a certain bowl, the concept of  
bowl belongs to no such particular object, and in that respect is rather 
Humean — that is, there is no underlying 'particular' beyond the 
collection of  properties that particular has.  
Sense: 	 Used by Wittgenstein and Frege to refer to the meaning or idea behind 
a proposition. Any proposition whose names did not pick out actual 
Tractarian objects would be, for Wittgenstein, nonsense — literally, no 
sense. Think of  the statement ‘Steven drew a square circle’, though the 
statement can be said (is a propositional sign) there is a disconnect 
between the statement and the objects in the proposition; the statement 
can have no sense because no such object as a square circle can exist in 
the real world (and so the proposition cannot pick out a name (square 
circle), as there is no object to match that name. Wittgenstein’s point 
was that we often use such statements in natural language and think 
that they do some work when in essence, they are saying nothing. 
Simple: 	 An entity or thing which does not depend upon any other proposition. 
See ‘Object’.  
Skepticism:	 A philosophical school of  thought, epitomised by Hume and others 
but, which originated in Ancient Greeks and was taken to its 
extremities by the Pyrrhonists. The school holds that knowledge 
requires a rigorous justification for the reason for that belief. 
Social, The: 	 A sociological term used as an objectless noun to refer to aspects of  
human life which involve interaction, social institutions, collective 
beliefs, solidarity, etc., but that do not restrict that referent to a specific 
social body, which ‘society’ would imply. 
Social Model (SM): Often known as the British Social Model. The model of  
disability that holds that disabled persons are disadvantaged by the 
expectations of  a society and by the way in which society is 
constructed. Various ‘weak’ versions of  the social model have been 
postulated which syncretise elements of  the medical models or other 
beliefs to soften the strict interpretation of  the social models. These 
weaker social models are sometimes considered ‘relational models’. 
Social Disability: The concept of  Social Disability is largely unclear and has not 
been well defined. It is generally regarded as relating to a person’s lack 
of  inclusion, equality, or opportunity in a certain society. Such 
disability does not have to be a function of  any given impairment — it 
is possible that a well rounded, capable, intellectual person may 
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experience social disability for their interest in a certain science fiction 
world, for example. These experiences may also be presented in terms 
of  social shunning, few friends, bullying, belittlement, and might result 
in the generation of  profound mental insecurities which may 
compound the situation. Social disability is related to disability (in 
general) and may be considered a sub-set of  disability — but because it 
may engender an unremitting frustration, difficulty, or vexation in the 
conduction of  daily-living tasks or goals, the PTD considers Social 
Disability to be ontologically equal with general disability. 
Ontology; Ontological: A branch of  philosophy that deals with the manner or 
nature of  being. Often used to describe the hierarchy of  things on a 
given scale, or to reference things that are of  equal status given a 
certain type. 
Sociopath: 	 Often considered to be identical to Psychopathy — though sometimes 
considered by others to be importantly different. The difference 
suggested is that sociopaths are created as a function of  their social 
environment during their formative years, and that psychopaths are 
generally born with the characteristics. Sociopathy is mostly described 
as a personality disorder which is characterised by generally antisocial 
behaviour, disinhibited or bold behaviour, and diminished empathy 
and remorse. 
State of  Affairs: A combination of  objects which when they exist is a fact or ‘what is 
the case’.  In a state of  affairs, objects stand in determinate relation to 
each other. Logical propositions may be used to indicate a state of  
affairs. 
Sympathy: 	 In the sense used in this thesis, it relates to Hume’s moral 
sentimentalism and portrays the notion that we are able to feel another 
persons passions when we look at them because they are much like us 
(as humans). The word used today would be ‘empathy’ — though there 
may be important nuances that make it importantly different. These 
nuances have not been engaged in this thesis.  
Syncretism: 	The combining of  different (sometimes contradictory) beliefs or 
ideologies, whilst blending practices of  various schools of  thought. 
Discrete traditions are amalgamated or merged in the process 
permitting an underlying unity and inclusive approach.  
Tractatus, The: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by Ludwig Wittgenstein. First published 
in 1921. A short book written by Ludwig Wittgenstein which sought to 
detail a logical language in which all of  the elements of  the world 
could be properly named and spoken about. The book has both 
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received critical acclaim and significant criticism. It is considered a 
significant work in Logical atomism. 
Tractarian: 	 Of  or relating to the Tractatus.   
Unremitting: Something that is protracted in that it occurs over a relatively long 
period of  time; importantly distinct from ‘continuous’. The effects from 
a broken knee can be disabling — and they are certainly unremitting 
for a certain period of  time. However, having only one arm is also 
unremitting — but for a much greater length of  time. A person with 
ME may experience fairly lengthy periods of  good health — but their 
condition is un-remitting in the sense that it will not go away. All of  
these examples are satisfactorily ‘unremitting’. 
War Doctor: 	Either the 12th or the 8th incarnation (depending upon your 
perspective of  timelines) of  the titular character from the long running 
British television show Doctor Who. The program features a long-lived 
alien who has a self  professed soft spot for humans and is often found 
saving the universe. The 12th (or 8th) incarnation ‘was the Doctor 
when it was not possible to be the Doctor’. Given the epithet ‘War 
Doctor’ for his experiences during the great time war. Much of  his 
timeline remains a mystery. 
Welfarist Account: A theory of  disability presented by Savulescu and Kahane which 
suggests that disability should refer to any stable physical or 
psychological property of  an individual that engenders a significant 
reduction of  that person’s level of  wellbeing in a given circumstance. 
They caution that such a property should exclude the effect that this 
condition has on wellbeing due to prejudice against that person by 
members of  their society. 
Wheelchair User: A person who uses a wheelchair as an aid. Such an individual 
may or may not be able to walk. A wheelchair should be considered an 
aid in the same way that glasses are an aid to myopic individuals. It is 
improper to suggest that all wheelchair uses are ‘bound’ to their chairs 
(for several reasons — apart from the fact that most wheelchair users 
are not tied into their chairs at all). 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: A German born engineer, philosopher, logician, and 
mathematician; 1889 — 1951. Wittgenstein wrote only a few books of  
interest — though these books have remained very influential. One of  
the logical atomists (along with Russell and Carnap) and much of  his 
early and later work was involved in the area. His most famous work, 
the Tractatus was sufficient in itself  to earn him his Ph.D., and its 
content has become much discussed and critiqued. 
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